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1.1 Introduction
Innovation is the main driver of growth and the wealth of nations. As emphasized by
Porter (1992, p. 65), “[t]o compete effectively in international markets, a nation’s busi-
nesses must continuously innovate and upgrade their competitive advantages. Innovation
and upgrading come from sustained investment in physical as well as intangible assets.”
Given the importance of innovation for competitiveness, it is a priority to understand
those factors that determine incentives to innovate at the firm level. There has been
much debate on the role of financial markets in promoting innovation. While developed
capital markets can improve the efficiency of long-term resource allocation through their
monitoring and disciplining mechanisms, the need to meet quarterly or annual financial
objectives gives rise to adverse externalities that may impair firms’ incentives to innovate
(Holmstro¨m, 1989; Porter, 1992).1
In this paper, we focus on one cornerstone of public equity markets, namely finan-
cial derivatives. Specifically, we study whether the volume of equity options written on
the underlying asset encourages or impedes firm innovation. Since the beginning of the
new century, the total equity options volume traded on U.S. exchanges has grown ex-
ponentially, from 676 million contracts in 2000 to over 3,727 million contracts in 2015.2
Unlike stock market listings, where firms apply, options listings are exogenous to firm de-
cisions; they are made within exchanges. These exchanges are self-regulating institutions
that are members of the Options Clearing Organization (OCC) which operates under
the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (for exchange-listed
options). Because the SEC plays an important role in determining the eligibility criteria
for securities in options trading, this topic is of particular interest to policy makers.3
Did the significant rise in the volume of trading undermine innovative efforts or did
it encourage firms to invest in innovation? We argue that for firms that are listed on
options markets, greater trading activity is associated with an increased propensity to
innovate. The literature suggests that active options markets alter incentives for mar-
ket participants to gather private information that is especially relevant for long-term
investments, and trading on such information makes stock prices more efficient (e.g., Cao,
1999; Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew, 2004; Pan and Poteshman, 2006; Hu, 2014). If
1Laurence D. Fink, chairman and CEO of BlackRock, recently summed this up in a letter to S&P
500 CEOs that BlackRock invests in (Business Insider, April 14, 2015): “Over the past several years at
BlackRock, we have engaged extensively with companies, clients, regulators and others on the importance
of taking a long-term approach to creating value. We have done so in response to the acute pressure,
growing with every quarter, for companies to meet short-term financial goals at the expense of building
long-term value. This pressure originates from a number of sources – the proliferation of activist share-
holders seeking immediate returns, the ever-increasing velocity of capital, a media landscape defined by the
24/7 news cycle and a shrinking attention span, and public policy that fails to encourage truly long-term
investment.”
2See Options Clearing Corporation.
3See Mayhew and Mihov (2004) for initial listing requirements.
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stock prices are more efficient, other types of (perhaps less-informed) investors learn more
about the fundamental value of the firm, which reduces some of the asymmetric informa-
tion problems connected to R&D. Because prices play an active role (i.e., managers learn
from prices) when investment decisions are made, this should then provide firm manage-
ment with more incentives to engage in value-enhancing innovative activities. Note that
informed agents in financial markets can ameliorate asymmetric information related to
innovative activities is widely recognized in the literature (e.g., Hall and Lerner, 2010;
Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales, 2013; He and Tian, 2013).4
In this paper, we focus on whether options trading spurs firm innovation in the context
of R&D-intensive industries. We believe that these firms provide an ideal research setting
for our study. For firms that invest more heavily in R&D, innovation is a core component
of their competitive strategy, but they might also be forced to make only partial disclosure
and be subject to a larger degree of information asymmetry (Bhattacharya and Ritter,
1983; Anton and Yao, 2002). It follows that these firms are more likely to be undervalued
by equity holders and have a greater exposure to hostile takeovers (Stein, 1988). More-
over, survey evidence by Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) shows that managers in
technology-intensive industries are more prone to sacrifice long-term sustainability to meet
desired short-term earnings targets, relative to managers in other industries, due to their
personal wealth and career concerns. They explain that meeting earnings benchmarks
(particularly the same quarter earnings from the previous year) helps to maintain a firm’s
current stock price. Taken together, if the enhanced informational efficiency induced by
options leads to better monitoring by reducing information asymmetries, making firms
more willing to invest in innovation, we claim that this mechanism is particularly relevant
for firms operating in R&D-intensive industries.
To test this conjecture, we assemble a rich and original dataset containing time-varying
information on standard measures of innovation based on U.S. patent data, R&D, options
trading, governance, etc. To approximate the total annual dollar options volume, we use
the approach proposed by Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2009). We run panel data
regressions on a sample of 548 publicly traded U.S. firms during the period from 1996 to
2004. This sample consists of large firms that are active in five broadly defined high-tech
sectors, where we observe high patenting propensities, and patents have been recognized
as a meaningful indicator of innovation at the firm level (as explained in Section 1.3).
Our baseline test reveals a positive association between innovation and options trad-
ing. Options trading has a positive impact on R&D spending but a larger positive effect
4If we believe that informed agents can reduce information asymmetries related to innovative activities
and that the stock market is an efficient resource allocation mechanism, then the “prospective role”
(Dow and Gorton, 1997) in which stock prices provide managers with relevant information for investment
decisions could generate the same prediction. Our focus on the disciplining role of stock prices (as
in Holmstro¨m and Tirole, 1993) is a natural choice for understanding the role of options trading in
innovation, although we consider the two approaches to be complementary.
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on the quality and/or productivity of R&D (i.e., citations per dollar of R&D invested).
These results are robust to using alternative sub-samples, alternative measures of innova-
tion, the inclusion of a wide range of control variables, lagged explanatory variables and
several econometric models. While these findings are consistent with the beneficial effect
of the production and aggregation of information in options markets, we have concerns
that our results could be biased if informed agents trade on the basis of unobservable char-
acteristics that are correlated with options volume and innovation. We account for such
selection issues by weighting sample observations using their propensity score of having
high levels of options trading and by estimating two-stage least squares (2SLS) models
using moneyness and open interest as instrumental variables. Overall, our identification
tests suggest that the positive correlation between options trading and innovation is not
simply driven by self-selection.
We extend these baseline results in two main directions. First, we examine the link
between options trading and three measures of innovative direction: (i) a measure based
on the diversity of patents applied for by the firm across technological classes, (ii) the Hall,
Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) measure of patent originality and (iii) a measure of risk-
taking behaviour based on the standard deviation of citations received across patents. The
results suggest that more active option markets are associated with a change in direction
and not just an increase in R&D spending and productivity.
Second, we attempt to identify the underlying economic mechanism through which
this link occurs. Our results could be explained by two hypotheses. On the one hand, the
results could be driven by the reasoning that poorly governed managers prefer to avoid
the difficult decisions and costly efforts associated with innovation and that the informa-
tion conveyed by more active options markets “forces” managers to innovate if they are
a priori reluctant to do so (i.e., managers prefer the quiet life as in Bertrand and Mul-
lainathan (2003)). On the other hand, the results could be consistent with the prediction
that increased monitoring “shields” managers against those reputational consequences
(i.e., career concerns as in Holmstro¨m (1989, 1999)) that are more likely to occur when
managers invest in innovation. Potential consequences occur because innovation involves
a high probability of failure, and the innovation process is unpredictable and idiosyncratic,
with many future contingencies that are impossible to foresee. In line with recent evidence
by Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) in the context of institutional investors, we
find strong support for the career concerns story. We show that the positive effect of
options trading on innovation is more pronounced when product market competition is
more intense, when CEOs are less “entrenched”, and for younger CEOs. Moreover, we
provide evidence that the positive effect of more active options markets on innovation is
magnified for firms that face a decline in profitability and remains substantial even after
accounting for executive compensation schemes.
Although we follow standard procedures in using patent counts weighted by forward
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citations as a proxy for innovation, we must admit that one of the main limitations of
our study is that we cannot completely exclude the possibility that our results may be
partially driven by managerial signalling motives. This is because one common down-
side in studies based on patents is that they are an indirect measure of innovation and
contain no information on non-patentable inventions or inventions held in secrecy. We
believe, however, that limiting our study to industries in which patenting represents the
most important mechanism used by these firms to protect their intellectual property for
appropriability and/or strategic reasons mitigates such concerns.
While there is a growing literature that links a variety of financial market character-
istics to innovation, to the best of our knowledge, such an analysis of the relationship
between options trading and innovation has not previously been undertaken. Empirical
studies have examined, for instance, the effect of institutional ownership on innovation
(Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales, 2013), analyst coverage (He and Tian, 2013), credit
supply (Amore, Schneider, and Zˇaldokas, 2013), stock liquidity (Fang, Tian, and Tice,
2014), leveraged buyouts (Lerner, Sorensen, and Stro¨mberg, 2011), investors’ failure tol-
erance (Tian and Wang, 2014), the decision to go public (Bernstein, 2015) and the de-
velopment stage of financial markets (Hsu, Tian, and Xu, 2014). There is very little on
the role played by options (or more general financial derivatives) in the R&D process of
publicly traded firms.
However, the possibility that active options markets are beneficial to the firm has
also been examined by another paper. Specifically, Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam
(2009) find that options trading activity increases firm value through its impact on price
informativeness. However, because greater informational efficiency tends to make an asset
more valuable because it reduces the risk of investing in it, these results require further
examination. Although several other studies also conclude that resources are allocated
more efficiently if prices convey more information, which in turn leads to greater firm
value (e.g., Khanna, Slezak, and Bradley, 1994; Dow and Gorton, 1997; Subrahmanyam
and Titman, 1999; Durnev, Morck, and Yeung, 2004; Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2007),
there is little empirical evidence of this effect on innovation. We view our study as
complementary to Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2009) because we take option
markets’ effect on prices as given and aim to explain how this influences firms’ incentives
to innovate. Thus, the main contribution of our paper is to provide a direct link between
options trading and the extent to which the firm allocates resources to innovation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the related
literature in greater detail. Section 1.3 describes the sample, the measurement of variables
and descriptive statistics. In Section 1.4, we present our main results. In Section 1.5, we
discuss the underlying mechanism through which options trading may affect innovation.
Section 1.6 concludes the paper.
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1.2 Related Literature
Our paper borrows from different strands of the literature. Our starting point is the
recognition that options stimulate informed trades and that the informational benefit of
options depends on the trading volume. Almost 40 years ago, Ross (1976) was the first to
argue that options trading can convey important information in a market with information
asymmetry by expanding the contingencies that are covered by traded securities. Apart
from reducing information asymmetry, Black (1975) notes that informed traders could
use options markets as an alternative venue for trading because option contracts provide
higher leverage. Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998) argue that options can be more
attractive for informed traders because the availability of multiple contracts confronts
uninformed traders with substantial challenges. In a similar vein, Cao (1999) suggests
that agents with private information should be able to trade more effectively on their
information in the presence of options, thus improving price informativeness. Moreover,
options are a mechanism for trading on information about future equity volatility, which
allows investors with information about stock price volatility to benefit from options (Ni,
Pan, and Poteshman, 2008). These notions are further supported by Chakravarty, Gulen,
and Mayhew (2004) and Pan and Poteshman (2006), who find that options order flows
contain information about the future direction of the underlying asset. More recently, Hu
(2014) shows that an options-induced imbalance significantly predicts future stock returns.
Taken together, these works provide strong support for the conjecture that informational
efficiency may be greater in the presence of options.
A firm’s informational benefit from options, however, should depend on the volume
of options traded, beyond the presence of an options market on the firm’s stock per
se (as in Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam, 2009). For example, due to the maxim
that “liquidity attracts liquidity”, informed agents would be more willing to trade on
their private information in markets with high trading volume since they allow them to
camouflage their trades (Kyle, 1985; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). In contrast, if informed
traders perceive a low-liquidity options market, they optimally desist from trading and
this belief becomes self-fulfilling (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988; Chowdhry and Nanda,
1991). It follows that the enhancement of the benefit from listing should be directly
related to whether the market for the listed options has sufficient volume because then
informed traders would be more active.
Second, our paper builds on the literature that interacts information production (i.e.,
price informativeness) with investment decisions in firms. The idea that the production
and aggregation of information as a consequence of trading between speculators and in-
vestors can be useful for the provision of incentives in firms is a relatively recent one.
Specifically, Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1993) and Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004) exam-
ine the role of price informativeness in disciplining managers and providing incentives to
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insiders to engage in value-increasing activities. Dow and Gorton (1997) show that, in
equilibrium, the information contained in stock prices can be used to guide investment de-
cisions because managers are compensated based on future stock prices. Subrahmanyam
and Titman (1999) study a setting in which investors may obtain information unavailable
to firm insiders that is useful in making investment decisions. They show that if such
information is freely available to outsiders, the firm chooses to go public. Empirically,
for example, Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) show that U.S. industries and firms ex-
hibiting larger firm-specific return variation make better capital budgeting decisions. The
findings in Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) suggest that firm managers learn from pri-
vate information concerning their own firms’ fundamentals contained in stock prices by
incorporating stock price information into corporate investment decisions. Foucault and
Gehrig (2008) show that cross-listing enables firms to obtain more precise information on
the value of their growth opportunities, which allows managers to make better investment
decisions. Finally, Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo (2011) provide evidence that if prices
are more efficient, the stock market is able to play a monitoring role that can reinforce
internal and external monitoring mechanisms, although the sign of this relationship is
ambiguous (i.e., they can interact as either complements or substitutes).
Our particular focus is on how the enhanced informational efficiency induced by op-
tions can “boost” managerial incentives to invest in innovation. Stein (1989) shows that
even in rational capital markets, firms take actions to improve current earnings at the
expense of lower future earnings in an attempt to misguide the market. Shleifer and
Vishny (1990) offer a different argument that leads to the same conclusion. Because arbi-
trage is cheaper for short-term assets than for long-term assets, the latter must be more
mispriced in equilibrium for net returns to be equal. It follows that managers may forgo
investment opportunities in long-term projects because the uncertainty of these assets can
take a long time to disappear. The empirical literature has shown evidence consistent with
managerial short-termism in publicly traded firms. For example, Asker, Farre-Mensa, and
Ljungqvist (2015) find that compared to unlisted firms, listed firms tend to invest less and
their investment levels are less sensitive to changes in investment opportunities. Bushee
(1998) shows that firms are more prone to cut R&D in response to a decline in earnings
when a very large proportion of institutional owners are investors that often trade in and
out of individual stocks.
Based on the streams of literature reviewed above, we argue that a potential solution to
the distortion of innovative investment due to agency problems is active options markets.
The intuition is the following. In the presence of option market participants who engage in
monitoring, informed agents move the stock price towards the fundamental value and thus
cause it to more closely reflect the effort exerted by the manager to enhance long-term
risky investment decisions. Because other financial market participants (especially firm
investors) may have difficulties properly evaluating managerial investment decisions in
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innovation (Stein, 1988), they can use stock prices as a signal of whether informed traders
agree or disagree with the allocation of corporate resources and can decide whether to
take action (as in Edmans and Manso, 2011). For example, if investors discover that the
manager is good despite bad public information, they will be more willing to retain their
shares because they will expect higher returns. Alternatively, they can directly use the
threat of disciplinary trading and can sell more if information turns out to be negative,
causing the stock price to drop.
1.3 Data and Methods
We examine the effect of options trading on innovation in the context of publicly traded
U.S. firms in the following five industries: (i) pharmaceuticals (SIC code 283), (ii) in-
dustrial and commercial machinery and computer equipment (35), (iii) electronics and
communications (36), (iv) transportation equipment (37), and (v) instruments and re-
lated products (38). A trade-off made in the design of our study was to limit the sample
to these five industries and not to consider the entire manufacturing universe. We ensured
that these industries represent a broad spectrum.5 Nevertheless, we exercised caution in
selecting these specific industries for several reasons. First, R&D has been and continues
to be vital for the long-run competitive advantage of firms operating in these industries. In
fact, these sectors have the highest ratio between R&D expenditure and net sales among
all industries (OECD, 2013). Second, these industries also form an apt context because
of how they protect and document their inventions. Patenting (on which our dependent
variables are based) is an important mechanism to protect intellectual property (Levin,
Klevorick, Nelson, Winter, Gilbert, and Griliches, 1987) and firms tend to patent most
patentable inventions. In particular, Mansfield (1986) shows that our sample industries
are characterized by high patenting propensities relative to most other industries. Third,
patents are a meaningful measure of innovation in these industries. The association be-
tween patents and technological innovation is likely to be stronger in industries in which
patents provide firms with fairly strong protection of their intellectual property.6 Acs,
Anselin, and Varga (2002) conclude that the measure of patented inventions provides a
fairly good, although not perfect, representation of innovative activity in these five indus-
tries. Therefore, patents have been extensively used in earlier research to understand the
innovation processes of firms within these industries (e.g., Katila and Shane, 2005; Coad
and Rao, 2008; Rothaermel and Alexandre, 2009).
5In 2004, these industries collectively included approximately 35% of all publicly traded U.S. manu-
facturing firms drawn from the Compustat database.
6Strictly speaking, patents are inventions. As Freeman and Soete (1997, p. 22) notes, they represent
“[...] an idea, a sketch or a model for a new improved device, product, process or system. Such inventions
may often (not always) be patented but they do not necessarily lead to technical innovations.”
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We use firm-level data on innovation and options trading from several data sources.
Our starting point is the Compustat universe which contains detailed information for all
U.S. publicly listed firms since the mid-1950s. We identified all firms traded on NYSE,
AMEX or NASDAQ with accounting data available between 1996 and 2004. To mitigate
backfilling bias, we require firms to be listed on Compustat for three years before including
them in the sample. Our main Compustat items are sales (SALE); a capital-labour ratio
constructed from the net stock of property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) and the
number of employees (EMP); and R&D expenditure (XRD). R&D is used to create R&D
capital stocks calculated using a perpetual inventory method with a 15% depreciation
rate following the method described in Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005).
Firm-level patent data are obtained from the latest version of the NBER patent
database which contains approximately three million patents granted by the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and citation information from 1976 to the end of
2006 (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001; Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002).7 We use patents
that are ultimately granted, dated by the year of application, which approximates the
year when the invention is completed because the patent system provides incentives to
file quickly. To match Compustat firms with U.S. patent assignee codes, we begin with
the name-matching tool of Bessen (2009) and then search by hand for variations on the
names in our panel. Our sample ends in 2004 because many patent applications filed
in the later years (i.e., 2005 and 2006) might still be under revision (Hall, Jaffe, and
Trajtenberg, 2001).
For data on options trading, we use OptionMetrics. This database contains informa-
tion on the daily number of contracts traded for each individual put and call option on
U.S. publicly listed equities along with daily closing bid and ask prices from 1996 on-
wards. The sample is selected to include firms with positive options volume to maintain
comparability, as firms without options listings tend to be small (Mayhew and Mihov,
2004) with different structural relationships between innovation and the right-hand vari-
ables.8 To approximate the total annual dollar options volume, we use the approach in
Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2009). Specifically, for each stock, we first multiply
the total trade in each option by the end-of-day quote midpoint for that option and then
aggregate this number annually across all trading days and all options listed on the stock.
To calculate other control variables and the variables used for exploring underly-
ing mechanisms, we collect institutional ownership information from Thomson Reuters’
CDA/Spectrum Institutional Holdings dataset (form 13F), corporate governance informa-
tion from the RiskMetrics database, analyst coverage data from the Institutional Brokers’
7See NBER Patent Data Project website.
8For example, Acs and Audretsch (1988) show that small firms spend disproportionately less on R&D,
but they appear to benefit more from R&D investments, suggesting they are more efficient at R&D than
their larger counterparts.
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Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database, CEO age and compensation from ExecuComp,
stock price information from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), intra-
day trades and quotes for constructing stock illiquidity measures from the Trade and
Quote (TAQ) database, and information on each firm’s alliances and joint ventures from
the Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum database.
These datasets do not overlap perfectly; thus, our baseline regressions run from 1996,
the first year options trading data are available, to 2004, the last year when we can
realistically construct innovation measures based on patent data. Although the exact
number of observations depends on the specific regression, the baseline sample for which
we estimate the equations contains 3,271 observations on 548 firms.9
1.3.1 Dependent variables
Our primary measure of innovation is a future citation-weighted count of U.S. patents.
We prefer patents weighted by citations as an indicator of innovative “output” over sim-
ple counts because patent citations can better reflect the technological and economic
“importance” or “value” of the underlying invention (Trajtenberg, 1990; Albert, Avery,
Narin, and McAllister, 1991). Specifically, the use of patent citations exploits the fact
that patent applications must acknowledge “prior art”, in which light they need to meet
the requirements for patentability, i.e., U.S. patent law requires an invention to be novel,
non-trivial and susceptible to industrial application for a patent to be granted.10 These
citations serve an important legal function because they can delimit the scope of the
property rights awarded to the inventor. U.S. patent applicants are legally required to
disclose any knowledge upon which their inventions are based. This prior art is typically
referenced through citations provided by patent applicants (inventors or their lawyers)
and patent examiners. Because of this important legal function, the economics of innova-
tion literature has frequently used the number of forward citations received by a patent as
an indirect measure of its value (e.g., Pakes and Griliches, 1980; Harhoff, Narin, Scherer,
and Vopel, 1999; Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt, 2005; Hall, Jaffe, and
Trajtenberg, 2005; Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales, 2013). To control for the fact
that citation counts are inherently truncated, we employ three strategies. First, we esti-
mate until 2004, allowing for a two-year window of forward citations for the last cohort of
patents in the data. Second, we include a full set of time dummies, which accounts for the
fact that patents taken out later in the panel have less time to be cited than patents taken
9Our sample faces another restriction from the overall Compustat database. Because our preferred
regressions use firm fixed effects, we condition our sample on firms that received at least one citation and
had at least two years of non-missing data for all variables between 1996 and 2004. Thus, we drop firms
from the Compustat/USPTO match that patented prior to 1996 but not in the 1996–2004 period, and
of those that did patent, we drop those that did not receive citations.
10See 35 U.S.C. 102 Conditions for patentability; novelty.
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out earlier in the panel. Third, we also perform our estimations using simple unweighted
patent counts.11
We consider several additional innovation metrics. First, we use R&D expenditure as
a measure of innovation inputs. Because more than 50% of firms in the entire Compustat
database do not report R&D expenditures, we follow common practice in the literature
by replacing missing values with zeros, although we obtain similar results when we drop
these observations or interpolate over any gaps of three years or less.12 Second, given that
self-citations may differ from other citations in various ways (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg,
2005), we weight patents by the number of non-self forward citations. Finally, in a series
of extensions, we examine changes in the direction of innovative efforts. To proxy for the
direction of a firm’s activities in its innovative process, we use the diversity of activities
(i.e., the dispersion of the firm’s patent portfolio across technological classes), originality-
weighted patent counts (i.e., the dispersion of backward citations across technological
areas) and a measure of risk-taking (i.e., the standard deviation of forward citations
across a firm’s patents).
It is important to note, however, that using patent data to measure innovation also has
limitations. In particular, not all firms patent their inventions because some inventions
do not meet the patentability criteria, and others are not patented for strategic reasons.
Moreover, firms differ in their patenting propensity, and the degree to which these fac-
tors are problematic varies substantially across industries (e.g., Levin, Klevorick, Nelson,
Winter, Gilbert, and Griliches, 1987; Cohen and Levin, 1989; Griliches, 1990). We believe
that limiting our study to specific industries in which patents are a meaningful indicator
of technological activities reduces such concerns because other factors that may affect
patent propensity are relatively stable within such a context (Cohen and Levin, 1989;
Griliches, 1990). Because firms may differ in their patenting propensity for unobserved
reasons even in R&D-intensive industries, we treated this problem as one of unobserved
heterogeneity across industries and firms, and control for such variations in our statistical
analysis.13
11We also experimented with adjusted citations, taking into account systematic differences in the
number of citations each patent receives across application year and technological class (Hall, Jaffe, and
Trajtenberg, 2001). This delivers very similar results to the unadjusted citations results presented here.
12Note that the fact that a firm does not report R&D expenditures in its financial statement does not
necessarily imply that the firm is not engaging in R&D. Because this information is public, a firm could
decline to report for strategic reasons.
13For example, one concern might be that our analysis includes firms in “complex” (i.e., SIC codes 35,
36, 37 and 38) and “discrete” industries (i.e., pharmaceuticals; SIC code 283) in the sense proposed by
Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000). The authors define complex (discrete) industries as those in which
a given technology is protected by many (few) patents. One might therefore observe a lower number of
patents generated by firms in discrete industries, but this does not necessarily imply that these firms
are less innovative. Moreover, one may argue that our industry classification is too broad to isolate,
for example, the role of highly innovative biotechnology companies within the pharmaceutical industry.
We account for this potential bias in our regressions by using the most detailed industry classification
available (i.e., four-digit SIC code).
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1.3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1.1 provides summary statistics of the main variables used in this study.14 Our
sample firms are large: $494 million in net sales at the median and 2,400 employees.
On average, a firm in our sample has 62 granted patents per year and subsequently
receives 294 citations for its patents, which is comparable to previous studies (e.g., Aghion,
Van Reenen, and Zingales, 2013). The citation series is highly skewed, with a median of
15. Due to the right-skewed distribution of cite-weighted patents, we use the natural
logarithm as the main innovation measure in our analysis. To avoid losing firm-year
observations, we add one to the actual values when calculating the natural logarithm.
The options volume measure has a mean value of $157 million and a median value of
$700 million. Regarding the other variables, an average firm invests $287 million in R&D,
approximately 51% of shareholders are institutional investors, its return on assets is 9%,
and 22.5 years have passed since its inclusion in Compustat.
Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics
Mean StdDev Min Median Max Observations Source
Cite-weighted patents 293.7 1181.3 0 15 18950 3271 USPTO
Patents 62.4 185.2 0 7 2355 3271 USPTO
Non-self cite-weighted patents 233.4 906.04 0 12 17188 3271 USPTO
Originality-weighted patents 30.8 89.3 0 4.0 1158.3 3245 USPTO
Std. Dev. of patent citations 4.9 6.02 0 2.8 66.5 2382 USPTO
Innovative diversity 0.62 0.21 0 0.67 0.94 1526 USPTO
Options volume (in $m) 156.7 700.3 0.00018 8.5 15134.5 3271 OptionMetrics
Moneyness 0.29 0.17 0.06 0.25 2.4 3271 OptionMetrics
Institutional ownership (in %) 50.7 27.5 0 56.8 100 3271 CDA/Spectrum 13F
Fixed capital (in $m) 1012.5 3913.1 0.04 105.2 84101 3271 Compustat
Employees (in 000s) 15.2 34.8 0.01 2.4 371.7 3271 Compustat
Sales (in $m) 3968.04 11841.2 0.004 494.4 171652 3271 Compustat
Firm age 22.5 15.5 3 16 55 3271 Compustat
R&D (in $m) 286.9 811.3 0 39.4 12183 3271 Compustat
1 - Lerner index 0.86 0.04 0.76 0.87 0.96 3271 Compustat
Profits/Assets 0.09 0.17 -1.37 0.12 0.62 3271 Compustat
CEO age 55.6 7.6 32 56 89 1996 ExecuComp
CEO vega (in $000s) 157.6 292.0 0 73.73 4578.0 1845 ExecuComp
CEO delta (in $000s) 761.9 1695.4 0 295.1 34647.1 1845 ExecuComp
Governance index 9.04 2.7 2 9 16 921 RiskMetrics and
Gompers et al. (2003)
As a preamble to our main analysis, we provide results of non-parametric regressions
that consider the relationship between our innovation measures and options trading. Fig-
ure 1.1 presents the results. In both panels, we show a line for the local linear regression
estimated by the lowest smoother with a bandwidth of 0.8. Panel A displays the non-
parametric relationship between the natural logarithm of (one plus) the number of patents
14Descriptive statistics for all other variables used throughout the course of our study are in the
Appendix, Table A.16.
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granted (unweighted patent counts) and the natural logarithm of options volume. Panel
B replicates the graph but uses our primary measure of innovation, the natural logarithm
of (one plus) forward citation-weighted patent counts. As can be seen, the correlation be-
tween innovation and options trading is clearly positive and appears to be monotonically
increasing across options volume.
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Figure 1.1: Non-parametric regressions of innovation and options volume
Notes: This figure presents non-parametric (local linear) regression of firms’ unweighted patent counts
(PATS ) and annual options volume (Panel A) and firms’ patents weighted by the number of forward
citations (CITES ) and annual options volume (Panel B). The graph is from 2000, the middle of our
sample period.
1.3.3 Specification
Our main econometric models focus on the relationship between future cite-weighted
measures of innovative activity and options trading. We estimate the following model
using ordinary least squares (OLS):
Yi,t = α + βOi,t + γZi,t + δt + λi + εi,t (1.1)
where i indexes firms and t indexes time. The dependent variable, Yi,t, is the natural
logarithm of (one plus) the number of cite-weighted patents. The options trading mea-
sure, Oi,t, is measured for firm i over its fiscal year t as the logarithmic transformation of
the options volume, although similar results are also obtained using the untransformed
variable. Because both innovation and options activity are in logarithmic form, the coef-
ficient on O gives us the elasticity of innovation to options trading. δt are time dummies
that account for inter-temporal variation that may affect the relationship between op-
tions trading and innovation and λi is a firm fixed effect that controls for unobserved
time-invariant firm heterogeneity. Because innovation metrics are likely to be autocorre-
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lated over time, all of our models will allow the standard errors to have arbitrary het-
eroskedasticity and autocorrelation (i.e., clustering standard errors by firm). The vector
Zi,t contains a range of control variables. Specifically, in our main regressions, we condi-
tion on firm size (Sales), capital-labour ratio (K/L) and deflated R&D stock, as suggested
by the literature on patent production functions (e.g., Pakes and Griliches, 1980; Haus-
man, Hall, and Griliches, 1984). The model of Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013)
shows that innovative activities are affected by institutional ownership; we include the
percentage of shares held by institutional investors (InstOwn). We also control for firm’s
age in the base model, measured as the number of years since the inclusion of the firm in
Compustat.
When a firm’s R&D stock is included in Z, we can interpret the equation as a “produc-
tion function” that relates past R&D investments to innovative outputs. It follows that
in this specification, β gives us the effect of options trading activity on the productivity of
R&D, measured by forward cite-weighted patent counts per R&D dollar invested. Note
that we also estimate models that omit the R&D stock from Z, and hence β indicates the
combined impact of changes in R&D stocks and innovative productivity.
Finally, λi, the fixed effects, is introduced into the models using the “pre-sample
mean scaling” estimator of Blundell, Griffith, and van Reenen (1999). Essentially, we
exploit the fact that we have a long pre-sample history of a firm’s innovative activities
and construct pre-sample averages of the dependent variables.15 This initial condition can
proxy for unobserved heterogeneity if the first moments of the variables are stationary.
Monte Carlo simulations show that this pre-sample mean scaling estimator performs well
compared to alternative econometric estimators for dynamic panel data models with a
long panel for innovations but only a short panel for the explanatory regressors.
1.4 Empirical Results
Table 1.2 presents our first set of regression results. Columns 1 through 4 report the OLS
estimates with the dependent variable Ln(1+CITES): the natural logarithm of (one plus)
the number of citation-weighted patents for issued patents applied for in year t. Due to
the count-based nature of citation and patent data, we also use count-based regression
models, such as the Negative Binomial (NB). Columns 4 through 8 report NB regressions.
Across all the columns of Table 1.2, the coefficient estimates on Ln(Optvol) are positive
(ranging between 0.118 and 0.244) and both economically and statistically significant.
For example, the coefficient of 0.118 in column 4 suggests that a 200% increase in the
dollar volume of options traded (e.g., from the median of $8.5 million to $25.5 million) is
15We estimate from 1996 and use the information on patenting between 1976 and 1995 to construct
the pre-sample means.
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associated with a 24% increase in cite-weighted patents (e.g., from the median of 15 to
19).16
We begin in column 1 with OLS regressions of Ln(1+CITES) on options trading
with controls for InstOwn, Ln(K/L), Ln(Sales), Ln(Age), four-digit industry dummies
and time dummies. Consistent with the bivariate relationships in Figure 1.1, there is a
positive and significant association between innovation and options volume. Column 2
includes the controls for fixed effects (which are highly significant) and these substantially
reduce the coefficient on Ln(Optvol) from 0.232 to 0.148. In columns 1 and 2, the options
volume coefficient measures the combined impact of changes in R&D productivity (more
innovative output per dollar of R&D invested) and innovative intensity (greater spending
on innovation). In column 3, we add the natural logarithm of each firm’s deflated R&D
stock, and hence the equation becomes a production function, where β indicates the
innovative premium of options trading per dollar of R&D. As expected, the coefficient
on Ln(R&D stock) shows a very robust positive association with patent citations. The
coefficient on options volume also declines by approximately 32%, from 0.232 to 0.158,
indicating that the main effect of options trading operates by impacting R&D productivity
rather than by stimulating more R&D spending. Column 4 presents the full model,
which includes the controls for fixed effects. As before, this reduces the options volume
coefficient from 0.158 to 0.118.17 The final four columns of Table 1.2 repeat the main
OLS specifications but use NB models. Our findings are similar.
16In the sample period between 1996 and 2004 the trading volume for our firms rose by 188%, so 200%
is a reasonable change to consider.
17The results are similar if we replace the Blundell, Griffith, and van Reenen (1999) controls for fixed
effects with the Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984) approach. For example, in an identical specification
to our main model in column 4, the coefficient (standard error) on Ln(Optvol) is 0.091 (0.034).
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Table 1.2: Innovation and options volume
Method OLS NB
Dependent Var. Ln(1+CITES) CITES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln(Optvol) 0.232∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.022) (0.025) (0.022) (0.026) (0.022) (0.026) (0.021)
InstOwn -0.229 -0.139 -0.046 -0.048 -0.211 -0.127 0.093 0.064
(0.200) (0.165) (0.178) (0.158) (0.228) (0.188) (0.206) (0.177)
Ln(K/L) 0.065 -0.004 0.102∗ 0.026 0.224∗∗ 0.075 0.260∗∗∗ 0.110
(0.070) (0.056) (0.061) (0.053) (0.097) (0.074) (0.083) (0.067)
Ln(Sales) 0.395∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.036) (0.053) (0.041) (0.044) (0.035) (0.048) (0.040)
Ln(Age) 0.115 -0.037 -0.051 -0.109 -0.062 -0.136 -0.266∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗
(0.106) (0.087) (0.096) (0.083) (0.109) (0.098) (0.101) (0.094)
Ln(R&D stock) 0.462∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.046) (0.047) (0.042)
Firm fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 3271 3271 3271 3271 3271 3271 3271 3271
Notes: This table presents estimates of OLS and NB panel regressions of firms’ patents weighted by
the number of forward citations (CITES ) on options volume (Optvol) and other firm-level control
variables. Firms in all columns: 548. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm (in parentheses).
All regressions control for a full set of four-digit industry dummies and time dummies. The time
period is 1996 – 2004 (with citations up to 2006); fixed effects are based on including pre-sample
means of the dependent variable as proposed by Blundell, Griffith, and van Reenen (1999). ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
1.4.1 Alternative innovation measures
In Table 1.3, we ask whether our results are driven by greater innovation output (more
patents) or greater innovation input (more R&D expenditure), and whether our results
are robust to the exclusion of self-citations. We find support for all three effects.
Columns 1 and 2 report the regression results from replacing the dependent variable
of cite-weighted patents with raw patent counts. We observe a pattern for the coeffi-
cient of options trading activity that is very similar to that in our baseline models (i.e.,
columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.2). We observe a positive and significant coefficient estimate
of Ln(Optvol) that falls substantially after we introduce time-invariant, firm-specific in-
novation determinants into the regressions. The effect, however, remains economically
and statistically significant. For example, the coefficient estimate in column 2 implies
that an increase in options volume by 200% leads to roughly 2 additional patents filed for
by a median firm in our sample. Given that a median firm files for 7 patents, this is a
significant increase.
The middle two columns examine the association between options trading activity
and R&D investment. We remove the deflated R&D stock from this specification because
we are interested in inputs and rely instead on a conditional fixed-effects estimator. In
columns 3 and 4, we find that options volume has a significant and positive association
with firm R&D investment, although the magnitude of this effect becomes smaller than
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that for cite-weighted patents after we add fixed effects. Thus, focusing on R&D as the
only measure of firm innovativeness may underestimate the importance of options trading.
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 1.3 show that the coefficient estimates on Ln(Optvol) con-
tinue to be positive and significant at the 1% level when we remove self-citations and
re-estimate Eq. (1.1) with the dependent variable replaced by the number of patents
weighted by non-self citations. We find this last result important because the interpre-
tation that our results are mainly driven by pure managerial signalling behaviour (as
opposed to pushing the firm towards more innovation) is difficult to reconcile with our
finding that firms with higher levels of options trading activity generate more forward ci-
tations in general and receive more forward citations from other firms in particular (e.g.,
as compared to an increase in patenting).
Table 1.3: Alternative innovation measures and options volume
Dependent Var. Ln(1+PATS) Ln(1+XRD) Ln(1+NS CITES)
Method: OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(Optvol) 0.176∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.024) (0.029) (0.014) (0.032) (0.028)
InstOwn -0.273∗ -0.213 -0.283∗ 0.017 -0.025 -0.045
(0.154) (0.140) (0.162) (0.102) (0.167) (0.149)
Ln(K/L) 0.101∗∗ 0.043 -0.060 0.080∗∗ 0.094∗ 0.032
(0.051) (0.044) (0.062) (0.031) (0.056) (0.052)
Ln(Sales) 0.144∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.033) (0.041) (0.034) (0.049) (0.039)
Ln(Age) 0.010 -0.028 0.087 0.605∗∗∗ -0.022 -0.094
(0.079) (0.069) (0.078) (0.151) (0.091) (0.080)
Ln(R&D stock) 0.432∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.043) (0.056) (0.045)
SIC four-digit dummies Yes Yes Yes n/a Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No BGV No Yes No BGV
Observations 3271 3271 3271 3271 3271 3271
Notes: This table presents estimates of OLS regressions of firms’ unweighted patent
counts (PATS ), R&D expenditure (XRD) and firms’ patents weighted by the num-
ber of non-self forward citations (NS CITES) on options volume (Optvol) and other
firm-level control variables. Firms in all columns: 548. Robust standard errors are
clustered by firm (in parentheses). All regressions control for a full set of time dum-
mies. The time period is 1996 – 2004 (with non-self citations up to 2006); BGV
fixed effects controls use the Blundell, Griffith, and van Reenen (1999) pre-sample
mean scaling estimator. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
1.4.2 Robustness checks
We conduct a rich set of basic robustness tests for our baseline results and discuss the
details of these tests in the Appendix. To summarize, we find that the positive effect of
options trading activity on innovation continues to increase monotonically, is preserved in
the two sub-periods during and after the Internet bubble, is robust to alternative proxies
for R&D inputs, lagged options volume, and alternative econometric models that deal
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with the right-skewed and non-negative nature of patents data.
To provide additional insights, we conduct several tests related to our main predic-
tion. To save space, these results are tabulated in the Appendix. First, we check if our
results are robust to the inclusion of additional (financial) control variables. Although
our approach is to condition on a wide range of firm characteristics (and fixed effects),
one could object that this does not adequately control for observable omitted variables
variables. For example, there may be concerns that our regressions omit the variable of
firm’s market value, which is correlated with the number of citations (Hall, Jaffe, and
Trajtenberg, 2005). Given that fundamentals that increase firm’s value may also increase
innovation and given that informed traders may be more likely to trade firms with higher
growth opportunities, this may produce a spurious upward bias on the coefficient on op-
tions volume.18 Similarly, He and Tian (2013) and Fang, Tian, and Tice (2014) show that
analyst coverage and stock liquidity are important determinants of firm innovation. To
address such concerns, in the Appendix, Table A.8, we augment our main specification
by including stock illiquidity (Illiquidity), leverage (Leverage), stock market-based firm
value (Tobin’s Q), profitability (ROA), capital expenditures (Capex ) and analyst coverage
(Analyst coverage). However, the coefficients on Ln(Optvol) continue to be positive and
significant at the 1% level, and the magnitude of the coefficient declines only slightly from
the baseline model (i.e., from 0.118 to 0.110).19
Another concern might be that our results are affected by firms’ external knowledge
sourcing behaviour. Because of the increased complexity of the technological and scien-
tific developments in our focal industries, firms cannot rely solely on internal R&D; they
need to (and do) source knowledge externally in order to enhance the performance of
their innovation process (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006). Simultaneously, when prices
are more efficient, managers can extract more information from the market so that they
can better assess the quality and potential outcomes of external knowledge acquisition ac-
tivities.20 To account for this, we include three alternative variables in our set of controls.
Specifically, we use the frequency to which firms engage in R&D collaborations (i.e., the
number of alliances and joint ventures reported in SDC), the intensity to which firms have
sourced external knowledge (i.e., the number of jointly owned patents divided by the total
number of patents) and the acquisition of innovative target firms (i.e., acquisition expen-
18The correlation between Tobin’s Q and Ln(Optvol) is positive (0.262) and significant at the 1% level.
19In unreported results, we also consider return volatility, measured by the annualized standard devi-
ation of daily returns. However, and consistent with the notion in Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam
(2009), the return volatility variable is not significant. For example, in an identical specification to col-
umn 1 Table A.8 in the Appendix, the coefficient (standard error) on return volatility is 0.017 (0.012),
while the coefficient on Ln(Optvol) remains positive and significant at the 1% level, with the magnitude
of the estimate almost identical to the one reported above.
20Prior studies provide evidence consistent with this argument. For example, Luo (2005) finds that the
positive correlation between announcement date return and the completion of mergers can be attributed
to insiders’ learning from outsiders after controlling for common information.
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diture normalized by total assets). We report the results in the Appendix, Table A.9. We
find that the coefficients on Ln(Optvol) continue to be of a very similar magnitude as in
column 4 of Table 1.2 (except when controlling for collaboration frequency because we
only consider firms that have some information in SDC) and continue to be significant at
the 1% level. Overall, this provides reassurance that our findings are primarily related to
internal R&D investment decisions.
Third, we argue that information asymmetries between the firm and market partic-
ipants are especially challenging in R&D-intensive industries (which is one reason why
this is our sample of interest). This is because the nature of firms’ core activities is
knowledge-based and highly opaque, and the fact that there could be a substantial cost
to revealing information to their competitors reduces the quality of the signal they can
make about their innovative activities (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983; Anton and Yao,
2002). Thus, if what we are capturing is related to the informational benefit from options
to a firm in reducing asymmetric information problems related to R&D, then this should
matter more for firms that are active in R&D-intensive industries, relative to cases where
such problems are less (or not at all) present. To show this, we begin by identifying firms
with positive options volume and non-missing data on all other variables that operate in
non-R&D-intensive industries, defined as those that are located in the OECD classifica-
tion (based on R&D intensities) of low-tech industries (OECD, 2011).21 Given that these
firms are very different from our focal firms, we then apply a matching procedure that
relies on a nearest neighbour matching of propensity scores (estimated as a function of
all firm characteristics, including fixed effects). After restricting the sample to common
support, we are left with a panel of 1,453 firm-years in both groups. In Column 1 of
Table A.10 in the Appendix, we estimate our main specification on the matched sample,
adding a dummy variable for R&D-intensive firms (= 1;0 = non-R&D-intensive). The
coefficient on Ln(Optvol) remains positive (0.120) and statistically significant at the 1%
level, while the coefficient on the dummy is also positive (1.219) and significant at the
5% level. In column 2, we add the interaction of this dummy variable with options vol-
ume. The estimates show that the interaction term, Ln(Optvol) x Dummy for high-tech,
is 0.186 and highly significant, as expected. Most interesting, however, the coefficient on
Ln(Optvol) goes towards zero (0.004) and becomes insignificant once the interaction term
is included. Taken literally, this indicates that there is no effect of options trading activity
on innovation in non-R&D-intensive industries, which is broadly consistent with the story
we present. For robustness, we also split the sample. In column 3, in R&D-intensive
industries, the coefficient on options volume is large, positive and significant at the 1%
21According to industrial codes of ISIC Rev.3 (NACE Rev.1 in Europe), OECD (2011) classifies
manufacturing industries in four subgroups of high-technology, medium high-technology, medium low-
technology and low-technology based on the technology intensity and level of R&D used in these indus-
tries.
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level, whereas in column 4, in non-R&D-intensive industries, the coefficient is smaller and
insignificant (0.144 versus 0.070).22
Finally, we perform a small event study that examines the effect of initial option
listings on firms’ innovation performance. To do so, we focus on the sub-sample of firms
who appear for at least two years before and after the listing event. After excluding firms
with multiple listings, we are left with a set of 93 events during the period between 1998
and 2002. Next, we proceed to construct a dummy variable, Post, that equals one for
the post-event period and zero for the pre-event period. In column 1 of Table A.11 in
the Appendix, we augment Eq. (1.1) by including Post. The within-firm estimator is of
0.370 and significant at the 5% level. In terms of economic significance, this suggests that
option listing is associated with a 37% increase in innovation in subsequent periods. In
our second diagnostic test, we examine the dynamics of innovation in the years around
the listing event. We use a window of eight years and include in our main specification
a set of dummy variables for the three years prior to the year when the firm was listed
and four years after the firm was listed (year zero is the omitted category). Figure 1.2
presents the results. Panel A depicts the within-firm changes in the raw number of patents
and panel B shows the changes in cite-weighted patents. In both figures, we find that
there is little effect in the first year after listing but in the following years innovation
increases substantially by about 64% (measured by cite-weighted patents) with respect
to the listing year.
Two conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, it mitigates concerns that options
trading is endogenous due to reverse causality. This is a particular concern when study-
ing innovation output because it is difficult to be addressed by lagging the explanatory
variable. Even if innovation is regressed on lagged options volume (as done in the Ap-
pendix, Table A.3), it may be that lagged innovation causes lagged options volume and
also causes current innovation. Because we only consider the first listing (based on the
data available to us), it cannot be caused by past listings. Second, the phenomenon of
such delayed effects is consistent with the starting point of our theory, i.e., that the benefit
from options is related to whether the market for the listed option has sufficient volume,
because trading volume needs time to build.
22Clearly, as detailed in Section 1.3, this approach has the problem that patent and citation data are a
less reliable indicator of innovation in low-tech industries. To address this, we experimented with different
sub-samples of non-R&D-intensive firms such as including low- and/or medium low-tech industries and
focusing only on those firms that have non-zero citations in more than 25% or 50% of the years they
appear in our sample. Our finding, however, remains unaltered in all these tests. For example, re-
doing the analysis using a matched sample of firms in low-tech industries which receive citations in more
than 50% of the years yields the following results: we estimate a coefficient on the interaction term of
0.240 (standard error = 0.061) and a coefficient on options volume of -0.054 (standard error = 0.052)
on this sub-sample of 2,192 observations. If we split this sub-sample into R&D- and non-R&D-intensive
industries, the coefficient on Ln(Optvol) is large and significant only for firms in R&D-intensive industries
(i.e., a coefficient of 0.130 with a standard error of 0.053 versus a coefficient 0.023 with a standard error
of 0.056).
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Figure 1.2: Innovation around the option listing event
Notes: This figure presents within-firm changes in (Panel A) firms’ unweighted patent counts (PATS )
and (Panel B) firms’ patents weighted by the number of forward citations (CITES ) in the years around
the option listing event. The estimates are taken from the regressions reported in column 2 and 4 of
Table A.11 in the Appendix.
1.4.3 Innovative direction
We make now use of alternative outcome variables to explore the idea that our baseline
results are not simply driven by greater R&D productivity (more citations per R&D
dollar) but are rather associated with different resource allocation decisions (or innovative
directions). To perform such a test, we use three different measures of the direction of
firms’ innovative efforts: (i) an originality index on knowledge inputs, (ii) a measure of
risk-taking behaviour and (iii) a proxy for innovative diversity. The results are shown
in Table 1.4. As before, all models are estimated via fixed effects OLS panel regression
using the pre-sample mean of the dependent variables. We lose some observations in these
specifications because in the fixed effects estimator, we require a firm to have at least some
information on the dependent variables in the 1996 – 2004 and pre-sample period.
In column 1, the outcome variable is an originality-weighted patent count. Originality,
as defined in Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001), is essentially one minus a Herfindahl
index of the concentration of backward patent citations across two-digit technological
classes. We find that the coefficient estimate on Ln(Optvol) is positive and significant
at the 1% level, suggesting that firms with more options trading activity make use of a
more diverse set of knowledge.23 In the next column, we use a measure of risk-taking
behaviour, i.e., the standard deviation of forward citations received across patents. The
23The coefficient on options volume continues to be positive and significant when we use NB (coefficient
of 0.157 with a standard error of 0.024) and Poisson (coefficient of 0.114 with a standard error of 0.050)
specifications.
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results show that there is a positive and meaningful relationship between Ln(Optvol)
and Ln(1+SD CITES).24 In column 3, we introduce the diversity of innovation activities,
defined as one minus the Herfindahl index of the number of patents across classes. The
patent portfolio includes all patents of a given firm over a three-year period. To control for
the fact that some firms are engaged in so little innovation that it may not be meaningful
to speak of a diverse (or concentrated) technological direction, we define a minimum
threshold of five patents to filter out such low-innovation firms.25 As shown, the estimate
on Ln(Optvol) is positive and significant at the 10% level, suggesting that firms with more
options trading activity file for a more diverse set of patents.26
Taken together, the results in Table 1.4 reveal that options trading appears to evoke a
change in the direction of innovative efforts as opposed to merely increase the amount of
R&D or patenting; on average, firms with more trading activity produce a more diverse
and original set of activities and are characterized by an increasing willingness to take risk
in their innovation process. We find these results especially intriguing because, intuitively,
one may conjecture that the disciplinary feature of financial markets is to force managers
to refrain from engaging in overly risky projects and to abandon creativity and diversity
for efficiency purposes. We take these results as a starting point to explore the question
of why this is the case in Section 1.5.
24Our findings are similar if we use the untransformed variable: the coefficient (standard error) on
Ln(Optvol) is 0.319 (0.085) in column 2 of Table 1.4 when Ln(1+SD CITES) is replaced by SD CITES.
25We also consider alternate cut-off points of 10, 20 and 50 patents and obtain similar results.
26For robustness purposes, we apply an alternative modelling approach that accounts for the bounded
nature of the dependent variable. Specifically, we employ a double-truncated Tobit model and find similar
results for the coefficient on options trading (i.e., the coefficient is 0.008 with a standard error of 0.004).
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Table 1.4: Innovation direction and options volume
Dependent Var. Ln(1+ORIG.) Ln(1+SD CITES) DIVERSITY
Method: OLS (1) (2) (3)
Ln(Optvol) 0.154∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.007∗
(0.022) (0.010) (0.004)
InstOwn -0.140 0.104∗∗ 0.028
(0.127) (0.052) (0.023)
Ln(K/L) 0.032 -0.022 0.005
(0.037) (0.024) (0.010)
Ln(Sales) 0.086∗∗∗ 0.010 0.027∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.012) (0.007)
Ln(Age) -0.026 -0.082∗∗∗ 0.018
(0.060) (0.029) (0.013)
Ln(R&D stock) 0.159∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ -0.003
(0.040) (0.012) (0.006)
Observations 3245 2382 1526
Notes: This table presents estimates of OLS panel regres-
sions of firms’ patents weighted by originality (ORIG.), the
standard deviation of forward citations across firms’ patents
(SD CITES ), and innovative diversity (DIVERSITY) on op-
tions volume (Optvol) and other firm-level control variables.
See Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) for a definition of orig-
inality. Diversity is defined as one minus the Herfindahl index
of the number of patents across two-digit technological classes.
Firms in columns: 542 in column 1, 455 in column 2, and 362
in column 3. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm (in
parentheses). All regressions control for a full set of four-digit
industry dummies, time dummies, and fixed effects by includ-
ing pre-sample means of the dependent variable as proposed
by Blundell, Griffith, and van Reenen (1999). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
1.4.4 Endogeneity of options trading
In this subsection, we address concerns that informed traders select firms on the basis of
characteristics that are observable to them but not observable for us. For example, in-
formed investors might decide to trade options on stocks when they anticipate an increase
in innovation. Another problem might be that our measure of options trading activity is
noisy. This is because intra-day execution prices are not available over the large sample
period. Although this is mitigated by annual averaging, we are likely to underestimate
the effect of options.27
We address these issues in a number of ways. First, we use matching estimators
27Another issue might be that different types of options provide different signals. Although we could
bring additional data to examine the breakdown of call and put options with different times to maturity,
there are no clear hypotheses. As Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2009) note, while it may be the
case that managers are more likely to act on “good news” as opposed to “bad news”, calls and puts can
be bought and sold freely. Thus, in the absence of information on the signed order imbalance (data we
unfortunately don’t have), disaggregating calls and puts cannot be unambiguously linked to managerial
investment decisions.
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to calculate the average effect of having high levels of options volume on innovation.
Second, we consider moneyness and open interest as two plausible exogenous instrumental
variables and perform 2SLS estimations of the regressions in Table 1.2. Third, we test in
Section 1.5 whether our results are consistent with additional predictions and empirical
findings concerning the environment in which options trading should have differential
effect on innovation.28
Propensity score matching
We start with propensity score matching (PSM) in order to see whether firms with high
trading activity would have innovated at a lower rate had they not high trading activity.
In the application that follows, we define a high (low) trading activity firm as a firm with
options volume above (below) the yearly median in a given three-digit SIC industry. The
PSM technique is based on the likelihood that an observation would be a high trading
activity firm conditional on observables (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, 1984). We use a
probit specification to estimate the probabilities of being a high trading activity firm (=
1;0 = otherwise) on a comprehensive list of observable characteristics, including all the
independent variables (including the additional controls), as well as fixed effects. We then
use the predicted probabilities, or propensity scores (stratified by industry and year), from
this probit estimation and perform the matching. As our main matching procedure we
use nearest neighbour matching that allows each treated firm to be matched with multiple
controls (i.e., 4, although our result are robust to any number of matches between 1 and
5), running the procedure with replacement. However, to ensure that the results are not
sensitive to our choice of matching estimator, we also provide evidence from kernel and
radius matching.
Table 1.5 reports the average treatment effect estimates. The average selection bias
(not tabulated) across all specifications ranges from 3.4% to 4.7%, which means that the
results are reliable. As can be seen, our findings are in line with those obtained in the
previous panel regressions. For example, the results in columns 1 and 2 suggest that
firms with high trading activity produce 70% more patents that subsequently generate
72% more citations per dollar of R&D than firms with low options volume, all significant
at the 1% level. Overall, this suggest that the non-random assignment of high levels of
options trading to more innovative firms (at least based on observables) does not explain
our findings.
28An interesting context for the purpose of our study would be the use of a difference-in-differences
estimator that relies on the exogenous variation in options trading generated by short selling bans or
constraints imposed by regulators during the 2007 – 2009 crisis. Unfortunately we lack data on patenting
during and after the crisis period.
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Table 1.5: Propensity score matching
Panel A: Panel B: Panel C:
Nearest neighbour matching Kernel Matching Radius Matching
Ln(1+CITES) Ln(1+PATS) Ln(1+CITES) Ln(1+PATS) Ln(1+CITES) Ln(1+PATS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High Optvol 0.722∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗ 1.155∗∗∗ 1.096∗∗∗
vs. (0.104) (0.092) (0.125) (0.094) (0.072) (0.063)
Low Optvol
Observations 2130 2130 2130 2130 2130 2130
Notes: This table presents estimates of differences in firms’ patents weighted by the number of forward
citations (CITES ) and firms’ unweighted patent counts (PATS ) between the treatment group (high
levels of options volume) and the control group (low levels of options volume). The matched sample is
constructed using a nearest-neighbour (Panel A), kernel (Panel B) and radius (Panel C) score matching
with scores given by a probit model in which the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals
one if a firm has an options volume above the yearly median in a given three-digit industry. The
propensity score is estimated using the following firm characteristics: InstOwn, Ln(K/L), Ln(Sales),
Ln(Age), Ln(R&D stock), Illiquidity, Leverage, Tobin’s Q, ROA, Capex, Ln(Analyst coverage) and
fixed effects. Firms in columns: 525. Standard errors are obtained using 200 bootstrap replications
(in parentheses). The time period is 1996 – 2004 (with citations up to 2006). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Instrumental variable
Our second approach to correct for the potential bias due to selection is an instrumental
variable strategy. Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2009) propose two instrumental
variables that are reasonably exogenous to the relationship between options volume and
innovation: (i) moneyness (i.e., the average absolute difference between the stock’s market
price and the option’s strike price) and (ii) open interest in the stock’s listed options. We
focus our analysis on moneyness while Table A.12 in the Appendix shows that our results
are similar if we use the total open interest in the stock’s listed options as alternative.
A good instrument is a variable that is correlated with options trading (this assump-
tion can be tested) but uncorrelated with our dependent variables except through other
independent variables. That is, the instrument should be a variable that can be excluded
from the original list of controls without affecting the results. As Roll, Schwartz, and
Subrahmanyam (2009) argue, there are several reasons that moneyness is related to op-
tions trading. First, informed traders may be more attracted to out-of-the-money (OTM)
options because they offer the greatest leverage but uninformed agents may prefer in-
the-money (ITM) options to avoid overly risky positions (Pan and Poteshman, 2006).
Moreover, volatility traders would avoid deep ITM or OTM options, as the vega of such
options is close to zero. Specifically, Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew (2004) show that
the trading volume by agents speculating on volatility tends to be concentrated in at-
the-money (ATM) options. In sum, these arguments suggest that moneyness is related
to options trading, although they do not establish an unambiguous direction. There is
no reason to believe, however, that (unsigned) moneyness is linked to innovation in any
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intrinsic way because exchanges periodically list new options with strike prices close the
stock’s market price.
Given that there is no strong rationale for a mechanical link between moneyness and
innovation, we use the average absolute moneyness as an instrument. This variable is
measured as the yearly average of the daily absolute deviation of the exercise price of
each traded option from the closing price of the underlying asset.29 The correlation of
this variable with options volume is 0.326, which suggests that the instrument is indeed
related to options trading, and is consistent with that reported in Roll, Schwartz, and
Subrahmanyam (2009). We implement the instrumental variable estimator using 2SLS.
Column 1 of Table 1.6 presents the first stage which regresses options volume on
moneyness (and all other controls). As indicated by the simple correlation, we find that
the instrument is positive and highly significant. Moreover, the first-stage F-stat for
the “weak instrument rule of thumb” is strongly significant (and well above ten), which
suggests that the hypothesis that the instrument can be excluded from the first-stage
regressions is rejected and that the instrument is not weak. Columns 2 and 3 present the
coefficient estimates for the second stage, where we control for endogeneity. Column 2
presents the results with cite-weighted patents as dependent variables. Consistent with the
findings from the OLS specification, the coefficient estimate on Ln(Optvol) is positive and
significant at the 1% level. In column 3, we find a very similar pattern using unweighted
patents as the dependent variable. To provide additional support for the validity of
our instrumental variable approach, we replicate the estimations of Table 1.6 using open
interest as an additional instrument and rely on the Hansen J-statistic. Our instrument
performs adequately in our tests (p-value = 0.93 and 0.31 in identical specifications of
columns 2 and 3, respectively), indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
instrument suitability.
To gauge the direction and magnitude of the bias due to the endogeneity of options
trading, we can compare the OLS results from Table 1.2 with those obtained from the
2SLS regressions. Interestingly, the 2SLS coefficient estimates on Ln(Optvol) are consid-
erably larger (i.e., more positive) than those of the OLS estimates, although the estimates
from both approaches are in the same direction and statistically significant.30 This OLS
bias towards zero could be because options trading is measured with some error or because
omitted variables simultaneously make firms innovative and more attractive to informed
29For traded option k on stock j for day d, the absolute deviation is |Ln(Pricej,d/Strikek)|. This is
averaged over all k and d within a year t for each stock j. Options without trades are not included in the
calculation of the moneyness variable. We obtain very similar results if we use volume-weighted average
annual moneyness for each stock j, where each option’s moneyness is weighted by the proportion of total
option volume for stock j contributed by that option.
30For robustness, we also consider the instrumental variable estimator by using the control function
approach (Blundell and Powell, 2004). The coefficient estimate (standard error) on Ln(Optvol) in the
control function estimation was also above the ordinary Poisson estimate (see Appendix, columns 4 and
8 of Table A.1): 0.188 (0.087) for CITES, and 0.165 (0.065) for PATS.
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traders. The attitudes and beliefs of CEOs could be an example of such omitted variables.
For instance, overconfident CEOs could attract more informed traders, while simultane-
ously, they could also be more likely to pursue innovation that results in more patents
and citations (Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh, 2012)
Table 1.6: Innovation and options volume – Moneyness
as instrumental variable
Method OLS 2SLS
(first stage) (second stage)
Dependent Var. Ln(Optvol) Ln(1+CITES) Ln(1+PATS)
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(Optvol) (instr.) 0.180∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.062)
InstOwn 1.051∗∗∗ -0.033 -0.259∗
(0.224) (0.179) (0.134)
Ln(K/L) -0.365∗∗∗ 0.095 0.061
(0.080) (0.067) (0.050)
Ln(Sales) 0.595∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗ 0.103∗∗
(0.052) (0.063) (0.042)
Ln(Age) -0.322∗∗∗ -0.059 -0.014
(0.123) (0.101) (0.071)
Ln(R&D stock) 0.361∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.071) (0.050)
Ln(Moneyness) 1.343∗∗∗
(0.155)
Observations 3271 3271 3271
Notes: This table presents estimates of 2SLS panel regres-
sions of firms’ patents weighted by the number of forward ci-
tations (CITES ) and firms’ unweighted patent counts (PATS )
on options volume (Optvol) and other firm-level control vari-
ables, with the average absolute moneyness Ln(Moneyness)
as instrumental variable. Firms in all columns: 548. Robust
standard errors are clustered by firm (in parentheses). All
regressions control for a full set of four-digit industry dum-
mies, time dummies, and fixed effects by including pre-sample
means of the dependent variable as proposed by Blundell,
Griffith, and van Reenen (1999). The time period is 1996 –
2004 (with citations up to 2006). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
1.5 Possible Mechanisms
Our evidence thus far is consistent with the implication of our leading hypothesis that
options trading enhances firm innovation, even after accounting for potential endogeneity
concerns. In this section, we turn to the last part of our analysis and discuss potential
underlying mechanisms through which this may occur. It is of course challenging to
provide definite proof, and hence our tests are only suggestive.
On a broad view, we suggest two possible explanations for our results. The first is
that managers prefer the “quiet” life as proposed by Hart (1983), Schmidt (1997) and
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Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and that the increased price informativeness induced
by options trading serves as a monitoring mechanism that forces managers to invest in
innovation if they are a priori reluctant to do so. Alternatively, the positive association
between options trading and innovation can also be attributable to career concerns. Most
prominently, Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) recently extend the Holmstro¨m
(1989, 1999) career concern model in the context of institutional investors (i.e., block-
holders) and innovation. Based on the observation that managers concerned with their
reputations in the labour market have incentives to take actions that boost current earn-
ings and the firm’s current stock price (Narayanan, 1985); the authors’ findings suggest
that the presence of institutional investors “protects” managers against the reputational
risk associated with long-term investments in innovation. Because of their informational
advantage, they have the ability to assess managerial efforts in innovation independent
of potential bad profit realizations in the short run. This, in turn, provides incentives for
the manager to forgo short-term profits and to invest in innovation. To the extent that
the previous literature, both theoretical and empirical, argues that options increase the
amount of private information conveyed by prices (e.g., Cao, 1999; Chakravarty, Gulen,
and Mayhew, 2004; Pan and Poteshman, 2006; Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam, 2009;
Hu, 2014), we may expect that this rationale also applies in the context of active options
markets.
To understand the extent to which the aforementioned stories might explain our find-
ings, we implement several tests concerning the environments in which options trading
activity should have differential effects on innovation. First, we examine whether the ef-
fect of options trading on innovation depends on product market competition. The quiet
life story suggests that the effect of options trading on innovation is weaker in highly com-
petitive environments because stronger competition increases the threat of bankruptcy,
which induces the manager to work harder to avoid liquidation and to keep his job (Hart,
1983; Schmidt, 1997). In contrast, if informed agents serve as a “shield” that protects
managers, this effect should be more pronounced when the degree of product market com-
petition is higher. This is because competition reduces the chances of success and hence
increases the reputational risk faced by managers if they do so. Second, we investigate
how innovation varies with options volume and managerial entrenchment. As Ferreira,
Ferreira, and Raposo (2011) show, a disciplining takeover is more likely when prices are
more efficient. Thus, an implication of our preceding discussion is that if managers pre-
fer the quiet life, the beneficial effect of options should be stronger when managers are
more “entrenched”. Specifically, if a firm adopts a large number of takeover defenses, it
might become partially insulated from the market for corporate control. In such cases,
the takeover market cannot play an effective disciplinary role, and managers have greater
ability to shirk. Moreover, if shareholder rights are restricted (i.e., the manager has more
bargaining power against shareholders), the CEO will also be more entrenched. Third, if
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career concerns are the driving force behind this relationship, the effect of options trading
on innovation should be stronger for younger CEOs because they are more concerned with
their careers, and to boost their careers, they are likely to engage in myopic behaviour.
Gibbons and Murphy (1992) show that implicit incentives from career concerns are much
more substantial for younger managers. Holmstro¨m (1999) notes that when managerial
ability is initially unknown and managerial effort is unobservable, young managers will
overwork to benefit their future careers. Thus, there should be little managerial slack for
younger CEOs. As before, under the quiet life story, options trading should have less of
an effect when managers are younger, while under the career concerns story, the impact
of options trading on innovation should be stronger when managers are younger.
1.5.1 Product market competition
Table 1.7 presents several results related to the interaction between options volume and
product market competition. To measure product market competition, we use the inverse
Lerner index (as in Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005)), defined as one
minus the median gross margin across all firms in the entire Compustat database with
the same three-digit industry SIC as the focal firm. Our main model allows this measure
to vary over time but we also consider its time-invariant form.
The first column reproduces our baseline results (column 4 of Table 1.2) and intro-
duces the time-varying measure of product market competition. In this specification, the
coefficient estimate on competition is positive and statistically significant (more compe-
tition yields more innovation), while the coefficient on Ln(Optvol) remains positive and
significant.31 Column 2 includes the interaction term between options trading and prod-
uct market competition which is positive and significant at the 1% level, as predicted
by the career concern hypothesis. In columns 3 and 4, we then replace the dependent
variable with raw patent counts and repeat the analysis. We observe similar patterns for
the interaction term. For robustness, columns 5 and 6 repeat the same specifications as
above but restrict the inverse Lerner index to be constant over time. This yields similar
results. Note that we are not able to estimate the main effect of competition in this model
because the measure is collinear with industry effects.
31In line with Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005), we find some evidence of an
inverted U-shaped relationship between innovation and product market competition. If we include a
term in the square of the inverse Lerner index, it is negative, whereas the linear term remains positive.
This quadratic term is insignificant, however, with a coefficient estimate of -32.205 and a standard error
of 28.076.
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Table 1.7: Innovation and options volume – Product market competition
Measure of competition Varies over time Constant over time
Dependent Var. Ln(1+CITES) Ln(1+PATS) Ln(1+CITES) Ln(1+PATS)
Method: OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(Optvol) 2.467∗∗∗ 1.962∗∗∗ 3.334∗∗∗ 2.579∗∗∗
x Competition (0.469) (0.249) (0.284) (0.319)
Ln(Optvol) 0.169∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.026) (0.037) (0.020) (0.029) (0.022)
Competition 5.834∗∗∗ 5.054∗∗ 6.852∗∗∗ 6.229∗∗∗
(1 − Lerner) (1.248) (2.024) (0.649) (1.213)
InstOwn -0.035 0.017 -0.212 -0.171 0.027 -0.165
(0.229) (0.183) (0.224) (0.181) (0.182) (0.181)
Ln(K/L) 0.026 0.041 0.042 0.053 0.047 0.058
(0.100) (0.080) (0.088) (0.071) (0.081) (0.071)
Ln(Sales) 0.132 0.147∗ 0.121 0.133∗∗ 0.151∗ 0.135∗∗
(0.093) (0.085) (0.069) (0.063) (0.086) (0.063)
Ln(Age) -0.107 -0.089 -0.032 -0.017 -0.077 -0.007
(0.148) (0.111) (0.092) (0.069) (0.112) (0.071)
Ln(R&D stock) 0.251∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.052) (0.035) (0.042) (0.052) (0.041)
Observations 3271 3271 3271 3271 3271 3271
Notes: This table presents estimates of OLS panel regressions of firms’ patents weighted by the number
of forward citations (CITES) and firms’ unweighted patent counts (PATS) on options volume (Optvol),
product market competition (Competition), their interaction and other firm-level control variables. Firms
in columns: 548. Robust standard errors are clustered at the three-digit industry level (in parentheses). All
regressions control for a full set of four-digit industry dummies, time dummies, and fixed effects by including
pre-sample means of the dependent variable as proposed by Blundell, Griffith, and van Reenen (1999). The
time period is 1996 – 2004 (with citations up to 2006). Product market competition is constructed as 1 −
Lerner index where Lerner is calculated as the median gross margin from the entire Compustat database in
the firm’s three-digit industry. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
1.5.2 Managerial entrenchment
Table 1.8 analyses the interaction between options trading and managerial entrenchment.
To measure the degree of managerial entrenchment, we use the “Governance Index” (G-
Index) introduced by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). It consists of twenty-four
corporate governance provisions and is based on firm-level corporate governance provi-
sions and firms’ governing state corporate law statutes. We obtain this information from
RiskMetrics. Because this covers S&P 1500 firms in 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004, our sam-
ple size declines in this analysis. A higher G-Index score indicates more restrictions on
shareholder rights or a greater number of anti-takeover measures.
Our evidence is consistent with the findings in Table 1.7. In line with the career concern
hypothesis (and in contrast to the quiet life hypothesis), the positive association between
options trading and innovation is stronger when managers are less entrenched. Specifically,
the interaction between options volume and managerial entrenchment in column 2 of Table
1.8 generates a significantly negative coefficient estimate of -0.028 (significant at 5%) while
the main effect of Ln(Optvol) remains positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.
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For robustness purposes, Table A.13 in the Appendix investigates the interaction between
options trading and the “Entrenchment Index” (E-Index) (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell,
2009). The findings are similar.
Table 1.8: Innovation and options volume – Managerial
entrenchment
Dependent Var. Ln(1+CITES) Ln(1+PATS)
Method: OLS (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Optvol) -0.028∗∗ -0.018
x G-Index (0.014) (0.013)
Ln(Optvol) 0.179∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.029) (0.029)
G-Index 0.019 0.045 0.010 0.026
(Governance Index) (0.033) (0.033) (0.029) (0.028)
InstOwn -0.067 -0.094 -0.031 -0.048
(0.191) (0.191) (0.169) (0.168)
Ln(K/L) 0.152∗∗ 0.151∗∗ 0.109∗ 0.109∗
(0.077) (0.076) (0.063) (0.063)
Ln(Sales) 0.111∗∗ 0.109∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.049) (0.046) (0.046)
Ln(Age) -0.184∗∗ -0.169∗ -0.114 -0.105
(0.092) (0.092) (0.085) (0.085)
Ln(R&D stock) 0.111∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.030) (0.027) (0.027)
Observations 921 921 921 921
Notes: This table presents estimates of OLS panel regressions of firms’
patents weighted by the number of forward citations (CITES) and firms’
unweighted patent counts (PATS), managerial entrenchment (G-Index),
their interaction and other firm-level control variables. Firms in columns:
331. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm (in parentheses). All
regressions control for a full set of three-digit industry dummies, time
dummies, and fixed effects by including pre-sample means of the depen-
dent variable as proposed by Blundell, Griffith, and van Reenen (1999).
The G-Index is an average of 24 provisions in the firm’s charter (see
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003). The measure is based on data from
RiskMetrics in 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
1.5.3 CEO age
Finally, we examine how CEO’s age alters the effect of options trading on innovation. To
capture CEO’s age, we extract information from ExecuComp. As before, this database
covers firms in the S&P 1500 so we are left with a sub-sample. Under the career concern
hypothesis, we expect that the effect of options trading on innovation should be more
pronounced for younger CEOs. If anything, it should increase the impact because career
concerns are stronger when managers are further from retirement, as that increases the
returns from influencing the market’s belief about their abilities. For this reason, invest-
ment decisions of younger CEOs should to be more affected by their career concerns than
those of older CEOs.
1.5. Possible Mechanisms 40
Table 1.9 presents evidence on the interaction between CEO’s age and options trading
on innovation. The estimate in column 2 of Table 1.9 confirms our conjecture and shows
a negative coefficient on the interaction term (-0.368) that is statistically significant at
the 5% level. Consistent with our earlier findings, the coefficient on Ln(Optvol) continues
to be positive and significant at the 1% level, while the coefficient on CEO age is negative
(older CEOs are less innovative), although the effect is not significant.
Table 1.9: Innovation and options volume – CEO age
Dependent Var. Ln(1+CITES) Ln(1+PATS)
Method: OLS (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Optvol) -0.368** -0.163
x Ln(CEO age) (0.162) (0.147)
Ln(Optvol) 0.166*** 0.162*** 0.161*** 0.159***
(0.044) (0.043) (0.035) (0.035)
Ln(CEO age) -0.245 -0.113 -0.309 -0.250
(0.389) (0.375) (0.339) (0.323)
InstOwn 0.005 0.036 -0.026 -0.012
(0.227) (0.226) (0.202) (0.203)
Ln(K/L) 0.050 0.045 0.097 0.095
(0.083) (0.082) (0.068) (0.068)
Ln(Sales) 0.299*** 0.301*** 0.241*** 0.241***
(0.068) (0.069) (0.060) (0.060)
Ln(Age) -0.155 -0.149 -0.086 -0.084
(0.132) (0.132) (0.113) (0.113)
Ln(R&D stock) 0.151*** 0.155*** 0.126** 0.128**
(0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052)
Observations 1996 1996 1996 1996
Notes: This table presents estimates of OLS panel regressions of firms’
patents weighted by the number of forward citations (CITES) and
firms’ unweighted patent counts (PATS) on options volume (Optvol),
CEO age, their interaction and other firm-level control variables.
Firms in columns: 337. Robust standard errors are clustered by
firm (in parentheses). All regressions control for a full set of four-
digit industry dummies, time dummies, and fixed effects by including
pre-sample means of the dependent variable as proposed by Blundell,
Griffith, and van Reenen (1999). CEO age is based on data from Ex-
ecuComp over the period 1996 – 2004. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
1.5.4 Profitability
To strengthen our explanation, in this section, we analyse one additional economic mech-
anism that is supposed to directly create greater market pressure imposed by investors – a
decline in profitability. Specifically, Kothari (2001) finds that financial reporting conveys
substantial information to outsiders about firm performance that significantly influences
market expectations and stock prices. Moreover, survey evidence reveals that profitability
is the most important externally reported performance measure and that the majority of
managers are willing to cut discretionary spending (e.g., R&D) to meet or exceed bench-
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marks (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005). Thus, the short-term pressure imposed
by external agents might be substantially more pronounced for firms with earnings that
reflect decreasing profitability because investors are more likely to exit based on this neg-
ative information and the stock price may drop. Managers in these firms are also at more
risk of being fired because boards aggressively fire CEOs for lower performance (Jenter
and Lewellen, 2014). In sum, if it is true that options trading activity shields managers
from short-term market pressures (and the risk of being fired), we expect that the positive
effect of options trading is magnified for firms with a decline in profitability.
Table 1.10 shows the results. In column 1, we regress the citations-weighted patent
count on the lagged change in profitability (adjusted by assets) and options trading (and
all the other controls). We find that higher profitability growth has a negative associ-
ation with innovation, but the effect is not significant, while the coefficient estimate on
Ln(Optvol) remains positive and significant. Column 2 interacts the profitability variable
with options volume. The coefficient on this interaction is negative and significant at
the 1% level, suggesting that innovation is more sensitive to options trading when firms’
profitability growth is lower. As before, columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.10 present the robust-
ness test by replacing the dependent variable with simple patent counts. Although we
observe a similar pattern, the coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant. This is
interesting, however, because at face value, this result combined with the insignificant in-
teractions in Table 1.8 and 1.9 when the dependent variable is replaced with Ln(1+PATS)
indicate that the effect of our mechanisms stems from its impact on R&D quality rather
than on higher patent propensities.
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Table 1.10: Innovation and options volume –
Profitability
Dependent Var. Ln(1+CITES) Ln(1+PATS)
Method: OLS (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Optvol) -0.308*** -0.127
x ∆ ROAt−1 (0.116) (0.082)
Ln(Optvol) 0.176*** 0.173*** 0.165*** 0.163***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.028) (0.028)
∆ ROAt−1 -0.256 0.517 -0.062 0.258
(0.229) (0.386) (0.151) (0.265)
InstOwn -0.124 -0.124 -0.245 -0.245
(0.175) (0.175) (0.158) (0.158)
Ln(K/L) 0.052 0.053 0.066 0.066
(0.058) (0.058) (0.051) (0.051)
Ln(Sales) 0.121*** 0.119** 0.128*** 0.127***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.039) (0.039)
Ln(Age) -0.088 -0.088 -0.032 -0.032
(0.094) (0.095) (0.081) (0.081)
Ln(R&D stock) 0.259*** 0.260*** 0.205*** 0.206***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.049) (0.049)
Observations 2658 2658 2658 2658
Notes: This table presents estimates of OLS panel regressions of
firms’ patents weighted by the number of forward citations (CITES)
and firms’ unweighted patent counts (PATS) on options volume
(Optvol), lagged change in profitability (∆ ROAt−1), their inter-
action and other firm-level control variables. Firms in columns: 526.
Robust standard errors are clustered by firm (in parentheses). All
regressions control for a full set of four-digit industry dummies, time
dummies, and fixed effects by including pre-sample means of the de-
pendent variable as proposed by Blundell, Griffith, and van Reenen
(1999). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
1.5.5 CEO compensation
Up to this point, we have not considered how managerial compensation can help to
motivate innovation. Under the optimal contracting view (Holmstro¨m and Tirole, 1993),
it is efficient for firms in active option markets to grant their managers more stock-
and less cash-based pay, as prices are more informative. At the same time, managerial
compensation packages that are closely tied to stock price may decrease risk aversion
and motivate the manager to expend effort in long-term intangible assets. In particular,
it is common to argue that incentives in the form of stock options prevent managers
from taking myopic decisions and provide them with increased incentives to take on risky
projects. Consistent with this, Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) find that compensation
structures with higher vega incentives (controlling for delta) are associated with riskier
investment policy as captured by increased R&D, increased focus and reduced PP&E.
Similarly, Francis, Hasan, and Sharma (2011) show that incentives in the form of vested
and unvested options have a positive and significant effect on patents and citations. Hence,
it is possible that part of the positive effect of options trading activity on innovation might
1.5. Possible Mechanisms 43
be attributable to contractual incentives. We explore this explicitly by conditioning on
executive compensation schemes.
The data on compensation comes from ExecuComp. Following prior literature (e.g.,
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006), the primary characteristics of compensation that we
consider are CEO delta and CEO option holdings vega. Delta is defined as the dollar
change in a CEO’s stock and option portfolio for a 1% change in stock price, and measures
the CEO’s incentives to increase stock price. Vega is the dollar change in a CEO’s option
holdings for a 1% change in stock return volatility; it measures the risk-taking incentives
generated by the CEO’s option holdings. These values are calculated using the one-
year approximation method of Core and Guay (2002). We also control for CEO cash
compensation (salary plus bonus) and CEO tenure as the number of years in office may
be associated with different compensation schemes.
In column 1 of Table 1.11, we re-estimate Eq. (1.1) on the sub-sample of firms with
non-missing compensation variables. The coefficient on Ln(Optvol) is 0.157 and significant
at the 1% level. In column 2, we add the compensation variables. The coefficients
on Ln(1+CEO vega) and Ln(1+CEO delta) are positive but insignificant while the key
coefficient on options volume continues to be positive but becomes smaller in magnitude
(i.e., goes down to 0.142), which represents a decrease of approximately 10% from the
estimate in column 1.32 In columns 3 and 4, we repeat the specifications of the first two
columns but use patent counts as dependent variable. We observe a similar pattern for
the coefficient on Ln(Optvol), i.e., it continues to be positive and significant but declines
by about 13% once the compensation variables are included. Interestingly, we also see
that the coefficient on Ln(1+CEO vega) turns significant, which means that higher vega
implies more innovative outputs (as one might expect). Overall, these findings suggest
that managerial compensation schemes capture part of the size effect of options trading
on innovation, and are thus part of the story, although the specific channel underlying
this mechanisms is rather ambiguous.
However, taking Table 1.11 as a whole, we note that options volume has a robust
positive effect on innovation across all the specifications, indicating that the relationship
between options trading activity and innovation goes substantially beyond compensa-
tion structures. This is what one would expect under the career concern explanation.
Specifically, although the design of the compensation contract can overcome some of the
disincentives to innovate, it does not shield managers from the reputational effects of
failed innovation. As Gillan, Hartzell, and Parrino (2009) show, in 2000, 54% of the firms
32The insignificant coefficient on CEO delta is consistent with the result in Fang, Tian, and Tice
(2014), indicating that greater pay-performance sensitivity is not associated with more innovation. This
finding remains unaltered if we replace CEO delta by the scaled wealth-performance sensitivity measure of
Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009). In an identical specification to column 2, the coefficient (standard
error) on this variable is 0.037 (0.048) whereas the coefficient (standard error) on options volume is 0.137
(0.045).
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in the S&P 500 had no explicit employment agreement with their CEOs (i.e., the CEOs
were employed “at will”). The median time horizon of the remaining 45% was 3 years.
Hence, because CEOs enter the labour market repeatedly, their payoffs are ultimately not
determined by explicit contracts, but by the effect their respective reputation has on their
ability to contract in the future.33
Table 1.11: Innovation and options volume – CEO
compensation
Dependent Var. Ln(1+CITES) Ln(1+PATS)
Method: OLS (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Optvol) 0.157∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.045) (0.035) (0.037)
Ln(1+CEO vega) 0.070 0.106∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.033)
Ln(1+CEO delta) 0.021 0.015
(0.058) (0.048)
Ln(1+CEO tenure) -0.037 -0.032
(0.050) (0.042)
Ln(1+CEO cash compensation) -0.066 -0.094∗∗
(0.047) (0.040)
InstOwn -0.107 -0.125 -0.135 -0.168
(0.204) (0.210) (0.188) (0.193)
Ln(K/L) 0.013 0.022 0.048 0.058
(0.085) (0.086) (0.070) (0.069)
Ln(Sales) 0.301∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.073) (0.063) (0.062)
Ln(Age) -0.164 -0.168 -0.075 -0.084
(0.127) (0.128) (0.116) (0.117)
Ln(R&D stock) 0.148∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗ 0.106∗∗
(0.055) (0.055) (0.052) (0.051)
Observations 1845 1845 1845 1845
Notes: This table presents estimates of OLS panel regressions of firms’ patents
weighted by the number of forward citations (CITES) and firms’ unweighted patent
counts (PATS) on options volume (Optvol), CEO compensation variables and other
firm-level control variables. Compensation variables are based on data from Exe-
cuComp over the period 1996 – 2004. CEO vega is the dollar change in the CEO’s
wealth for a 0.01 change in standard deviation of returns; CEO delta is the dollar
change in the CEO’s wealth for a 0.01 change in stock price; Vega and delta values
are calculated using the one-year approximation method of Core and Guay (2002).
CEO cash compensation is the sum of CEO salary and bonus and CEO tenure
is the number of years the CEO has held the position. Firms in columns: 323.
Robust standard errors are clustered by firm (in parentheses). All regressions con-
trol for a full set of four-digit industry dummies, time dummies, and fixed effects
by including pre-sample means of the dependent variable as proposed by Blundell,
Griffith, and van Reenen (1999). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
33Incorporating the choice of compensation contracts as a consequence of options trading into our anal-
ysis clearly goes beyond the scope of this paper, but endogenizing this decision represents an interesting
avenue for future research.
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1.6 Discussion and Conclusion
How do financial derivatives affect managerial investment decisions in the real economy?
Specifically, do they hinder or promote innovation? This paper attempts to answer these
questions by studying the relationship between innovation and options markets.
Our findings contrast with the view that developed financial markets exacerbate my-
opic behaviour by managers and suggest instead that the presence of informed traders
in the options market boosts innovation, even after accounting for R&D investments and
the potential endogeneity of options volume. In particular, firms with more options trad-
ing activity obtain more patents and patent citations per dollar of R&D invested. We
interpret these findings as evidence that the enhanced information efficiency induced by
options reduces information asymmetries related to R&D, which provides incentives to
managers to invest in innovation. This positive impact could derive from a change in the
direction of innovative activities or an increase in R&D spending and productivity. Our
findings support the former: firms with greater options trading activity pursue a more
creative, diverse and risky innovation strategy.
Our results complement those of Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2009), who find
that option markets increase firm valuations by allowing agents to cover more contin-
gencies and by stimulating trading on private information. Specifically, we strengthen
their claims by establishing a direct link between options trading activity and managerial
investment decisions and show that higher levels of options volume are associated with a
more efficient allocation of R&D resources, which then translates into higher firm value.
To show this, we rely on two findings. First, Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) provide
evidence that an extra citation per patent boosts a firm’s market value by 3%. Second,
we repeat the tests in Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) with a slightly augmented set
of control variables. We find that the raw number of patent counts and cite-weighted
patent counts have a positive and significant association with a firm’s market value.34 In
summary, these pieces of evidence suggest that informed traders in the options market
reward successful innovation outcomes with a higher valuation. Together with the core
finding of our paper that the main effect of options trading is to alter the quality of inno-
vation outputs, the above evidence seems to reveal one possible “bright” side of financial
derivatives: their positive impact on firms’ market value by motivating firms to invest in
innovative activities.
We discuss several possible mechanisms that could contribute to these findings. First,
in line with Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) and contrary to the view that in-
formed traders have a disciplinary effect on managers by “forcing” them to innovate, we
find that the presence of informed traders improves the incentives to innovate by reducing
34These results are tabulated in Table A.14 in the Appendix.
1.6. Discussion and Conclusion 46
career concerns. The beneficial effect of options trading is more pronounced when prod-
uct market competition is intense, when managers are less entrenched, and for younger
CEOs. We complement their findings by showing that informed agents play a crucial role
in motivating innovation, even if these agents cannot intervene directly in firms’ opera-
tions (i.e., compared to blockholders). Second, given the pressure from investors to meet
profitability targets, decreasing investments in innovation is one of the major real earnings
management tools that managers often use to report positive or increasing income. Our
analysis indicates that informed traders do recognize the consequences of cutting R&D
activities and therefore mitigate myopic investment problems. Lastly, we show that the
role of informed trading in motivating innovation exists beyond the structure of manage-
rial compensation and corresponding incentives. Although compensation is a mechanism
that links options trading activity and innovation, this effect appears to be substantially
dominated by reputation-based incentives, at least in our setting.
While our findings on these mechanisms are consistency with our theory, an unan-
swered question remains, namely, what is the bottom-line impact of options trading on
innovation after accounting for the proposed economic mechanisms. To that end, we di-
rectly control for all five mechanism variables and re-estimate an augmented version of
Eq. (1.1). The results are tabulated in the Appendix, Table A.15. Overall, we find that
options trading continues to be positively and significantly (at the 1% level) related to
innovation even after controlling for its dependence on these mechanisms but becomes
smaller in magnitude (i.e., goes down from 0.216 to 0.154), which reflects a 29% drop
from the baseline model.35 This suggests that while our mechanisms are able to explain
a significant proportion of the positive effect of options trading on innovation, the re-
maining effect is still strikingly large. Specifically, a coefficient of 0.154 suggests that an
increase of 200% in the dollar volume of options traded is associated with a 31% increase
in cite-weighted patents. For a median firm in this sub-sample, this implies that an in-
crease in the trading volume from $15 million to $45 million leads to approximately 7
additional cite-weighted patents (i.e., from 21 to 28). This is a result of economic as well
as statistical significance.
Clearly, we made some simplifying assumptions throughout the paper. Specifically, we
assume that managers can influence corporate innovation. However, even in the absence
of a specific link, there are several reasons to believe that managers can indeed influence
patent-based measures of innovation. As Lerner and Wulf (2007) emphasise, managers
can change the compensation schemes of R&D executives towards more long-term incen-
35To avoid too many missing values in this test, we fill years missing G-Index with the preceding year’s
G-Index. Also note that the magnitude of the baseline estimate is different from the one reported in
Table 1.2, column 4, because we have only a sub-sample of firms (i.e., firms included in the S&P 1500
index) with non-missing mechanism variable. This allows us to compare the change in coefficients on the
same observations.
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tives, which can significantly improve the quality of innovative outputs. Managers could
also initiate reorganizations with new strategic priorities. For instance, Daniel Vasella,
the CEO of Novartis from 1996 to 2010, generated a large increase in R&D productiv-
ity with two major strategic moves. First, Vasella expanded Novartis’s research from a
narrow focus on internal discovery and development capabilities to exploration in new
areas through extensive collaborations and the establishment of science-based research
institutes. Second, he assigned budget and performance responsibilities over R&D to the
business units by setting precise goals, cutting waste, and rewarding successful innovators
(Datar and Reavis, 2003).
Moreover, while our study draws on one particular “bright” side of financial derivatives,
we are agnostic about how these instruments may affect other stakeholder groups in other
ways. Although innovation is important for growth and the wealth of nations, we do
not conclude that the greater research productivity shown in our study enhances social
welfare. With estimates of the current size of the market for derivatives at approximately
$700 trillion, this should, however, be a concern for academics, government regulators,
managers, and investors. We leave a proper evaluation of the net effects of financial
derivatives for future research.
Chapter 2
Measuring Risk when Expected
Losses are Unbounded
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2.1 Introduction
Risk measurement is becoming more and more important in Economics, Finance and
Insurance. Although the standard deviation has many interesting properties as a risk
measure in a Gaussian world, asymmetries and heavy tails imply inconsistencies between
the standard deviation and the second order stochastic dominance (or the classical utility
functions), and they also make it difficult to interpret the standard deviation in terms
of potential capital losses. Several recent approaches have attempted to overcome these
drawbacks. In particular, a first line of research deals with the axioms that an index of
riskiness must satisfy from an Economic Theory perspective (Aumann and Serrano, 2008),
whereas a second line deals with the properties allowing us to interpret a risk measure as
potential losses and capital requirements (Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath, 1999).
This paper focuses on the Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999) approach with
a significant novelty: We allow for risks generating unbounded expected losses. As will
be seen, Cauchy or a Pareto distribution presents many mathematical problthe inclusion
of risks with unbounded expectation (for instance, risks with a ems when extending the
notion of coherent (Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath, 1999) or expectation bounded
(Rockafellar, Uryasev, and Zabarankin, 2006) generalized risk measure, and previous lit-
erature has addressed this caveat by losing some desirable mathematical properties. For
instance, if we use the value at risk (V aR) as a risk measure then we lose continuity
and sub-additivity. Though there are risk measures for heavy tailed risks recovering sub-
additivity (or convexity at least, Kupper and Svindland (2011)), we still lose continuity.
This paper overcomes the mathematical problems above by extending a given coherent
or expectation bounded risk measure to a limited new setting. For instance, despite the
fact that the conditional value at risk (CV aR) cannot be continuously extended to the
whole space of random risks, we will see that in fact it can be continuously extended to
some “smaller” spaces containing some risks with infinite expected value. In practical
situations most of the involved risks will have finite expected value, so we should not
expect to find infinitely many risks with infinite expectation. More likely, we will just
find a few, or even only one. Then, instead of extending a coherent risk measure to a “too
large set of risks”, we will look for extensions applying if the set of heavy tailed risks is
finitely generated.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 is devoted to introducing notations, the
framework, and the main problem we are going to address: The extension of risk measures
so as to conserve continuity and sub-additivity (or convexity, at least) and simultaneously
involve risks whose fat tail leads to unbounded expected losses. We will summarize the
mathematical problems affecting this objective.
Theorem 2 is the main result of Section 3. It states the existence of the required
extension if the set of fat tailed risks has a finite generator. Furthermore, Remarks 3 and
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4 will show how to construct the extended risk measure in a recursive manner.
Section 4 provides us with illustrative examples and applications. In particular, we
will extend the CV aR and the weighted CV aR (WCV aR) by “integrating in a coherent
manner” these risk measures with the V aR of the heavy tailed risks. We have selected
CV aR and WCV aR due to their additional properties, since they are consistent with sec-
ond order stochastic dominance (Ogryczak and Ruszczynski, 2002) and may be frequently
optimized by linear programming methods (Mansini, Ogryczak, and Speranza (2007), see
also Konno and Yamamoto (2005)). We will also summarize some actuarial applications,
such as some extensions of the expected value premium principle.
The last section of the paper summarizes the most important conclusions.
2.2 Preliminaries and Notations
Consider the probability space (Ω,F , IP) composed of the set of “states of the world”
Ω, the σ−algebra F and the probability measure IP. Denote by IE (y) the mathematical
expectation of every IR−valued random variable y defined on Ω. Let 1 6 p < ∞ and
denote by Lp the Banach space of random variables y on Ω such that IE (|y|p) < ∞,1
endowed with the norm
‖y‖p = (IE (|y|p))1/p .
According to the Riesz Representation Theorem, Lq is the dual space of Lp, where q ∈
(1,∞] is characterized by 1/p+ 1/q = 1.
Let [0, T ] be a time interval. From an intuitive point of view, one can interpret that
y ∈ Lp represents the portfolio pay-off at T for some arbitrary investor (finance), or
claims at T for some arbitrary insurer (actuarial science). Throughout this paper y will
represent the random wealth at T , although other interpretations would not modify our
main conclusions. If
ρ : Lp −→ IR
is a risk measure then ρ (y) may be understood as the “risk” associated with the wealth
y. Let us assume that ρ satisfies a representation theorem in the line of Artzner, Delbaen,
Eber, and Heath (1999) or Rockafellar, Uryasev, and Zabarankin (2006). More precisely,
consider the sub-gradient of ρ
∆ρ = {z ∈ Lq;−IE (yz) 6 ρ (y) , ∀y ∈ Lp} ⊂ Lq (2.1)
composed of those linear expressions lower than ρ. ∆ρ will be convex and
1and therefore IE
(
|y|p′
)
<∞ if 1 6 p′ 6 p. Recall that Lp′ ⊃ Lp if 1 6 p′ 6 p.
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weakly∗−compact,2 and ρ will be its envelope, in the sense that
ρ (y) = Max {−IE (yz) ; z ∈ ∆ρ} (2.2)
holds for every y ∈ Lp. Furthermore, we will also assume the existence of E˜ρ > 0 such
that
∆ρ ⊂
{
z ∈ Lq; IE (z) = E˜ρ
}
. (2.3)
These assumptions are equivalent to the well-known properties of sub-additivity, homo-
geneity and translation invariance. To sum up, we have:
Assumption 1. The risk measure ρ satisfies the equivalent conditions a) and b)
below:
a) The set ∆ρ given by (2.1) is convex and weakly
∗−compact, (2.2) holds for every
y ∈ Lp, and (2.3) holds.
b) ρ is continuous, sub-additive ( ρ (y1 + y2) 6 ρ (y1) + ρ (y2)), homogeneous ( ρ (λy) =
λρ (y) if λ > 0) and E˜ρ−translation invariant ( ρ (y + k) = ρ (y1) − E˜ρk if k ∈ IR is
zero-variance).
We will not prove the equivalence between Conditions a) and b) above as similar results
may be found in several papers (see, for instance, Balba´s, Balba´s, and Balba´s (2013)).
Assumption 1 is not at all restrictive since it is satisfied by every expectation bounded
risk measure with E˜ρ = 1 and by every deviation measure (Rockafellar, Uryasev, and
Zabarankin, 2006) with E˜ρ = 0. Examples of expectation bounded risk measures are the
CV aR and the WCV aR, amongst many others. Examples of deviation measures are,
amongst others, the classical p−deviation
σp (y) = [IE (|IE (y)− y|p)]1/p ,
or the upside and downside p−semi-deviations
σ+p (y) = [IE (|Max {y − IE (y) , 0}|p)]1/p
and
σ−p (y) = [IE (|Max {IE (y)− y, 0}|p)]1/p .
If E˜ρ = 1 then it is easy to see that ρ is also coherent in the sense of Artzner, Delbaen,
Eber, and Heath (1999) if and only if
∆ρ ⊂ Lq+ = {z ∈ Lq; IP (z > 0) = 1} .
2See Rudin [15] for further details about weakly∗−compact sets in Banach spaces.
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Assumption 1 may be relaxed and the main conclusions of this paper remain true. For
instance, sub-additivity and homogeneity may be replaced by convexity (in the line of
Balba´s, Balba´s, and Balba´s (2010) or Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002)) and E˜ρ−translation
invariance may be removed in 1b). Nevertheless, we prefer to impose Assumption 1 as it
is because it significantly simplifies the exposition.
We will also deal with the (metric but not Banach) space L0. Every random variable
belongs to L0, whose usual metric is given by
d (y1, y2) = IE (Min {|y1 − y2| , 1}) .
It is known that Metric d above leads to the “convergence in probability”, which is strictly
weaker than the Lp-convergence. As said above, d cannot be given by a norm, and L0
is not a Banach space. Therefore, the dual space of L0 may be “too small”, and this
dual actually reduces to zero if IP is atomless (Rudin [15]). In particular, if a function
ρ : L0 −→ IR satisfies Condition 1a), then (2.2) implies that ρ = 0. In other words:
Remark 1 Assumption 1 cannot be imposed for functionals ρ : L0 −→ IR, because it
would imply that ρ = 0 if IP were atomless.
The latter remark implies that there are no non-null, continuous, sub-additive and ho-
mogeneous functionals on L0 (or even on much smaller proper subspaces of L0, Delbaen
(2009)). Yet in finance, operational risk and insurance one can find risks whose distribu-
tion does not belong to L1, i.e., it does not have a finite expectation (Chavez-Demoulin,
Embrechts, and Nesˇlehova´, 2006). Several authors have proposed to use V aR if tails
are so heavy that it is impossible to find sub-additive risk measures (Chavez-Demoulin,
Embrechts, and Nesˇlehova´ (2006), Embrechts, Puccetti, Ru¨schendorf, Wang, and Beleraj
(2014), etc.). Others have studied non-continuous sub-additive risk measures (Kupper
and Svindland, 2011). On the other hand, using continuous sub-additive risk measures
has many important analytical advantages, since the optimization of such functions is
much simpler and many classical financial and actuarial problems (pricing and hedging,
portfolio choice, equilibrium, optimal reinsurance, etc.) become much easier to tackle
(Balba´s, Balba´s, and Balba´s (2010), among others). For these reasons, it may be worth-
while to look for partial solutions overcoming Remark 1 above, while still preserving some
kind of continuity and sub-additivity. This is the main purpose of this paper.
Consider a finite collection of linearly independent final wealths
{w1, w2, ..., wm} ⊂ L0
and suppose that their tails are so fat that wi /∈ L1, i = 1, 2, ...,m (i.e., IE (|wi|) = ∞,
i = 1, 2, ...,m). Consider the linear manifold L generated by {w1, w2, ..., wm} and suppose
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that it does not contain non-null elements of Lp. Since L has finite dimension, it only
has a unique separated vector topology (Rudin, 1973), and this is the one induced by the
topology of L0. In other words, the sequence (
∑m
i=1 xi,nwi)
∞
n=1 converges in probability
to
∑m
i=1 xiwi if and only if (xi,n)
∞
n=1 converges to xi, i = 1, 2, ...,m. Thus, manifold L
recovers the structure of a Banach space and we can define non-trivial risk measures on
L, that we will denote ρL.
Assumption 2. A risk measure ρL : L −→ IR satisfies the equivalent conditions a)
and b) below:
a) The set
∆L =
{(ξi)mi=1 ∈ IRm; −
∑m
i=1 xiξi 6 ρL (
∑m
i=1 xiwi) ∀ (xi)mi=1 ∈ IRm}
⊂ IRm
is convex and compact, and
ρL (w) = Max
{
−
m∑
i=1
xiξi; (ξ1, ξ2, ..., ξm) ∈ ∆L
}
holds for every w =
∑m
i=1 xiwi ∈ L.
b) ρL is continuous, sub-additive, and homogeneous.
2.3 Extending the risk measure
As said above, L does not present the drawbacks of L0, and the risk measure ρL does
satisfy the required properties. According to Remark 1, ρL cannot be extended to the
whole space L0 unless we lose its good properties. Thus, let us propose a partial extension
that allows the “integration” those risks included in L and those included in Lp. In
practical applications we do not expect to find infinitely many risks involving infinite
expectations. More likely, we will just find a few (or even only one). Then, the proposed
solution may be sufficient, since we will be able to have a “global risk measure” containing
both ρ and ρL.
In order to jointly manage the risk given by ρ and ρL, we need to deal with the space
Lp + L =
{
y +
m∑
i=1
xiwi ∈ L0; y ∈ Lp, (x1, x2, ..., xm) ∈ IRm
}
which contains those risks included in Lp, those ones included in L, and their linear
combinations.
Theorem 2 There exists an extension ρ˜L : L
p + L −→ IR such that:
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a) ρ˜L is continuous, sub-additive, homogeneous, and E˜ρ−translation invariant (i.e.,
ρ˜L (y + w + k) = ρ˜L (y + w)− E˜ρk if y ∈ Lp, w ∈ L, and k ∈ IR).
b) ρ˜L (y) = ρ (y) if y ∈ Lp and ρ˜L (w) = ρL (w) if w ∈ L.
c) ρ˜L is minimal among the functionals Γ : L
p + L −→ IR satisfying a) and b).
d) The set (sub-gradient of ρ˜L)
∆˜L =
{(z, ξ) ;− IE (yz)−∑mi=1 xiξi 6 ρ˜L (y +∑mi=1 xiwi) ∀ (y, x) ∈ Lp × IRm}
⊂ Lq × IRm
(2.4)
is convex and weakly∗−compact.
e)
ρ˜L (y + w) = Max
{
− IE (yz)−
m∑
i=1
xiξi; (z, ξ1, ξ2, ..., ξm) ∈ ∆˜L
}
(2.5)
holds for every y ∈ Lp and every w = ∑mi=1 xiwi ∈ L.
We will skip the proof of Theorem 2 since it is quite technical and beyond the scope of
this paper.3 However, from an intuitive viewpoint, Theorem 2 has a simple interpretation.
One can extend both ρ and ρL in such a manner that they become “integrated” in a
global measure ρ˜L which preserves the required properties, despite the fact that L
p + L
has infinitely many dimensions and the convergence in this global space still involves
convergence in probability. Therefore, one can simultaneously deal with those standard
risks y with finite expectations and those much heavier tailed risks w whose expectations
are not finite.
Theorem 2 is an existence result, but it does not indicate how to construct ρ˜L in
practice. Let us address this point.
Remark 3 (Building ρ˜L in practice for a single heavy tailed risk). Suppose firstly that
m = 1, i.e., L is a linear manifold generated by only one heavy tailed risk w with no finite
expected value.
Step 1. Construct the sub-gradient ∆˜L of ρ˜L in such a way that the natural projections
Πp : L
p + L −→ Lp and ΠL : Lp + L −→ L satisfy Πp
(
∆˜L
)
= ∆ρ and ΠL
(
∆˜L
)
= ∆L.
It may be easily done as follows:
Step 2. Fix φ ∈ Lp,
− ρ (φ) = Min {IE (φz) ; z ∈ ∆ρ} (2.6)
3The proof uses the Hausdorff maximal principle or, equivalently, the Zorn’s lemma (Rudin, 1973)).
One must construct familes of weakly∗−compact sub-sets of Lq× IRm whose projections equal ∆ρ and ∆L
respectively. The intersection of a totally ordered sub-family is non void and minimal for the sub-family,
and the Zorn´s lemma leads to the sub-gradient ∆˜L of ρ˜L.
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and
ρ (−φ) = Max {IE (φz) ; z ∈ ∆ρ} (2.7)
(see (2.2)). Choose φ in such a manner that −ρ (φ) < ρ (−φ) holds.4 Notice that (2.6)
and (2.7) obviously imply that
− ρ (φ) 6 IE (φz) 6 ρ (−φ) (2.8)
holds for every z ∈ ∆ρ.
Step 3. Transform the interval
[−ρ (φ) , ρ (−φ)]
into the interval
[−ρL (w) , ρL (−w)]
by means of the (one to one, unless −ρL (w) = ρL (−w)) increasing affine function5
[−ρ (φ) , ρ (−φ)] 3 t −→ F (t) =
−ρL (w) + ρL (−w) + ρL (w)
ρ (−φ) + ρ (φ) (t+ ρ (φ)) ∈ [−ρL (w) , ρL (−w)] .
Step 4. ∆˜L will be chosen according to the affine function above. More precisely,
∆˜L =
{(z, ξ) ; z ∈ ∆ρ and ξ = F (IE (φz))}
⊂ Lq × IR.
(2.9)
According to (2.8), the construction of ∆˜L is correct and its weakly
∗−compactness follows
from the weakly∗−compactness of ∆ρ and the continuity of F and IE. It may be also proved
that Πp
(
∆˜L
)
= ∆ρ and ΠL
(
∆˜L
)
= ∆L hold, though this proof is complex and therefore
omitted.
Step 5. Once ∆˜L is known, ρ˜L is given by (2.5), which becomes now
ρ˜L (y + xw) = Max {− IE (yz)− xF (IE (φz)) ; z ∈ ∆ρ} (2.10)
4Notice that 0 = ρ (0) 6 ρ (φ) + ρ (−φ) leads to −ρ (φ) 6 ρ (−φ). Moreover, the existence of φ
satisfying the strict inequality holds if ρ is not linear (∆ρ is not a singleton), which is the case for all of
the usual risk measures.
5Once again, 0 = ρL (0) 6 ρL (w) + ρL (−w) leads to −ρL (w) 6 ρL (−w).
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for every y ∈ Lp and every x ∈ IR. Manipulating,
IE (yz) + xF (IE (φz)) =
IE (yz) + x
(
−ρL (w) + ρL (−w) + ρL (w)
ρ (−φ) + ρ (φ) (IE (φz) + ρ (φ))
)
=
IE
(
z
(
y + x
(
ρL (−w) + ρL (w)
ρ (−φ) + ρ (φ) φ
)))
+x
(
−ρL (w) + ρL (−w) + ρL (w)
ρ (−φ) + ρ (φ) ρ (φ)
)
,
and (2.2) and (2.10) imply that
ρ˜L (y + xw) =
ρ
(
y + x
(
ρL (−w) + ρL (w)
ρ (−φ) + ρ (φ) φ
))
+
(
ρL (w)− ρL (−w) + ρL (w)
ρ (−φ) + ρ (φ) ρ (φ)
)
x.
(2.11)
Notice that (2.11) leads to ρ˜L (y) = ρ (y) if x = 0, and ρ˜L (w) = ρL (w) if y = 0 and
x = 1. In other words, ρ˜L really extends ρ and ρL.
The selection of φ (Step 2) is only constrained by the inequality −ρ (φ) < ρ (−φ),
which generates many degrees of freedom. In other words, we really have a choice when
computing in practice the extension ρ˜L of Theorem 2, since it is not unique. Next section
gives some rules to select φ, mainly related to the specific risk ρ˜L (y + xw) that one would
like to associate with some reachable strategies y + xw of Lp + L.
Remark 4 (Building ρ˜L in practice: General case). Let us apply the induction method
on the number m of heavy tailed risks. Suppose that we have an extension ρ˜L of ρ and ρL
on Lp+Lm−1, Lm−1 denoting the linear manifold generated by {w1, w2, ..., wm−1}. In such
a case we have to extend ρ˜L to one more dimension, and it is obvious that the methodology
described in Step 1 − Step 5 above applies again. Thus, bearing in mind (2.11), we can
select φm ∈ Lp with −ρ (φm) < ρ (−φm) and the global risk measure ρ˜L will be given by
ρ˜L (y +
∑m
i=1 xiwi) =
ρ˜L
(
y + xm
(
ρL (−wm) + ρL (wm)
ρ (−φm) + ρ (φm) φm
)
+
∑m−1
i=1 xiwi
)
+
(
ρL (wm)− ρL (−wm) + ρL (wm)
ρ (−φm) + ρ (φm) ρ (φm)
)
xm.
(2.12)
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2.4 Examples
Expressions (2.11) and (2.12) provide us with the continuous, sub-additive, homogeneous
and E˜ρ−translation invariant extensions we were looking for. Moreover, they may be
easily computed in practice because we have closed formulas, and they are easily optimized
(minimized) because we have a convex and weakly∗−compact sub-gradient (see (2.4),
(2.5), (2.9) and (2.10)). Let us show two examples whose unique objective is to illustrate
how ρ˜L is in practice.
Example 1. Suppose that we would like to use the conditional value at risk ρ =
CV aRµ with the level of confidence 0 < µ < 1, but one of the risks w has a Pareto
distribution with unbounded expectation (for instance, this situation may be usual in
operational risk, Chavez-Demoulin, Embrechts, and Nesˇlehova´ (2006)). Obviously ρ (w) =
CV aRµ (w) = ∞, which means that CV aRµ is not continuous any more and, therefore,
the computation and optimization of risks such as CV aRµ (y + xw), with y ∈ L1 and
x ∈ IR, is quite difficult to address from a mathematical perspective (Balba´s et al [3]).
Then, following Embrechts, Frey, and McNeil (2005), one can deal with the value at risk
in order to measure the risk of the heavy tailed distribution w, and then to integrate this
risk measure with the conditional value at risk. In such a case, (2.11) leads to the risk
measure
C˜V aRµ (y + xw) =
CV aRµ
(
y + x
(
V aRµ (−w) + V aRµ (w)
CV aRµ (−φ) + CV aRµ (φ)φ
))
+
(
V aRµ (w)− V aRµ (−w) + V aRµ (w)
CV aRµ (−φ) + CV aRµ (φ)CV aRµ (φ)
)
x,
(2.13)
for y ∈ L1 and x ∈ IR. Expression (2.13) provides us with a continuous, sub-additive,
homogeneous and 1−translation invariant risk measure that extends CV aRµ and applies
to the Pareto distribution w and its linear combinations with risks of bounded expectation.
Furthermore, according to Remark 3, (2.4) and (2.5), and bearing in mind that the
CV aRµ−sub-gradient is (Rockafellar, Uryasev, and Zabarankin, 2006){
z ∈ L1; IE (z) = 1, 0 6 z 6 1
1− µ
}
,
(2.13) may be represented by its convex and weakly∗−compact sub-gradient, composed
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of those couples (z, ξ) ∈ L1 × IR such that
IE (z) = 1
0 6 z 6 1
1−µ
ξ = −V aRµ (w) + V aRµ (−w) + V aRµ (w)
CV aRµ (−φ) + CV aRµ (φ) (IE (φz) + CV aRµ (φ))
. (2.14)
As already said, we have a choice for φ ∈ L1, and the selection of this risk affects the final
extension C˜V aRµ in (2.13). In practice φ may be chosen in such a manner that the risk
of some selected heavy tailed distributions still matches their value at risk, since V aRµ
has a nice economic interpretation in terms of potential capital losses. Formally, one can
select a collection of risks {y1, y2, ..., yk} ⊂ L1 with bounded expectation, and then choose
φ ∈ L1 so as to satisfy
C˜V aRµ (yi + w) = V aRµ (yi + w) ,
i = 1, 2, ..., k. 
Example 2. According to Remark 4, Example 1 may be easily extended for more
than one Pareto (or other heavy tailed) distribution. In other words, if {w1, w2, ..., wm}
are independent Pareto distributions whose non-trivial linear combinations have un-
bounded expectations, then one can construct a continuous, sub-additive, homogeneous
and 1−translation invariant C˜V aRµ such that C˜V aRµ (y) = CV aRµ (y) if the expecta-
tion of y is bounded, and C˜V aRµ (wi) = V aRµ (wi), i = 1, 2, ...,m. Expression (2.12)
provides us with the effective construction in a recursive manner. Besides, the role of
CV aR may be played by many other coherent risk measures (Wang measure, dual power
transform, risk measures given by concave distortions, weighted CV aR, etc.), and the role
of V aR may be played by alternative selections of every risk ρL (wi) (ad hoc selections
based on expert opinions and such that −ρL (wi) 6 ρL (−wi), V aR with much higher
level of confidence than µ if the tails are too fat, etc.). Finally, if the role of the coherent
risk measure is replaced by a deviation measure (absolute deviation, standard deviation,
semi-deviations, etc.), then we will be creating its continuous, sub-additive, homogeneous
and 0−translation invariant extensions (deviations) that also apply for some risks with
unbounded expectation (and therefore unbounded first order central moment, unbounded
second order central moment, etc.) and their linear combinations with risks with finite
mean value. 
Example 3. (Actuarial application: Extending the expected value premium prin-
ciple). Many classical financial and actuarial problems (portfolio choice, optimal rein-
surance, operational risk, etc.) have been revisited with coherent risk measures. Our
extension permits us to involve risks with unbounded expectation.
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Let us deal with a particular application whose purpose is just illustrative. Consider
a random wealth w whose expectation equals infinite. w endows IR with a probability
measure IP on its Borel σ−algebra F . Obviously,
IE (|w|) =
∫ ∞
−∞
|u| dIP (u) =∞, (2.15)
and therefore IE (w) and CV aRµ (w) do not exist. According to Example 1, we can
consider the risk measure C˜V aRµ, which satisfies C˜V aRµ (w) = V aRµ (w).
There are many derivatives f (w) of w belonging to L1, and therefore the expected
value premium principle (EV PP ) applies for them all. If λ > 0 is the loading rate, then
the price of f (w) will be given by
EV PPλ (f (w)) = (1 + λ) IE (f (w)) = (1 + λ)
∫ ∞
−∞
f (u) dIP (u) . (2.16)
Interesting particular cases for f (w) may be the “call-spreads with thresholds a < b”,
given by
f (w) =

0, if w < a
w − a, if a 6 w 6 b
b− a, if w > b
but there are much more examples. Since (2.16) applies to price every f (w) ∈ L1, we
can use the pricing method of Balba´s et al [5] in order to overcome the caveat implied
by (2.15), and therefore we can extend (2.16) and create the pricing rule EV PP(λ,µ,φ)
for risks being linear combinations of w and L1. Actually, EV PP(λ,µ,φ) (w) will be the
optimal value of 
Min (1 + λ)
[
C˜V aRµ (y − w) + IE (y)
]
y = f (w) ∈ L1
y being the decision variable. According to Balba´s et al. [5], EV PPλ will be extended
to EV PP(λ,µ,φ) in such a manner that it is still continuous on L
1 + {xw;x ∈ IR}, sub-
additive and homogeneous. Moreover, bearing in mind (2.9), (2.14), and the duality
results of Balba´s, Balba´s, and Garrido (2010), it may be proved that
EV PP(λ,µ,φ) (w) =
(1 + λ)
[
−V aRµ (w) + V aRµ (−w) + V aRµ (w)
CV aRµ (−φ) + CV aRµ (φ) (IE (φ) + CV aRµ (φ))
]
.

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2.5 Conclusions
This paper has proposed a constructive way so as to extend risk measures beyond L1 and
simultaneously preserve good mathematical properties such as continuity, sub-additivity,
homogeneity and translation invariance. This may be very useful in order to integrate in
a global framework risks with unbounded expectation (for instance, some Pareto distribu-
tions) with more standard risks. The good properties of the extended risk measure have
favorable implications, in the sense that many classical actuarial and financial problems
(pricing, hedging, portfolio selection, equilibrium, optimal reinsurance, operational risk,
etc.) may be revisit when some expectations are infinite. Illustrative practical exam-
ples have been presented, such as extensions for the conditional value at risk or for the
expected value premium principle.
Chapter 3
Modelling Electricity Swaps with
Stochastic Forward Premium Models
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3.1 Introduction
A growing number of electricity market participants use derivatives contracts as a way
of trading synthetic electricity generation plants1. Therefore, electricity derivatives are
becoming progressively an important part of the global energy commodities market. By
far, the most liquid derivatives contracts in the electricity markets are forwards, futures
and swaps2. Thus, to develop proper models of these electricity contracts is an important
step for computing risk measures and for the pricing of other derivatives (e.g. options).
The first pricing models for electricity forwards and swaps relied on the classic cost-of-
carry pricing model (i.e. spot-price-based approach). This approach has been reasonably
successful in the case of many storable commodities; see Schwartz (1997). In this vein,
Hilliard and Reis (1998), Schwartz and Smith (2000), Lucia and Schwartz (2002), Cartea
and Figueroa (2005) and Casassus and Collin-Dufresne (2005), among others, presented
extensions of the basic model. However, in the case of electricity, this approach is prob-
lematic. First, electricity swap contracts imply the delivery of a non-storable commod-
ity (electricity) during a period (e.g. twenty-four hours a day during the whole month
of January) instead of the point-in-time delivery period that is common in most other
commodity forward contracts. The non-storability of electricity makes the standard no-
arbitrage pricing approach hard to justify. Second, the framework based on spot prices
is unable to incorporate information about the future (e.g. addition of new generation
facilities). Third, the theoretical swap prices generated by using these kinds of models
are not necessarily consistent with market prices.
If the pricing model based on spot prices is an appropriate framework for the pricing
electricity swap contracts, we should expect that the correlation between spot prices and
swap market prices should be relatively high and stable over time for most maturities.
However, the empirical evidence suggests otherwise, especially when the maturity of the
swap contract is longer than one week. In fact, the historical correlation between elec-
tricity spot prices and nearby swap prices is neither high nor particularly stable. The
implication is that, in the case of electricity, the spot price is unlikely to be a good proxy
for most swap prices. Borovkova and Geman (2006a) document that, for the Nord Pool
data, the historical correlation (computed by means of a moving window of the past 60
days) between spot prices and the nearby monthly swap contract ranges from 0.65 to
1For instance in Europe the EFET (www.efet.org) a group of more than 100 energy trading companies
from 27 European countries promotes energy trading throughout Europe and provides templates of many
standardized energy derivatives contracts.
2In most electricity markets, forward and futures contracts guarantee delivery of the electricity over
a period of time (e.g. monthly or yearly contracts) rather than at a fixed future time. As Benth, Cartea,
and Kiesel (2008) argue the nature of these contracts are very similar to a swap exchanging a fixed price
for floating (spot) electricity price during the defined period. In fact, swap contracts are integrals of
traditional forward contracts, with fixed delivery time. Therefore, in this paper, a swap is a futures
contract with delivery over a given period.
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-0.15. In our EEX data sample, and using the same procedure, the average value of this
correlation is 0.34, but it ranges from 0.87 to -0.54. To put these figures into perspective,
Alexander (1999) reports that the average correlation between WTI crude oil spot and
NYMEX near monthly futures prices is 0.83 and it ranges from 0.65 to 0.95. In the case
of oil log returns, the average value of the correlation is 0.92 and the correlation ranges
from 0.12 to 0.99. However in the case of the returns of the EEX electricity swap prices,
the average value of the correlation is negative (-0.005), and the correlation ranges from
0.45 to -0.353.
For these reasons, we propose a pricing approach based on modelling the swap curve
directly, and allowing for a very general distribution for the sources of uncertainty (in-
novations) influencing the state variables. Our model features factors accounting for (a)
the average swap price within each market segment, (b) the deterministic seasonal factor
and, (c) the stochastic changes in the swap curve shape. The model relies on a particular
case of the Multivariate Generalized Hyperbolic (MGH) distributions, namely the Multi-
variate Normal Inverse Gaussian (MNIG) distributions, which allow stochastic dynamics
in terms of correlated NIG Lvy processes. We test the model using data from the German
Power Market (European Energy Exchange, EEX) which is Europes largest power market
in terms of consumption.
This study extends current literature in several ways. First, Kiesel, Schindlmayr, and
Bo¨rger (2009) suggest a two-factor model for electricity swaps calibrated to at-the-money
options on electricity swaps traded in the EEX market. However, the degree of liquidity of
these options varies substantially across contracts and over time. Thus, we prefer working
directly with the swap prices, because, at least some of them, are usually highly liquid
all the time. Second, in contrast with Benth, Cartea, and Kiesel (2008) who allow for
just one Brownian motion as the driver of the dynamics of the swap curve, we argue
that correlated Lvy process for each market segment are useful to explain the dynamic
behaviour of swap prices, allowing for a more realistic representation. Third, Fleten and
Lemming (2003), Audet, Heiskanen, Keppo, and Vehvila¨inen (2002), Koekebakker and
Ollmar (2005) and Bjerksund, Rasmussen, and Stensland (2010) build a continuum of
instantaneous-delivery forward contract by smoothing market prices, or by combining
market prices with forecasts generated by bottom-up models. However, we argue that
working directly with the most liquid swap prices is more transparent, instead of using ad
hoc numerical procedures to extract smooth curves from quoted prices4. In our case, the
liquid contracts are the six contracts closer to maturity for the monthly, quarterly and
3See also the evidence in Benth, Benth, and Koekebakker (2008) for the Nord Pool.
4Advocates of the smoothing algorithms posit that futures prices with fixed time to maturity can
be extracted each day from the smoothed curve. The main criticism is however that the prices are not
”true” market prices but interpolations and these smoothed prices may distort the empirical analysis.
We prefer to concentrate on actual market prices and include the effect of the changing time to maturity
in the SFP component
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yearly delivery periods.
Summing up, our contributions are as follows. First, we propose a new stochastic
forward premium model that includes exposures to average swap prices within each market
segment, deterministic seasonal factors and mean-reverting stochastic deviations from the
average price following MNIG processes. This model effectively captures realistic, time-
varying characteristics in swap prices, overcoming the limitations of standard models
of swap curves that cannot account for asymmetries and fat tails. Second, our empirical
results during the period from 2004 to 2013 provide strong evidence supporting our model
in comparison with other alternatives, because it presents better empirical fit than spot
price-based or traditional HJM-based models. Third, we show that models who do not
account for the impact of non-normality are not able to replicate market prices, and,
in particular, they are unable of taking account of tail risk. This result is important
because Gonza´lez-Pedraz, Moreno, and Pen˜a (2014) present evidence suggesting that
tail risk measures for energy portfolios based on standard assumptions (e.g. normality)
underestimate actual tail risk, especially for short positions and short time horizons.
Another important practical implication of our VaR analysis is that that the capital
charges to traders using EEX electricity swap contracts (based on risk adjusted capital
under the normality assumption) should be adjusted (most likely upwards) and that
the evaluators of the performance of the traders should adjust their recommendations
accordingly.
The rest of paper is as follows. In Section 3.2, we briefly revise related literature and
present our model. After we describe the data in Section 3.3, we report the results of
the empirical analysis in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 compares the model against alternative
approaches. Section 3.6 presents some Value-at-Risk results. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 The Model
In this section, we outline the basic characteristics of the theoretical model and present
some guidelines for its practical implementation. Given that we make use of the MNIG
distribution, we suggest readers Embrechts, Frey, and McNeil (2005) for definition and
properties of this distribution.
3.2.1 Literature Review
The models for pricing and hedging financial derivatives on energy prices belong to three
broad categories: (i) based on fundamental equilibrium (ii) based on spot energy prices
and other key variables such as convenience yields or interest rates and (iii) based on
forward price processes. Models in the first category focus on supply and demand re-
lationships to obtain the power prices as a solution of an optimization problem. This
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optimization problem embodies information on market prices and trading activity. This
allows the computation of the forward prices, using the condition that they provide equi-
librium in the demand for forward contracts; see Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002). In
a similar vein, Supatgiat, Zhang, and Birge (2001) show that market-clearing prices are
determined by solving a Nash equilibrium problem for the bidding strategies of market
agents. Although useful for a wide range of applications, models in this category do not
capture appropriately the price dynamics, which is what market participants need in order
to develop effective hedging and risk management strategies.
The second category is based on specifying stochastic processes of the spot price
and possibly of a limited set of other state variables, calibrating their parameters using
market data. Then, one may resort to closed formulas or numerical approximations, in
order to price contingent claims. Examples of this approach are Schwartz (1997), Hilliard
and Reis (1998), Schwartz and Smith (2000), and Casassus and Collin-Dufresne (2005),
among others. This approach has been successfully applied to some energy commodities,
particularly crude oil, but its adequacy is less clear in the case of electricity markets
because of the very specific features present in electricity spot prices. These characteristics
are strong seasonality, mean reversion, jumps, stochastic volatility and regime switching
(see Escribano, Ignacio Pen˜a, and Villaplana (2011) among others) and are caused by the
difficulties of storing electricity efficiently; see also Lucia and Schwartz (2002), Geman
and Roncoroni (2006) and Cartea and Figueroa (2005). Besides that, this approach has
some disadvantages such as its inability to incorporate information about the future (e.g.
decreases in supply caused by planned maintenance of generation facilities) and because
endogenously generated swap prices are not necessarily consistent with observable market
prices. Quinn, Reitzes, and Schumacher (2005) argue that electricity swap prices are a
function of market expectations of demand and cost conditions during the actual delivery
period, and these expectations are not necessarily influenced by current market behaviour
(i.e. spot prices), and they present evidence supporting their claim in the PJM market.
Furthermore, the historical correlation between electricity spot prices and the nearby swap
prices is not particularly stable, which suggests that the spot price is not a good proxy
for the futures prices. Benth and Koekebakker (2008) find that contracts located in the
very short end of the swap curve are the only ones with sizeable correlations with the
spot price at Nord Pool.
The third category is based on the direct modelling of the term structure of the elec-
tricity swap prices. Within this category, a first line of research relies on Heath, Jarrow,
and Morton (1992) (HJM) which focus on the dynamics of the swap curve as a whole.
Examples of this approach are Cortazar and Schwartz (1994), Amin et al. (1995), Mil-
tersen and Schwartz (1998), Clewlow and Strickland (2000), Koekebakker and Ollmar
(2005), Miltersen (2003), Audet, Heiskanen, Keppo, and Vehvila¨inen (2002) and Trolle
and Schwartz (2009), among others. In all these cases, the market swap price curve is
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an input into the derivative pricing model and therefore derivatives prices thus generated
should be consistent with observable swap market prices. A second line of research fo-
cuses on modelling a given function of observed swap prices and then analysing stochastic
deviations from this function by means of additional state variables. An example of this
approach is Borovkova and Geman (2006b), who propose to use a parsimonious two-factor
model, in which the first factor is the average forward price and the second factor is analo-
gous to the stochastic convenience yield. However, a potential problem of all the previous
models within this category is their assumption of Gaussian distributions for the inno-
vations of the stochastic processes5. As suggested by Frestad, Benth, and Koekebakker
(2010) in the case of electricity swaps, this assumption is unlikely to be appropriate, be-
cause the innovations of the electricity swap prices are strongly non-normal. Besides that,
the factor structure of the swap curve in the electricity markets is probably much more
complex than in another energy markets. For instance, Koekebakker and Ollmar (2005)
report that, in order to explain more than 98% of the variation in the sample covariance
matrix in the Nord Pool, they need more than ten factors. Interestingly, factors explain-
ing a large proportion on the variation in the long end of the curve seem to have very low
explanatory power in the short end of the curve. This fact suggests that, besides a few
general factors affecting the whole curve, some parts of the curve are exposed to unique
risk factors that other parts of the curve are not exposed to. Frestad (2008) find strong
support for this hypothesis in the Nordic electricity market by using this idea of common
and unique factors.
In most papers, the innovation processes driving the state variables are Gaussian. In
this paper, we prefer to use a more general process for the innovations. There is growing
evidence suggesting that the Normal Inverse Gaussian (NIG) distribution, which was first
used for modelling speculative returns in Barndorff-Nielsen and Prause (2001), fits heavy-
tailed and skewed financial data well and is, at the same time, analytically tractable,
see, for instance, Rydberg (1999), Barndorff-Nielsen and Prause (2001), Forsberg and
Bollerslev (2002), and Karlis (2002) among others. Therefore the NIG distribution is
especially suitable for the modelling of financial prices, and in particular for the term
structure individual contract dynamics (Benth, Cartea, and Kiesel, 2008) as well as their
joint evolution (Andresen, Koekebakker, and Westgaard, 2010b). These are the reasons
why we choose the MING distribution as our preferred choice.
5Exceptions are Andresen, Koekebakker, and Westgaard (2010a) who present a discrete random-field
model based on the multivariate NIG distribution, and Di Poto and Fanone (2012) who apply a Le´vy
multifactor market model by using Independent Component Analysis.
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3.2.2 The General Model
Assume T < ∞ and let (Ω, F,Q) be a complete filtered probability space, with an in-
creasing and right continuous filtration [Ft]t∈[0,T ] where, as usually, F0 contains all sets of
probability zero in F . We assume that the market trades swap contracts with different
delivery periods and a bond that yields a constant risk free rate r > 0, so futures and
forward prices are equal. Consider the price Fi(t, T ) of a swap contract with expiry date
T = 1, . . . , N which is also the start of the delivery period, time to maturity τ = (T − t)
,and delivery length period given by the subscript i = 1, . . . , I (e.g. i = 1 (M) for monthly
contracts, i = 2 (Q) for quarterly contracts and i = 3 (Y) for yearly contracts) . These
contracts are settled against the daily average spot price during the delivery period and,
in agreement with market practice, we call them electricity swaps. Hence, Fi(t, T ) denotes
the price vector of a completely observable swap curve at time t, where vector T indicates
the different swap contracts starting delivery dates which are available at trading date
t, and the vector subscript i denotes the underlying asset (delivery period) over which is
defined each curve’s swap contract. Notice that in a general term structure model, we
consider the evolution of the continuum of swap contracts for all the possible expirations.
Since only subsets of them trade in the market, we develop a version of the model that
specifies the dynamics only for tradable contracts that are liquid enough. Therefore our
model follows the spirit of the market model, see Brace, Musiela, et al. (1997), which was
originally developed for interest rates. Borovkova and Geman (2006b) propose a similar
model to ours, but they consider only two sources of uncertainty, driven by uncorrelated
Gaussian innovations. We instead allow for multiple sources of uncertainty, and these
sources of uncertainty follow correlated MNIG distributions. In doing, so our model cap-
tures the correlation among the sources of uncertainty, as well as some salient stylized
facts in the swap electricity market, such as extreme kurtosis. The starting point of
our analysis is the following stochastic forward premium model (SFP henceforth), which
relates swap prices for any maturity T and delivery length period i as follows,
Fi(t, T ) = F texp (si(K) + γi(t, T )) (3.1)
where the first component in the right-hand side is the average level of the swap price
within each market segment i defined as the geometric average of the current swap prices
as follows
F i(t) =
N
√√√√ N∏
T=1
Fi(t, T ) (3.2)
and N is the maximum liquid maturity6. The average swap price does not contain
6For instance if there are three delivery periods, the first with a length of one month, the second with
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seasonal factors, which are included in the deterministic seasonal premia factor si(K).
We define this premium as the collection of long-term average premia on swaps expiring
in the calendar period (week, month, quarter) with respect to the average swap price. De-
pending on the value of i, K can take 52 (weekly), 12 (monthly) or 4 (quarterly) different
values. By construction the average of the seasonal factors for each i must be zero. For in-
stance in the case of which i = M , that is a monthly (M) delivery period, there are twelve
seasonal factors sM(K), K = 1, . . . , 12 that is, a deterministic collection of 12 parameters.
The quantity γi(t, T ) is the stochastic forward premium (SFP) for the delivery period
i and expiry date T . By construction, this SPF is zero on average, and we define it as
γi(t, T ) = lnFi(t, T )− lnF i(t)− si(K) (3.3)
Next, we specify the stochastic dynamics of the state variables in terms of Multivariate
Normal Inverse Gaussian (MNIG) Le´vy processes. Notice that the dimension of the system
is d = I+I×N . Let L(t) be a d-dimensional vector of MNIG Le´vy processes. This means
that it has stationary and independent increments, in the sense that the distribution of
L(t)−L(s), t > s > 0 , is only dependent on t−s and not on t and s separately, such that its
increments dL(t) = L(t+dt)−L(t) = X are, standardized (i.e. zero-mean, unit variance)
and MNIG distributed with probability density function MNIGd (X;α, β, δ, µ,Σ)
f(X) =
δ
2(d−1)/2
[
α
piq(x)
](d+1)/2
Kd+ 1
2
[αq(x)]× exp p(x) (3.4)
where,
q(x) =
√
δ2 + (x− µ)′Σ−1(x− µ), p(x) = δ
√
α2 − β′Σβ + β′(x− µ)
and Kd+ 1
2
is the modified Bessel function of the second kind with index (d+ 1)/2, and
the parameters have the following characteristics, δ > 0,α2 > β′Σβ, β ∈ Rd, µ ∈ Rd,
Σ = σij ∈ Rd×d and we require Σ to be positive definite and |Σ| = 1. The mean vector of
X is
E[X] = µ+ δΣβ
√
α2 − β′Σβ
and the covariance matrix V [X] = vij i = 1, . . . , d; j = 1, . . . , d is defined as
a length of three months (one quarter) and the third with a length of twelve months (one year), thus
i = 1 (M),2(Q),3(Y) and I = 3. If there are six liquid maturities 1 to 6, then T = 1, 2, . . . , 6 and N = 3.
In summary, the liquid contracts are M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, M6, Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q6 and Y1, Y2,
Y3, Y4, Y5 and Y6.
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V [X] = δ
√
α2 − β′Σβ[Σ + (α2 − β′Σβ)−1Σββ′Σ (3.5)
Note that if the skewness parameter is zero β = 0 the mean vector coincides with µ
and the covariance matrix Σ solely determines the correlation structure. For asymmetric
MNIG distributions, the correlation structure depends on all parameters, excepting µ.
The marginal distributions of the MNIG distribution are univariate NIG distributions
(Lillestol, 2000). Denoting the parameters of the marginal distributions of the i th compo-
nent of X as Xi and using the obvious notation, the scale-free indicators of asymmetry χi
and kurtosis ξi, {(χi, ξi) ∈ R2; |χi| < ξi < 1} are respectively defined as (Rydberg, 1999):
χi =
ξiβi
αi
; ξi =
1√
(1 + δiγ2i
where γi =
√
α2i − β2i . If the two scale-free parameters are close to zero (i.e. (χi, ξi) ≈
(0, 0)) the marginal NIG distribution is close to being normal. On the other hand, when
the scale-free parameter ξi is very close to one, the marginal NIG distribution is very
similar to the heavy-tailed Cauchy distribution.
We define de dynamics of lnF i(t) and γi(t, T ) under the market probability measure
by the stochastic differential equations:
dlnF i(t) = κi(ζi − lnF i(t))dt+ θF idLF i(t); i=1,. . . ,I (3.6)
dγi(t, T ) = −ωi,Tγi(t, T )dt+ θγi(T )dLγi(T )(t); i=1,. . . ,I T=1,. . . ,N (3.7)
The SFPs are subject to their own sources of uncertainty, given by the standardized
MNIG Le´vy processes, dLF i(t), and dLγi(T )(t) which are assumed to be correlated. We
can substitute (3.6) and (3.7) into (3.1) and derive the dynamics of the swap log-prices
under the market probability measure as follows:
dlnFi(t, T ) =
[
κi(ζi − lnF i(t))− ωi,Tγi(t, T ) + si(K)
]
dt
+ θF idLF i(t) + θγi(T )dLγi(T )(t); i=1,. . . ,I T=1,. . . ,N
And therefore lnFi(t, T ) is obtained by integrating the above differential equation with
the initial condition
lnFi(0, T ) = lnF i(0) + si(K) + γi(0, T )
The term structure of swap prices variances is:
ϕ2i (t, T ) = η
2
i + τ
2
i,T + 2θF iθγi(T )vF i,γi(T ) (3.8)
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where η2i = θ
2
F i
× vF i and τ 2i,T = θ2γi(T ) × vγi(T ) are the variances of the corresponding
average factor and of the stochastic discount factor respectively and vF i,γi(T ) is the covari-
ance between the average factor and the stochastic discount factor, all of them elements
of (3.5).
As we are interested in pricing other derivatives, we now consider how to price these
derivatives in the risk-neutral world. First, notice that we specify the dynamics (3.1),
(3.6) and (3.7) under the market (real-world) probability measure P; therefore, we must
select a risk-neutral probability measure Q. A common choice (see Benth, Benth, and
Koekebakker (2008)) is the Esscher transform which generalizes the Girsanov transform to
Le´vy processes and guarantees that the L(t) process is still a NIG Le´vy process under Q.
This Esscher transform implies that, under the risk-neutral measure Q, the transformed
LQ(t) vector is MNIG-distributed with density function MNIGd (X;α, β + η, δ, µ,Σ) , or
in other words, the Esscher transform only changes the asymmetry of the process. The
vector µ measures the price of jump risk, that is, the price that market players charge for
assuming the risk of not being able to hedge. A positive price leads to a more right-skewed
distribution. Given an estimate of the vector µ, and the transformed process under Q,
we can apply standard techniques to price other derivatives such as options.
3.2.3 Implementation
Assume we have an historical dataset of n daily swap curves Fi(t, T ) t = 1, . . . , n, where
vector T indicates the different swap contracts starting delivery dates which are available
at trading date t, and the vector subscript i denotes the underlying asset (delivery period)
over which is defined each curve’s swap contract. Writing (3.1) in logarithm form
lnFi(t, T ) = lnF i(t) + si(K) + γi(t, T ) (3.9)
The least squares optimal estimator for lnF i(t, T ) is simply the arithmetic average of
log-swap prices within each market segment i. We estimate factor si(K) by
ŝi(K) =
1
n
∑
Tk∈Ai
n∑
t=1
(
lnFi(t, Tk)− lnF i(t)
)
(3.10)
where Ai are the sets of available maturities at time t for contracts with delivery period
i = 1, . . . , I, and the index K takes different values k. The seasonal factors must be
zero on average for each seasonal period (e.g. monthly) , and then
∑K
k=1 si(k) = 0. We
estimate the SFP factor by means of the equation
γ̂i(t, T ) = lnFi(t, T )− lnF i(t)− ŝi(K) (3.11)
For the sake of clarity, we use the notation i=1(M),2(Q),3(Y) and T = 1, . . . , 6 in what
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follows. Given the complexity of the estimation, we apply a two-step procedure. In the
first step we estimate simultaneously all the parameters of mean reversion and volatility
in discrete-time versions of Equations (3.6) and (3.7) by means of a system of seemingly
unrelated regression equations (SURE). In doing so, we assume that error terms may have
cross-equation contemporaneous covariance . The system takes the form(
OlnF i(t)
Oγ̂i(t, T )
)
=
(
κi(ζi − lnF i(t− 1))
−ωi,Tγi(t− 1, T )
)
+
(
θF iF i
θγi(T )γi(T )
)
(3.12)
The system contains 21 equations (3 + 6 × 3) and this SURE model is estimated
using the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) method. Given the dimensions of
the problem and that in the second step we require the covariance matrix of the MNIG
process Σ to be positive definite and |Σ| = 1 a convenient normalization suggested in
Urzua (1997) is as follows. Let the residuals form Equation (3.12) be defined as
Y =
(
F i
γi(T )
)
, t = 1, . . . , n (3.13)
where Y (dimensions d × n) has a mean vector of zero and covariance matrix Ω = (i,j).
Let Γ denote the orthogonal matrix whose columns are the standardized eigenvectors of
Ω, and Λ denote the diagonal matrix of the eigenvalues of Ω . Define Ω−1/2 as the inverse
of the square root decomposition of Ω; or, in other words, that
Ω−1/2 = ΓΛ−1/2Γ′ (3.14)
Then the random variable
X = Ω−1/2Y (3.15)
has a zero mean vector, and an identity matrix as its covariance matrix. This variable X,
which contains the standardized and orthogonal residuals, is then used in the second step.
In the second step we use X as the estimation of the vector dL(t), which is assumed
to be MNIG distributed with probability density function MNIGd (X;α, β, δ, µ,Σ) and
we estimate the corresponding parameters of the MNIG distributions by using the EM
algorithm developed by Øig˚ard, Hanssen, Hansen, and Godtliebsen (2005) which is an
extension of Karlis (2002). We compute bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 500
replications. In order to compute the term structure of swap prices given by (3.8) we set
ϕ2i (t, T ) = η
2
i + τ
2
i,T + 2θF iθγi(T )ωF i,γi(T ) where η
2
i = θ
2
F i
× ωF i and τ 2i,T = θ2γi(T ) × ωγi(T )
are the variances of the corresponding average factor and of the stochastic discount factor
respectively and ωF i,γi(T ) is the correlation between the two factors, all of them obtained
from (3.12).
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3.3 Data
Germany is Europe’s largest power market and therefore we choose this market as the
source of the data. Our data set consists of daily data from June 1, 2004 until December
31, 2012, on settlement prices for the following available baseload swap contracts traded in
EEX: Yearly, Quarterly and Monthly (Phelix-Base/Month/Quarter/Year-Futures). The
company operating EEX market (EEX AG) has provided the data. We choose the six most
liquid contracts within each market segment, that usually are the closest to maturity ones.
Within each market segment, these six contracts represent the 99% (100%), 97% (99%)
and 100% (100%) of the total trading volume (open interest) in the case of monthly,
quarterly and yearly contracts, respectively. We explain the relative liquidity of each
contact in more detail in Section 3.2. We define the continuous series as a perpetually
linked series of swap settlement prices. For example, M1 starts at the nearest contract
month, which forms the first values of the continuous series, until the contract reaches its
expiry date, or until the first business day of the actual contract month. At this point,
we take the next trading contract month. For all series, we compute the returns as the
first difference of log prices.
3.3.1 Summary Statistics
We show the graphs for all swap price series in Figure 3.1 by market segments. The
monthly series seem to be the more volatile followed by the quarterly series, being the
yearly series the most stable one.
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Figure 3.1: Panel A. Patent counts


Table 3.1 provides information on the basic statistics for all series in levels. We show
the individual series in Panel A and the averages of each market segment in Panel B.
Looking at the averages of each market segment (monthly, quarterly and yearly), the
average price tends to increase with the maturity of the contract and the volatility tends
to decrease with the maturity of the contract, as expected. Volatility is usually higher for
the closest-to-maturity contract (Samuelson effect), confirming the well-known fact that
short-dated swaps tend to be more volatile than long-dated swaps. Within each class,
the average price follows the same pattern, but the volatility has behaviour that is more
complex. In the case of monthly contracts, the volatility has an inverted u-shape, in the
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case of quarterly contracts, it has a u-shape and in the case of yearly contracts, it increases
with time to maturity. In the returns series (not shown) the volatility follows the expected
pattern, decreasing with time to maturity and ranging (in annualized terms) from 33% in
the case of M1 to 13% in the case of Y6. All series present positive asymmetry and sig-
nificant kurtosis, suggesting that the normality assumption is not suitable for these series.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
     M1     M2     M3     M4     M5     M6     Q1     Q2    Q3  Q4 Q5 Q6 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 
Panel A: Daily Swap Prices 
 Mean 48.74 49.92 50.60 50.99 51.45 51.50 50.44 51.47 51.46 51.74 52.47 52.76 52.00 52.61 53.52 55.23 56.69 57.54 
 Median 47.88 48.85 49.20 49.17 49.13 49.66 48.75 49.60 49.98 51.79 52.41 51.84 51.94 53.70 54.59 55.30 56.15 57.30 
 Maximum 98.41 96.76 98.23 101.94 101.00 102.75 97.50 100.93 94.95 84.75 94.07 98.33 90.15 89.00 89.67 90.30 96.30 96.80 
 Minimum 26.50 26.45 28.25 29.05 30.35 30.55 28.69 31.17 31.05 30.50 30.55 31.70 33.12 33.70 34.40 36.69 37.51 38.29 
 Std. Dev. 12.82 12.95 13.15 13.01 12.86 12.48 12.76 12.25 10.89 10.33 11.30 11.54 9.90 9.58 9.73 10.04 11.09 11.13 
 Skewness 0.80 0.79 1.04 1.23 1.25 1.19 0.98 1.19 0.56 0.36 0.72 0.81 0.64 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.58 0.55 
 Kurtosis 3.76 3.68 4.29 5.06 5.37 5.37 4.25 5.28 3.43 3.21 4.22 4.65 4.72 4.48 4.33 3.76 4.18 4.07 
 JB 287.2 269.4 541.4 939.8 1072.9 1024.5 488.0 985.3 132.3 51.67 324.9 485.2 415.6 232.4 187.5 73.78 249 215.5 
Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Panel B: Average Series M, Q and Y 
   M   Q   Y                
 Mean 50.53 51.73 54.60                
 Median 48.98 50.73 54.83                
 Maximum 99.85 95.09 92.04                
 Minimum 28.53 30.61 35.62                
 Std. Dev. 12.88 11.51 10.24                
 
 
Notes: This table reports some descriptive summary statistics for daily swap prices over the full sample
period from 6/1/2004 to 12/31/2012. The sample size is 2179 observations. JB is the Jarque-Bera
normality test. Probability is the p-value of this test under the null of normality.
3.4 Empirical Results
In this section, we present the estimation of the components of the swap price as defined
in Equation (3.1), that is, the average swap price, the seasonal components and the
stochastic forward premium.
3.4.1 Average swap prices
We compute average swap prices as the simple average of swap log prices within each
market segment. Figure 3.2 contains the graphs and the basic statistics are in Table 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: Average Swap Prices

The basic statistics of the average swap price are consistent with the ones in Table
3.1 in the sense that average price increases with maturity and volatility decreases with
maturity. The average return is close to zero, the volatility is higher in the monthly
segment and it is lower in the yearly segment, and all series have positive asymmetry
and high kurtosis. It is interesting to note that the correlation (both in levels and in first
differences) is far from one in the case of the averages in the monthly and yearly segments.
This fact stresses the convenience of working with a model based on a specific average
component for each market segment.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
 
 

        M       Q      Y 
Panel A:   
 Mean 50.330 51.470 54.520 
 Median 48.630 50.520 55.190 
 Maximum 93.630 92.470 91.620 
 Minimum 30.410 32.210 35.780 
 Std. Dev. 12.010 10.260 10.010 
 Skewness 1.090 0.870 0.450 
 Kurtosis 4.840 5.020 4.520 
 JB 742 644 283 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 
   
Correlation M Q Y 
M 1.00  
Q 0.94 1.00 
Y 0.77 0.91 1.00 
    
     Panel B:   
 Mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Maximum 0.130 0.080 0.070 
 Minimum -0.080 -0.070 -0.060 
 Std. Dev. 0.013 0.011 0.008 
 Skewness 0.330 0.090 0.330 
 Kurtosis 9.810 9.610 12.610 
 JB 4251 3973 8426 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
Correlation M Q Y 
M 1.00   
Q 0.84 1.00  
Y 0.68 0.89 1.00 
    

Notes: This table reports some descriptive summary statistics for average swap prices computed as the
geometric average of daily swap prices within each market segment and over the full sample period from
6/1/2004 to 12/31/2012. The sample size is 2179 observations. JB is the Jarque-Bera normality test.
Probability is the p-value of this test under the null of normality.
3.4.2 Seasonal Components
We show the seasonal component computed using the method described in Equation
(3.10) in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: Average Swap Prices

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Notes: The figure presents the estimated seasonal components ŝi(K) =
1
n
∑
Tk∈Ai
∑n
t=1
(
lnFi(t, Tk)− lnF i(t)
)
, where A(i) are the sets of available maturities at time t
for contracts with delivery period i = 1, . . . , I. And the index K refers to each month (k = 1 . . . 12).
Summary statistics for these seasonal components are below the plot. The last 3 columns present an
interval of confidence for them and the t-test of the null hypothesis of zero mean.
As expected, swaps expiring in fall and winter are at a premium with respect to the
average price level, and swaps expiring in spring and summer are at a discount. The
January and February premium is the highest, at 9%. On the other hand, May has the
highest discount, at 11%. A statistical significance test (not shown) reveals that most
seasonal components are significantly different from zero at the usual levels.
3.4.3 Stochastic forward premium factors
Using Equation (3.11) we compute the estimated SFPs. Their basic statistics are in
Table 3.3, in levels γ̂i(t, T ) in Panel A and in first differences Oγ̂i(t, T ) in Panel B. All
γ̂i(t, T ) series have means that are close to zero, as expected, and volatilities generally
fall as we include more distant market segments, furthermore, all series present some
asymmetry and kurtosis, as well as first order autocorrelation coefficients close to one
(not shown). All series Oγ̂i(t, T ) present means that are essentially zero, and volatilities
that usually decrease with the time to maturity. Some present positive skewness but
others present negative skewness, and the first-order autocorrelation coefficient (not
shown) is usually below 0.1, suggesting a slow mean-reverting behaviour. High kurtosis
seems to be a salient feature in all cases. Therefore, the evidence suggests that all these
series are highly non-normal.
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics Stochastic Forward Premium (SFPs)
  
                  
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 
 Panel A: SFPs Levels  
 Mean -0.037 -0.014 -0.001 0.009 0.020 0.023 -0.036 -0.008 0.005 0.007 0.011 0.020 -0.048 -0.036 -0.019 0.013 0.037 0.053 
 Median -0.033 -0.018 -0.003 0.008 0.018 0.021 -0.028 -0.004 0.017 -0.002 0.011 0.034 -0.036 -0.030 -0.018 0.005 0.030 0.049 
 Maximum 0.219 0.208 0.176 0.189 0.191 0.312 0.257 0.113 0.241 0.205 0.157 0.248 0.118 0.025 0.021 0.094 0.125 0.131 
 Minimum -0.310 -0.215 -0.153 -0.101 -0.180 -0.251 -0.328 -0.178 -0.119 -0.086 -0.136 -0.187 -0.244 -0.110 -0.058 -0.037 -0.037 -0.032 
 Std. Dev. 0.083 0.060 0.044 0.043 0.060 0.084 0.098 0.068 0.044 0.047 0.067 0.076 0.065 0.029 0.013 0.028 0.034 0.037 
 Skewness -0.389 -0.228 -0.067 0.326 0.161 0.031 -0.438 -0.321 -0.922 0.593 0.073 -0.242 -0.668 -0.234 -0.123 1.070 0.458 0.120 
 Kurtosis 3.532 3.570 3.795 3.574 3.366 3.690 3.028 2.265 3.616 3.362 2.093 2.836 3.101 2.350 3.244 3.486 2.572 2.281 
 JB 80.69 48.31 58.98 68.46 21.57 43.55 69.74 86.56 343.20 139.62 76.62 23.74 162.96 58.19 10.89 437.51 92.65 52.19 
 Panel B: First Differences of SFPs 	
   
 Mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Maximum 0.076 0.040 0.033 0.041 0.027 0.046 0.063 0.026 0.030 0.024 0.027 0.032 0.022 0.022 0.018 0.017 0.020 0.048 
 Minimum -0.077 -0.064 -0.023 -0.051 -0.034 -0.041 -0.043 -0.024 -0.020 -0.024 -0.033 -0.036 -0.040 -0.023 -0.015 -0.016 -0.022 -0.032 
 Std. Dev. 0.011 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
 Skewness -0.064 -0.101 0.171 -0.243 -0.087 0.270 0.320 0.006 0.511 0.016 -0.067 0.111 -0.503 -0.150 0.576 0.161 -0.044 0.755 
 Kurtosis 9.812 12.36 6.156 8.610 5.160 6.650 11.546 7.480 8.961 7.007 7.344 6.521 7.942 8.493 9.466 6.747 10.36 22.07 
 JB 80.69 48.31 58.98 68.46 21.57 43.55 69.74 86.56 343.20 139.62 76.62 23.74 162.96 58.19 10.89 437.51 92.65 52.19 
 
 
                  
 
 

Notes: This table reports some descriptive summary statistics for SFPs, in levels γi(t, T ) (Panel A) and
in first differences Oγi(t, T ) (Panel B) for the full sample period from 6/1/2004 to 12/31/2012. The
sample size is 2179 observations. JB is the Jarque-Bera normality test. Boldface means that the test
rejects the null of normality.
We show the correlations between the returns of the average series and the returns
of the SFPs series in Table 3.4. The monthly contracts tend to be correlated with
their average factor and with nearby monthly contracts as well as with some quarterly
contracts. However, their correlation with the yearly contracts is usually not high. There
is (relatively high) correlation across yearly contracts and there is correlation between
the yearly contracts and its average factor but the correlation of the yearly contracts
with the monthly and quarterly contracts is usually quite low. Overall, the evidence is
consistent with the assumptions in our theoretical model, because it includes correlations
both within and across market sectors, and thus it permits a more realistic representation
of market prices.
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Table 3.4: Correlations Average factors and SPFs

 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 M Q Y 
M1 1.00 
M2 0.42 1.00 
M3 -0.30 -0.09 1.00 
M4 -0.56 -0.41 0.09 1.00 
M5 -0.59 -0.52 -0.05 0.22 1.00 
M6 -0.60 -0.54 -0.14 0.16 0.29 1.00 
Q1 0.51 0.44 0.11 -0.31 -0.44 -0.52 1.00 
Q2 0.00 -0.05 -0.14 -0.04 0.07 0.10 0.19 1.00 
Q3 -0.20 -0.19 0.01 0.09 0.15 0.22 -0.37 0.02 1.00 
Q4 -0.18 -0.15 0.01 0.11 0.11 0.17 -0.48 -0.34 0.10 1.00 
Q5 -0.21 -0.14 0.01 0.14 0.18 0.14 -0.46 -0.45 -0.19 0.11 1.00 
Q6 -0.23 -0.20 -0.07 0.18 0.20 0.23 -0.50 -0.40 -0.12 0.00 0.14 1.00 
Y1 0.18 0.15 0.07 -0.10 -0.19 -0.19 0.15 -0.01 0.02 0.05 -0.03 -0.24 1.00 
Y2 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.09 -0.06 0.05 0.05 0.11 -0.01 0.57 1.00 
Y3 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 0.03 0.11 0.08 -0.10 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.11 -0.14 0.20 1.00 
Y4 -0.08 -0.08 -0.04 0.05 0.08 0.09 -0.07 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.10 -0.49 -0.39 0.05 1.00 
Y5 -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.05 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 0.06 -0.66 -0.70 -0.32 0.13 1.00 
Y6 -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 0.09 -0.60 -0.68 -0.39 -0.02 0.58 1.00 
M 0.46 0.36 -0.06 -0.32 -0.34 -0.37 0.52 0.23 -0.13 -0.25 -0.29 -0.37 0.60 0.30 -0.14 -0.34 -0.35 -0.30 1.00 
Q 0.17 0.15 0.02 -0.11 -0.13 -0.18 0.17 0.11 -0.01 -0.06 -0.08 -0.21 0.69 0.44 -0.13 -0.42 -0.45 -0.38 0.84 1.00 
Y 0.06 0.07 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.08 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 -0.06 0.40 0.29 -0.11 -0.30 -0.26 -0.18 0.69 0.89 1.00 
 
Notes: This table presents the correlations between the returns of the average factors OlnF i(t) and the
returns of the SPF factors Oγi(t, T ) for each segment. The sample size is 2178 observations. Boldface
indicates statistical significance at 5% level.
3.4.4 The relative weight of the components
An important practical question is the proportion of the total variation explained by each
component for the different market segments. To study this issue we run a regression,
where the explanatory variables are the components that are included sequentially. In the
monthly segment, on average, the average swap price explains around 75% of the total
variation, the SFP component explains an additional 15% and the seasonal component
explains the remaining 10% of the total variation, and the differences across maturities
are not very marked. The same situation appears in the quarterly segment, where the
average swap price explains around 80%, the SFP component explains an additional 5%
and the seasonal component explains the remaining 15% of the total variation. In the
case of the yearly segment, and on average, the average swap price explains around 85%,
and the SFP component explains the remaining 15% of the total variation.
One implication of these results is that the specific component in each swap contract
represents a non-negligible source of risk. This risk is specific of each contract and we
cannot hedge this risk by using other swap contracts. For instance if one trader wants to
hedge a position in a yearly contract using monthly contracts, there is an specific risk that
can be as high as more than 20% of total risk, and this idiosyncratic risk cannot be avoided
by using monthly contracts. Additionally, by using these monthly contracts, the trader
is assuming additional idiosyncratic risks in each monthly contract. The consequence of
this is that a trader wishing to hedge some electricity swap contracts in the EEX market
using other (shorter maturity) electricity swap contracts assumes significant basis risk.
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3.4.5 Model Estimation
In Table 3.5 we present the results of the results of the estimation of model (3.12) for the
average swap prices and the stochastic discount factors. Panel A contains the results for
the average series factor and the estimation of their individual NIG distributions. Panel B
contains the estimation of the parameters of the MNIG distribution of the standardized
and orthogonalized residuals from Equation (3.12). Panels C and D contain the same
information for the SFP of contract within each market segment (monthly, quarterly
and yearly). The mean reversion parameter is significant in all cases, suggesting a mean
reverting process, albeit with different speeds. The process is faster in the case of the
SPF of the monthly contracts, followed by quarterly and then yearly contracts, being the
slowest in the case of the processes for the average prices. The residual volatility varies
considerably, being higher in the case of the residuals of the processes for the average
prices and decreasing with the time to maturity in the case of the SPF across market
segments, as expected.
A test of multivariate Normality (Urzua, 1997) of the residuals (not show) clearly
reject the null of normality. Regarding the NIG parameters of the individual distributions,
estimated α are always significant and vary from 0.44 (Y6) to 1.04 (Y2) , β are usually
positive but non-significant, the δ are positive and significant, ranging from 0.43 to 1.03
(same contracts as before) , and the µ are very close to zero, as expected. The scale-free
indicator of asymmetry, χ varies around 0.03 but usually it is not significant and the
kurtosis parameter ξ is highly significant and varies from 0.68 (Y2) to 0.95 (Y6). The
likelihood ratio test strongly supports the NIG distribution as a better alternative than
the standard normal distribution for all individual distributions. It is also interesting to
note that the SFP component corresponding to each swap contract, shares some common
characteristics with the other SFPs within each market segment (symmetry, the degree
of mean reversion) but it also has some specific features (different volatility levels).
The parameters of the MNIG distribution shown in Panel C give a similar message,
with non-significant mean and asymmetry parameters and significant values in the cases
of the parameters measuring tail heaviness and scale. The overall impression is that we
can characterize the MNIG distribution as being essentially symmetric and having strong
tail heaviness.
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Table 3.5: Estimation of SURE and MNIG Models
 
       M        Q      Y 
Panel A: Estimation 	 and Marginal NIG 
κι 
 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
ζι 
 4.062** 4.060** 4.0560** 
 
   0.013 0.011 0.008 
α 
 0.604** 0.538** 0.663** 
β 0.030 -0.026 0.067* 
δ 0.600** 0.503** 0.628** 
µ 
-0.030 0.025 -0.063 
 0.045 -0.046 0.090* 
 0.906** 0.934** 0.886** 
LR  41119** 37137** 29287** 
Panel B: Parameters of MNIG residuals 
α 0.694** 0.694** 0.694** 
β 0.046 0.035 0.028 
δ 0.684** 0.684** 0.684** 
µ -0.017 -0.027 0.047 
 
 

 
 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6
Panel C: Estimation 	and Marginal NIG 

 -0.011** -0.0142** -0.033** -0.032** -0.017** -0.011** -0.0127** -0.014** -0.023** -0.019** -0.012** -0.010** -0.006** -0.006** -0.007** -0.006** -0.007** -0.006** 
	 0.011 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.0072 0.0041 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 
α 0.711** 0.751** 0.846** 0.772** 0.763** 0.599** 0.7268** 0.8878** 0.917** 0.998** 0.916** 0.798** 0.828** 1.040** 0.997** 0.625** 0.498** 0.444** 
β 0.038 0.041 0.039 -0.004 -0.001 0.068* -0.0252 0.0339 0.016 0.048 0.071* 0.031 -0.048 0.007 0.080* 0.052* 0.018 0.027 
δ 0.634** 0.655** 0.771** 0.679** 0.703** 0.569** 0.7002** 0.8953** 0.915** 0.997** 0.915** 0.810** 0.814** 1.031** 0.974** 0.640** 0.501** 0.438** 
µ 
-0.034 -0.035 -0.035 0.004 0.001 -0.064 0.0243 -0.0342 -0.016 -0.048 -0.071 -0.031 0.047 -0.007 -0.078 -0.053 -0.018 -0.027 
 0.046 0.046 0.037 -0.005 -0.001 0.103* -0.0296 0.0293 0.013 0.034 0.058* 0.031 -0.047 0.004 0.057* 0.074* 0.033 0.060* 
 0.871** 0.855** 0.803** 0.84** 0.842** 0.912** 0.854** 0.766** 0.752** 0.709** 0.753** 0.812** 0.802** 0.688** 0.714** 0.896** 0.943** 0.960** 
LR  31519** 37140** 23287** 14753** 17695** 18847** 29519** 41137** 38767** 16113** 19655** 14567** 37779** 48127** 35541** 14432** 16755** 14517** 
Panel D: Parameters of MNIG residuals 
α 0.694** 0.694** 0.694** 0.694** 0.694** 0.694** 0.694** 0.694** 0.694** 0.694** 0.694** 0.694** 0.694** 0.694** 0.694** 0.694** 0.694** 0.694** 
β 0.011 0.001 0.025 -0.025 -0.008 0.045 -0.013 0.009 0.029 0.032 0.033 0.039 -0.048 0.005 0.019 0.034 0.016 0.011 
δ 0.684** 0.684** 0.684** 0.684** 0.684** 0.684** 0.684** 0.684** 0.684** 0.684** 0.684** 0.684** 0.684** 0.684** 0.684** 0.684** 0.684** 0.684** 
µ 0.012 0.002 0.001 0.0345 0.008 0.005 0.011 0.01 0.0243 -0.034 -0.016 -0.048 -0.071 0.031 0.047 0.007 0.078 0.053 

Notes: This table presents estimates of model (3.12). The SURE system contains 21 equations (3+63) and
is estimated using the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) method. To take into account residual
autocorrelation a first order AR(1) term is included in all equations. In the second step we use the
standardized residuals from Equation (3.12) F i and γi(T ) using the Urzua (1997) method as estimations
of the vector dL(t), which is MNIG. The sample period spans from 6/1/2004 to 12/31/2012. The sample
size is 2178 observations. Standard errors for the parameters in the first step are heteroskedasticity-
and autocorrelation consistent. Standard errors for the NIG parameters are based on generating 500
bootstrapped samples. * denotes significance at 5% level and ** at 1% level. The likelihood ratio test is
computed as follows LR = −2 ∗ LOGLK(N(0, 1)) + 2 ∗ LOGLN(NIGd (α, β, δ, µ)). For each equation
and marginal distribution. Panel A contains the results for the average series factor and the estimation
of their marginal NIG distributions. Panel B contains the estimation of the parameters of the MNIG
distribution of the standardized and orthogonalized residuals from Equation (3.12). Panels C and D
contain the same information for the SFP of contract within each market segment (monthly, quarterly
and yearly).
Table 3.6 contains the correlations among the ordinary residuals from Equation (3.12)
and in boldface; we highlight the correlations used in the computations of the volatility
term structure.
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Table 3.6: Correlations of the residuals of model (12)
 
 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 M Q Y 
M1 1.00 
M2 0.42 1.00 
M3 
-0.30 -0.09 1.00 
M4 
-0.57 -0.42 0.10 1.00 
M5 
-0.60 -0.52 -0.05 0.23 1.00 
M6 
-0.60 -0.54 -0.14 0.16 0.30 1.00 
Q1 0.51 0.44 0.11 -0.31 -0.44 -0.53 1.00 
Q2 0.00 -0.04 -0.14 -0.05 0.06 0.10 0.19 1.00 
Q3 
-0.21 -0.19 0.00 0.10 0.16 0.24 -0.37 0.02 1.00 
Q4 
-0.19 -0.15 0.01 0.12 0.12 0.18 -0.49 -0.35 0.10 1.00 
Q5 
-0.22 -0.14 0.01 0.15 0.18 0.15 -0.47 -0.46 -0.18 0.12 1.00 
Q6 
-0.24 -0.21 -0.07 0.18 0.21 0.24 -0.52 -0.41 -0.11 0.01 0.16 1.00 
Y1 0.18 0.15 0.08 -0.10 -0.19 -0.20 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.25 1.00 
Y2 
-0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.09 -0.06 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.56 1.00 
Y3 
-0.08 -0.06 -0.05 0.03 0.11 0.08 -0.11 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.12 -0.15 0.21 1.00 
Y4 
-0.08 -0.08 -0.04 0.05 0.08 0.10 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 -0.51 -0.40 0.07 1.00 
Y5 
-0.05 -0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.05 -0.02 -0.06 -0.05 0.06 -0.67 -0.71 -0.32 0.16 1.00 
Y6 
-0.06 -0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 0.09 -0.61 -0.68 -0.39 0.00 0.59 1.00 
M 0.47 0.37 -0.06 -0.32 -0.35 -0.38 0.53 0.23 -0.14 -0.25 -0.29 -0.38 0.60 0.31 -0.14 -0.35 -0.35 -0.31 1.00 
Q 0.17 0.15 0.02 -0.11 -0.14 -0.18 0.18 0.11 -0.01 -0.07 -0.08 -0.22 0.69 0.45 -0.13 -0.44 -0.46 -0.38 0.84 1.00 
Y 0.06 0.07 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.08 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 -0.06 0.40 0.30 -0.11 -0.31 -0.27 -0.19 0.69 0.89 1.00 

Notes: This table presents the correlations of the residuals from (3.12). The sample size is 2178 observa-
tions. Boldface indicates the correlations needed in order to compute the term structure of swap prices
given by (3.8).
3.4.6 In-sample Goodness-of-Fit
As a formal test of the extent to which the NIG distribution is successful in representing
the (one-day) innovations in the marginal distributions of the average swap price and
the SFPs, we implement tests of fit based on the empirical distribution function (EDF).
These statistics measure the discrepancy between the EDF and a given theoretical distri-
bution (e.g. Normal or NIG). We calculate two statistics: the Cramer-von Mises and the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov. We calculate the parameters of the NIG distribution by maximum
likelihood. Next, we face the problem of how to evaluate these test statistics, given that
the true parameter values of the (NIG) distribution are unknown. To solve this problem,
and following Capasso, Alessi, Barigozzi, and Fagiolo (2009), we generate 5000 Monte
Carlo simulations of i.i.d. NIG random numbers for each market segment. In doing so,
we obtain approximate distributions of the EDF test statistics. We briefly summarize the
results. The null hypothesis is that the stochastic elements in the marginal distributions
follow NIG distributions. The number of violations of the null hypothesis at the 5% sig-
nificance level is always lower than the critical value suggesting that, in all cases, one-day
returns follow NIG distributions.
3.4.7 Volatility term structure
In Table 3.7 we present the volatility term structure that has been computed by using
Equation (3.8) and (3.12) with the calibrated parameters obtained in Table 3.5 and
Table 3.6.
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Table 3.7: Correlations of the residuals of model (12)
 
 
 Market Model Absolute Error Relative Error 
M1 0.3264 0.3269 -0.30% 0.30% 
M2 0.2613 0.2620 -0.59% 0.59% 
M3 0.2190 0.2190 -0.03% 0.03% 
M4 0.2002 0.2003 -0.17% 0.17% 
M5 0.1999 0.1991 0.76% 0.76% 
M6 0.1997 0.1988 0.94% 0.94% 
Q1 0.2245 0.2248 -0.32% 0.32% 
Q2 0.1925 0.1928 -0.29% 0.29% 
Q3 0.1831 0.1830 0.12% 0.12% 
Q4 0.1815 0.1813 0.26% 0.26% 
Q5 0.1843 0.1840 0.28% 0.28% 
Q6 0.1759 0.1753 0.68% 0.68% 
Y1 0.1738 0.1739 -0.16% 0.16% 
Y2 0.1506 0.1511 -0.72% 0.72% 
Y3 0.1311 0.1312 -0.12% 0.12% 
Y4 0.1237 0.1231 1.06% 1.06% 
Y5 0.1264 0.1259 0.90% 0.90% 
Y6 0.1336 0.1330 0.83% 0.83% 
 
    
Average    0.17% 0.47% 

Notes: This table presents the market volatility of swap returns and estimated volatility using the term
structure of swap prices variances. The term structure of swap prices variances is given by ϕ2i (t, T ) =
η2i + τ
2
i,T + 2θF iθγi(T )vF i,γi(T ).
As may be seen in Table 3.7 the model is able to reproduce the overall volatility struc-
ture with high degree of precision irrespective of the market segment. Average absolute
and relative errors are lower than 0.5%. The average contributions of each of the elements
in (3.8) to the total variance explained by the model are as follows: 87.5% corresponds
to the variance of the corresponding average factor, 18.5% corresponds to the variance
of the stochastic discount factor, and -6.1% corresponds to the covariance term between
the average factor and the stochastic discount factor. However the range of variation is
substantial, being in the first case from 41% to 111%, in the second case from 9% to
37% and in the third case from -49% to 31%. The implication of these results is that the
order of magnitude of determinants of the variance for each contract should be analysed
carefully because, although in some cases the impact of the average factor dominates, in
other cases the impact of the covariance component can be determinant.
3.5 Comparison against alternative models
Here we compare the performance of the baseline model introduced in Section 3.2 against
two competing models, the first one is a one-factor spot price model and the second one
is a HJM-based approach. Details are in Appendix B.1 and Appendix B.2 respectively.
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3.5.1 Spot Prices: One factor Model
The results of the estimation of this model and the pricing exercise with the computation
of RMSE are in Appendix B.1. As an illustration, we present the results for contracts
M1, Q1 and Y1 (which are the liquid contracts within each market segment) during 2010
and compare them against market prices. The results suggest that this model is not able
to capture the basic features of swap market prices. In particular, theoretical prices are
much more volatile than market prices as the graphs in Figure B.2 suggest. The reason
is that theoretical prices are simple functions of spot prices which are always much more
volatile than swap prices. The correlation between theoretical prices and market prices is
not particularly high, being (on average) 0.53, 0.41 and 0.09, for monthly, quarterly and
yearly swaps respectively. The pricing errors are not independent and the theoretically
based variances do not appropriately reflect market volatility. Besides that, the residuals
from the model are strongly non-normal, contradicting the basic assumptions underlying
this model. In summary, this one-factor model does not capture the basic characteristics
of the swap prices and therefore is unlikely to be useful for pricing or hedging purposes.
3.5.2 Swap Prices: HJM Model
The results of the estimation of this model are in Appendix B.2. The eigenvalues resulting
from the eigenvector decomposition tell us the importance of each eigenvector and hence
the number of factors that we should include in our model. Thus, the first eigenvector is
the most important, explaining 87%, 89% and 94% of the total variation in the evolution
of the swap curve for the monthly, quarterly and yearly contracts respectively.
Table B.3 presents in Panel A the LS estimates of the parameters from the volatil-
ity functions obtained in CPA using equation σ1i(t, Ti) = exp−ki(Ti − t)σ1i for the full
sample period 2004-2012. Panel B reports the in-sample root mean squared pricing er-
rors (RMSEs). We compute daily errors based on the fitted swap prices in Panel A.
We compute the volatility function implied by the HJM model and by the SFP model
and compare the results against market prices. In the case of the HJM model, root-mean
squared errors (RMSEs) are 6.05%, 19.32%, and 11.96% for monthly, quarterly and yearly
contracts respectively. By contrast, the RMSEs for those contracts are 0.10%, 0.12% and
0.30% respectively in the case of the SFP model. The degree of fit of the SFP model is
substantially higher than the HJM model. It is fair to say that, although the model seems
to fit the volatility term structure to some extent, it is unable to recover the skewness and
kurtosis observed in the empirical distributions. By contrast, the SFP model not only
fits better the markets volatility term structure, but also is able to take into account the
skew and kurtosis.
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3.6 Value at Risk
In order to compare the performance of alternative models in comparison with the SFP
model, we compute Value-at-Risk (VaR) at different probability levels over a one-day
horizon. The details of the procedure are in Appendix B.3. We present the results
in Table 3.9. It may be seen that the V aRNormalQ , calculated under the assumption
of normality tends to understate risk, and this understatement is very strong for high
confidence levels (99.5% and 99.99%) suggesting that tail risk is severely underestimated.
On the other hand V aRNIGQ tends to mildly overestimate risk at relatively low significance
levels but it is able to properly account for extreme tail risk. It is worth noting that the
overestimation of risk provided by the NIG distribution is proportionally much lower than
the underestimation of risk produced by the normal distribution.
One important practical implication of our results is as follows. We know that VaR
models allow users to control risk and decide how to allocate limited resources. Financial
intermediaries impose a capital charge to traders based on risk-adjusted capital. This
creates a natural incentive for traders to take a position only when they have strong
views on markets. If they have no views, they should abstain from trading. Our results
suggest that the risk-adjusted capital for traders using EEX swap electricity contracts
should be increased in comparison with the standard practice based on the normality
assumption. Traders should also rationally adjust positions as risk changes (in the face
of an increasingly volatile environment a sensible response is to scale down positions).
Furthermore and given that VaR is also a performance evaluation tool, the evaluators of
the performance of the traders should adjust their measures accordingly.
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Table 3.8: Correlations of the residuals of model (12)
 

  N(1%) N(0.5%) N(0.01%) NIG(1%) NIG(0.5%) NIG(0.01%) 
M1 2.84** 3.07** 14.53**    -1.24 -1.79 1.68 
M2 3.27** 4.59** 8.10** -2.32** -2.39** 1.68 
M3 2.84** 5.50** 10.24** -3.18** -3.30** -0.47 
M4 2.63** 3.98** 14.53** -3.39** -3.30** -0.47 
M5 3.70** 4.89** 16.67** -3.18** -3.30** -0.47 
M6 4.35** 6.43** 18.81** -3.18** -3.30** -0.47 
Q1 3.70** 6.10** 10.24** -3.18** -2.70** -0.47 
Q2 4.56** 6.41** 18.81** -4.04** -3.30** -0.47 
Q3 3.70** 6.41** 16.67** -2.96** -2.39** -0.47 
Q4 2.41** 3.67** 18.81** -2.96** -3.00** -0.47 
Q5 4.35** 6.41** 23.10** -3.83** -2.70** -0.47 
Q6 5.21** 7.93** 14.53** -3.83** -2.70** 1.68 
Y1 4.35** 6.71** 16.67**    -0.17    -1.49 1.68 
Y2 4.13** 6.71** 10.24**    -1.46 -2.39** 1.68 
Y3 3.70** 6.10** 10.24**    -1.68 -2.70** 1.68 
Y4 2.63** 3.67** 10.24** -3.18** -2.70** 1.68 
Y5 2.63** 5.50** 20.96**    -1.89 -2.39** -0.47 
Y6 3.70** 6.10** 25.24**    -1.68      -2.09* -0.47 

Notes: This table reports the results of Wald test for daily swap prices. The sample period spans from
6/1/2004 to 12/31/2012. The sample size is 2178 observations. **, or * indicates that the coefficient
estimate is significantly different from the null hypotheses at the 1%, or 5% level, respectively. A positive
(negative) z statistic indicates that the model underestimates (overestimates) risk.
3.7 Conclusions
It is important to develop models of electricity markets that are able to handle the non-
Gaussian nature of electricity prices. The reason is that risk measures and derivatives
prices depend on the distribution used in a model. From a structural point of view,
we posit that swap electricity prices result from at least three driving forces. First, a
stochastic factor acting as an anchor of the overall level of the curve, this factor repre-
senting the average consensus price for the contracts within a given maturity slot (yearly,
quarterly, monthly). Second, a factor reflecting stable seasonal components because of
market anticipation of weather-related variations in demand. Third, a factor accounting
from (men-reverting) stochastic deviations from the previous two factors, these deviation
depending on the time to maturity and the length of the delivery period.
Besides that, the innovations of the stochastic factors are non-normal, a critical fact
that should be taken properly into account. In particular, failure for account for asymme-
tries and fat tails leads to theoretical prices that are not compatible with market prices.
Our model takes into account all these features. With an empirical application based
the largest European power market (Germany), during the period from 2004 to 2013, the
evidence strongly support our model.
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By accounting for all these factors, our model gains extra explanatory power, compared
with a one-factor model based on spot prices and with a HJM-based model. Another
remarkable point is the ability our model has in capturing extreme tail risk, as suggested
by the results of the VaR analysis. A practical implication of our results is that the capital
charges to traders using EEX electricity contracts, based on risk-adjusted capital and on
the normality assumption, are too conservative. We suggest increasing them and that
the evaluators of the performance of the traders should adjust their recommendations
accordingly.
Looking forward, an application of our model to other electricity markets offers an
interesting topic for further investigation, given the local behaviour of many electricity
markets. The application of our model for the pricing of structured derivative contracts,
hedging strategies, portfolio diversification, and risk management purposes represent other
natural directions for further research.
Appendix A
Appendix for ”The Bright Side of
Financial Derivatives: Options
Trading and Firm Innovation”
This Appendix provides additional material to the results presented in “The Bright Side
of Financial Derivatives: Options Trading and Firm Innovation”. In Section A.1, we
describe the construction of the main dataset. In Section A.2, we discuss and report ro-
bustness tests for the baseline results reported in Section 1.4 of the paper. In Section A.3,
we report additional tests which supplement other parts of the main article. Descriptive
statistics are in Table A.16.
A.1 Main dataset
The main firm level data sample is generated through the combination of several datasets.
Because we are using patents (weighted by total future citations) as our key mea-
sure of innovation, we rely on the matching of the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office (USPTO) to the North American Compustat data hosted at the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) (see Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001; Jaffe
and Trajtenberg, 2002, for details). The main matching was performed based on the
concordance file provided by Bessen (2009) that connects the assignee identification
number of the NBER patent data set to the Compustat GVKEY identification num-
ber. These connections reflected the firms and subsidiaries identified in the Who Own’s
Whom? database (published annually by Dun & Bradstreet International). Owner-
ship may change through mergers, acquisitions, or spin-offs, and when an organization is
acquired/merged/spun-off, its patents likely go to the new owner. These changes have
been tracked using data on the mergers and acquisitions of public companies reported
in the SDC database. We use the updated version of the NBER match containing
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citations through to 2006 (downloaded from the NBER Patent Data Project website,
https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home/downloads). All patents
granted between 1976 and 2004 are included (just under 3 million patents) and cita-
tion information is available from 1976 to 2006 (over 23 million citations). The need to
have some patent data is the main reason why our sample is much smaller than the full
Compustat sample.
The second dataset we draw on comes from OptionMetrics LLC, a financial research
firm specializing in the analysis of option markets. The IvyDB US data set from Option-
Metrics contains daily closing option prices (bid and ask) for all U.S. exchange-listed and
NASDAQ equities and market indices, as well as all U.S. listed index and equity options,
starting from January 1996 (which is why this is the first year in our sample). Besides
option prices, it also contains daily time-series of the underlying spot prices, dividend
payments and projections, stock splits, historical daily interest rate curves and, most im-
portantly, option volumes. Implied volatilities and sensitivities (delta, gamma, vega and
theta) for each option are calculated as well. The comprehensive nature of the database
makes it most suitable for empirical work on option markets. The primary key (Security
ID) for all data contained in IvyDB is linked to the security’s CUSIP number and ticker
symbol, so the merging of the two datasets is straightforward.
Third, we obtain data on institutional ownership from Thomson Reuters’
CDA/Spectrum Institutional Holdings dataset. Starting in 1978, all institutions with
more than $100 million of securities under discretionary management are required to re-
port their holdings to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) using form 13F.
Each quarter, these institutions must disclose any common stock positions greater than
10,000 shares or greater than $200,000 in value. The data includes the numbers of in-
stitutional owners, the number of share issues and the percentage of outstanding shares
held by each institution. For each fiscal year, we take the average of the four quarterly
institutional holdings given by form 13F and treat that as our measure of institutional
ownership (InstOwn). Given that the ownership data does not cover all the firms in the
dataset, we lose 304 firms when we match the Compustat accounting data and ownership
data.
We started with the NBER USPTO/Compustat match and kept all domestic firms
trading on NYSE (stock exchange code 11), AMEX (12) and NASDAQ (14) with non-
missing accounting data on fixed assets (PPENT), employees (EMP) and sales (SALE)
that are listed on Compustat for at least three years. Since our preferred regressions use
fixed effects, we condition our sample on firms who had received at least one citation and
had at least two years of non-missing data on all variables. This leaves us with a merged
dataset of 1,329 firms and 9,265 observations between 1996 (the first year of the options
data) and 2004 (the last year of the patent data). For reasons explained in the main
article, our final sample consists of firms with positive options volume that are active
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in five broadly defined R&D-intensive industries: (i) pharmaceuticals (SIC code 283),
(ii) industrial and commercial machinery and computer equipment (35), (iii) electronics
and communications (36), (iv) transportation equipment (37), and (v) instruments and
related products (38). This leaves us with 3,271 observations on 548 firms which is our
baseline sample.
A.2 Robustness tests for the baseline results
We conduct a rich set of robustness tests for our baseline results and report them in Tables
A.1 – A.11. First, we check whether our results are robust to alternative econometric
models. We start with a Poisson model when the dependent variable is the number of
cite-weighted patents and the number of (unweighed) patents and report the results in
Table A.1. As shown, the coefficients on Ln(Optvol) remain positive and significant across
all columns, consistent with our baseline findings. For example, the coefficient estimate
on Ln(Optvol) is 0.143 (p-value < 0.01) if we reproduce our baseline fixed effects model
of cite-weighted patents (column 4 of Table 1.2 in the main article) and is 0.106 (p-value
< 0.05) when we use simple patent counts as dependent variable. Next, because our
dependent variables are right skewed (e.g., 24% of our sample firms have a zero number
of citations), we use three modelling strategies that take this into account. We report the
results in Table A.2. In columns 1 and 2, we adopt a quantile regression approach at the
75th percentile. The baseline results continue to hold and we obtain similar findings if
we run the quantile regressions at the 70th, 80th, 85th and the 95th percentiles. We then
use zero-inflated negative binomial (columns 3 and 4) and zero-inflated Poisson models
(columns 5 and 6). We also find consistent results.
Second, because our main analysis uses contemporaneous independent variables, we
run alternative specifications where we lag the variables. As a first step, our approach
has been to explore empirically the effects of time lags between options trading and
the dependent variables. Estimating models with various time lags (i.e., from t − 1 to
t− 5) for the options trading variable, we found broadly consistent results for all models,
but with coefficients on Ln(Optvol) that were consistently larger compared to the ones
obtained from the contemporaneous models. We present the results of models with one-
and three-year lagged explanatory variables, since adding further lags reduce the number
of observations for firms in the dataset, without providing any appreciable gain in the
precision of the estimates. The coefficients on Ln(Optvol) are shown in panels A (one-
year lag) and B (three-year lag) of Table A.3, and are positive in all regressions. For
example, the coefficients in column 1 suggest that increasing options trading activity from
the sample median ($8.5 million) to the 75th percentile ($53.5 million) is associated with
a 98% increase in future cite-weighted patents in the following year and a 67% increase
in three years, all significant at the 1% level.
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Third, we examine if the effect of options volume on innovation is monotonic (i.e.,
after conditioning on covariates). In Table A.4, we begin with the inclusion of Ln(Optvol)
and its squared term. We find that the impact of Ln(Optvol) on cite-weighted patents
is still positive and significant (coefficient = 0.105 and p-value < 0.1 in column 1 of
Table A.4), but the coefficient estimate on the squared term, Ln(Optvol) x Ln(Optvol),
is not significant. Next, we create a dummy variable, High Optvol, that equals one if the
options volume for a given firm is above the median in that year and zero otherwise, and
interact this dummy with Ln(Optvol). We then re-estimate Eq. (1) in the main article
by adding the High Optvol dummy and the interaction term, Ln(Optvol) x High Optvol.
However, as shown in columns 2, 4 and 6, the coefficient estimates on the interaction
terms are not statistically significant, while the coefficients on Ln(Optvol) remain positive
and highly significant. In un-tabulated analyses, we obtain similar results if we replace
the dependent variable with unweighed patent counts. Overall, and consistent with the
bivariate relationship in Figure 1.1 in the main article, it appears that the effect of options
trading activity on innovation is monotonic.
Fourth, our preferred control for R&D inputs is a continuous measure of the depre-
ciated sum of past R&D expenditures. Although widely used in prior studies, it may
partly conceal some of the effects of R&D. To mitigate such concerns, we include just
the contemporaneous R&D flow and establish dummy variables based on deciles of the
distribution of R&D stock. We report the results in Tables A.5 and A.6, respectively. In
both cases, the coefficients on options volume continue to be positive and significant. For
example, according to columns 1 and 2 of Table A.5, an increase in options volume from
the sample median ($8.5 million) to the 75th percentile ($53.5 million) is associated with
a 74% increase in citations and a 74% increase in the number of patents filed.
Fifth, given that our sample period (1996 – 2004) includes the “dot-com bubble” which
is conventionally dated between 1996 and 2000 (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003), we rerun
our regressions for the two sub-periods 1996 – 2000 and 2001 – 2004. As can be seen in
Table A.7, the coefficients on Ln(Optvol) are positive and significant (at the 1% level)
in both sub-periods, which provides reassurance that our results are not driven by high
coefficient magnitudes in the earlier or later period.
Finally, in Table A.8 we report the regression results after the inclusion of additional
(financial) control variables. In Table A.9 we report the regression results after controlling
for firms’ external knowledge acquisition activities. In Table A.10 we report the regression
results on the differential effect of options trading on innovation in R&D- and non-R&D-
intensive industries based on a matched sample. In Table A.11 we report the within-firm
regression results that compare changes in innovation before and after firms’ inclusion in
options markets. These findings are discussed in Section 1.4.2 of the main article.
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A.3 Other tests
In this section, we show additional regression results that supplement other parts of the
paper. We discuss these results in the main text.
In Table A.12 we show the results from the two-stage least-squares regression (2SLS)
using the average open interest across all options on a stock throughout the calendar year
as alternative instrument.
In Table A.13 we show the regression results on the interaction between options volume
and managerial entrenchment using the “Entrenchment Index” (E-Index) (see Bebchuk,
Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009, for details).
In Table A.14 we show the regression results from examining the effect of firm inno-
vation (and options volume) on its market valuation (Tobin’s Q).
In Table A.15 we show the regression results from examining the effect of options
volume on innovation after controlling for all five economic mechanisms.
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Table A.1: Innovation and options volume – Poisson model
Dependent Var. CITES PATS
Method: Poisson (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln(Optvol) 0.230∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗ 0.106∗∗
(0.062) (0.034) (0.067) (0.035) (0.051) (0.042) (0.053) (0.044)
InstOwn -0.040 -0.088 -0.055 -0.102 -0.189 -0.083 -0.090 -0.054
(0.240) (0.221) (0.219) (0.215) (0.237) (0.235) (0.223) (0.222)
Ln(K/L) 0.634∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗ 0.676∗∗∗ 0.555∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗ 0.371∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗
(0.232) (0.164) (0.252) (0.170) (0.186) (0.165) (0.195) (0.165)
Ln(Sales) 0.531∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.219∗ 0.128∗ 0.610∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗ 0.148∗∗
(0.091) (0.067) (0.117) (0.076) (0.070) (0.065) (0.095) (0.069)
Ln(Age) -0.042 -0.261∗∗ -0.175∗ -0.330∗∗∗ -0.014 -0.255∗∗ -0.191∗∗ -0.352∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.112) (0.102) (0.099) (0.086) (0.109) (0.086) (0.093)
Ln(R&D stock) 0.349∗∗ 0.165∗ 0.469∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.090) (0.109) (0.091)
Firm fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 3271 3271 3271 3271 3271 3271 3271 3271
Notes: This table presents estimates of Poisson panel regressions of firms’ patents weighted by
the number of forward citations (CITES ) and firms’ unweighted patent counts (PATS ) on options
volume (Optvol) and other firm-level control variables. Firms in all columns: 548. Robust standard
errors are clustered by firm (in parentheses). All regressions control for a full set of four-digit
industry dummies and time dummies. The time period is 1996 – 2004 (with citations up to 2006);
fixed effects are based on including pre-sample means of the dependent variable as proposed by
Blundell, Griffith, and van Reenen (1999). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.2: Innovation and options volume – Other (alternative) specifications
Method Quantile regression Zero-inflated NB Zero-inflated Poisson
Dependent Var. Ln(1+CITES) Ln(1+PATS) CITES PATS CITES PATS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(Optvol) 0.105∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗
(0.016) (0.013) (0.028) (0.024) (0.040) (0.049)
InstOwn -0.034 -0.153∗ 0.046 0.102 -0.088 0.004
(0.128) (0.088) (0.164) (0.175) (0.211) (0.218)
Ln(K/L) 0.021 0.032 0.167∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.036) (0.070) (0.060) (0.168) (0.163)
Ln(Sales) 0.123∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.114 0.137∗∗
(0.025) (0.021) (0.038) (0.043) (0.074) (0.068)
Ln(Age) -0.167∗∗∗ -0.082∗ -0.215∗∗ -0.235∗∗∗ -0.318∗∗∗ -0.356∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.044) (0.087) (0.076) (0.097) (0.092)
Ln(R&D stock) 0.315∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.163∗ 0.276∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.025) (0.039) (0.044) (0.088) (0.089)
Observations 3271 3271 3271 3271 3271 3271
Notes: This table presents estimates of quantile (at the 75th percentile), zero-inflated
NB and zero-inflated Poisson panel regressions of firms’ patents weighted by the number
of forward citations (CITES ) and firms’ unweighted patent counts (PATS ) on options
volume (Optvol) and other firm-level control variables. Firms in all columns: 548.
Robust standard errors in columns 1 and 2 are obtained from 200 bootstrap replications.
All regressions control for a full set of four-digit industry dummies, time dummies, and
fixed effects by including pre-sample means of the dependent variable as proposed by
Blundell, Griffith, and van Reenen (1999). The time period is 1996 – 2004 (with citations
up to 2006); ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.3: Innovation and options volume – Lagged explanatory variables
Method OLS NB Poisson
Dependent Var. Ln(1+CITES) Ln(1+PATS) CITES PATS CITES PATS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: One-year lag
Ln(Optvol) 0.185∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗
(0.033) (0.028) (0.033) (0.027) (0.047) (0.056)
InstOwn -0.108 -0.215 0.002 0.025 -0.103 -0.024
(0.182) (0.162) (0.202) (0.172) (0.215) (0.204)
Ln(K/L) 0.023 0.042 0.078 0.151∗∗ 0.610∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.050) (0.079) (0.067) (0.191) (0.170)
Ln(Sales) 0.123∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.147 0.170∗∗
(0.044) (0.036) (0.043) (0.040) (0.090) (0.072)
Ln(Age) -0.116 -0.059 -0.215∗∗ -0.258∗∗∗ -0.353∗∗∗ -0.385∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.077) (0.100) (0.082) (0.104) (0.091)
Ln(R&D stock) 0.255∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.146 0.242∗∗
(0.050) (0.046) (0.047) (0.045) (0.105) (0.101)
Observations 2658 2658 2658 2658 2658 2658
Panel B: Three-year lag
Ln(Optvol) 0.130∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗
(0.042) (0.039) (0.044) (0.033) (0.049) (0.061)
InstOwn -0.058 -0.194 0.142 0.027 -0.064 0.099
(0.222) (0.201) (0.243) (0.192) (0.265) (0.213)
Ln(K/L) 0.005 0.048 0.179∗∗ 0.143∗∗ 0.733∗∗∗ 0.578∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.062) (0.084) (0.070) (0.222) (0.174)
Ln(Sales) 0.159∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.153 0.205∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.042) (0.054) (0.042) (0.115) (0.076)
Ln(Age) -0.099 -0.105 -0.211∗ -0.294∗∗∗ -0.409∗∗∗ -0.452∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.091) (0.112) (0.083) (0.120) (0.092)
Ln(R&D stock) 0.215∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.118 0.182∗
(0.051) (0.051) (0.053) (0.048) (0.122) (0.105)
Observations 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687
Notes: This table presents estimates of OLS, NB and Poisson panel regressions of firms’
patents weighted by the number of forward citations (CITES ) and firms’ unweighted
patent counts (PATS ) on (lagged) options volume (Optvol) and other (lagged) firm-level
control variables. Firms in all columns: 526 in panel A and 399 in panel B. Robust
standard errors are clustered by firm (in parentheses). All regressions control for a
full set of four-digit industry dummies, time dummies, and fixed effects by including
pre-sample means of the dependent variable as proposed by Blundell, Griffith, and van
Reenen (1999). The time period is 1996 – 2004 (with citations up to 2006); ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.4: Innovation and options volume – Monotonic relationship?
Method OLS NB Poisson
Dependent Var. Ln(1+CITES) Ln(1+CITES) CITES CITES CITES CITES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(Optvol) 0.065 -0.012 -0.045
x High Optvol (0.069) (0.067) (0.072)
High Optvol -0.159 0.042 0.166
(0.269) (0.251) (0.259)
Ln(Optvol) 0.009 -0.003 -0.011
x Ln(Optvol) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Ln(Optvol) 0.105∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.044) (0.060) (0.046) (0.074) (0.059)
InstOwn -0.017 -0.024 0.066 0.068 -0.126 -0.103
(0.159) (0.159) (0.178) (0.178) (0.222) (0.222)
Ln(K/L) 0.025 0.024 0.107 0.106 0.540∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.052) (0.067) (0.067) (0.172) (0.172)
Ln(Sales) 0.127∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.140∗ 0.128∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.072) (0.075)
Ln(Age) -0.107 -0.106 -0.213∗∗ -0.213∗∗ -0.326∗∗∗ -0.328∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.084) (0.095) (0.095) (0.102) (0.102)
Ln(R&D stock) 0.253∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.159∗ 0.164∗
(0.046) (0.046) (0.042) (0.042) (0.085) (0.086)
Observations 3271 3271 3271 3271 3271 3271
Notes: This table presents estimates of OLS, NB and Poisson panel regressions of firms’
patents weighted by the number of forward citations (CITES ) on options volume (Optvol),
its squared term, a dummy variable for high options volume (High Optvol), its interaction
with options volume and other firm-level control variables. High Optvol equals one if the
options volume for a given firm is above the median in year t and zero otherwise. Firms
in all columns: 548. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm (in parentheses). All
regressions control for a full set of four-digit industry dummies, time dummies, and fixed
effects by including pre-sample means of the dependent variable as proposed by Blundell,
Griffith, and van Reenen (1999). The time period is 1996 – 2004 (with citations up to
2006); ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.5: Innovation and options volume – Contemporaneous R&D spending
Method OLS NB Poisson
Dependent Var. Ln(1+CITES) Ln(1+PATS) CITES PATS CITES PATS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(Optvol) 0.140∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.091∗
(0.030) (0.025) (0.029) (0.025) (0.043) (0.052)
InstOwn -0.041 -0.218 0.021 -0.032 -0.084 -0.039
(0.156) (0.137) (0.177) (0.147) (0.207) (0.214)
Ln(K/L) 0.026 0.042 0.099 0.141∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.044) (0.065) (0.058) (0.171) (0.164)
Ln(Sales) 0.100∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.078 0.094
(0.042) (0.034) (0.042) (0.039) (0.070) (0.064)
Ln(Age) -0.040 0.024 -0.144 -0.151∗∗ -0.298∗∗∗ -0.291∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.067) (0.093) (0.075) (0.109) (0.103)
Ln(1+XRD) 0.316∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.046) (0.048) (0.047) (0.093) (0.084)
Observations 3271 3271 3271 3271 3271 3271
Notes: This table presents estimates of OLS, NB and Poisson panel regressions of firms’
patents weighted by the number of forward citations (CITES ) and firms’ unweighted
patent counts (PATS ) on options volume (Optvol), contemporaneous R&D spendings
(XRD) and other firm-level control variables. Firms in all columns: 548. Robust
standard errors are clustered by firm (in parentheses). All regressions control for a
full set of four-digit industry dummies, time dummies, and fixed effects by including
pre-sample means of the dependent variable as proposed by Blundell, Griffith, and van
Reenen (1999). The time period is 1996 – 2004 (with citations up to 2006); ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.6: Innovation and options volume – R&D stock dummy variables
Method OLS NB Poisson
Dependent Var. Ln(1+CITES) Ln(1+PATS) CITES PATS CITES PATS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(Optvol) 0.163∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.024) (0.028) (0.024) (0.032) (0.043)
InstOwn -0.088 -0.188 0.073 -0.039 -0.271 -0.187
(0.166) (0.140) (0.176) (0.146) (0.217) (0.220)
Ln(K/L) 0.024 0.035 0.100 0.144∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗
(0.053) (0.043) (0.067) (0.058) (0.152) (0.156)
Ln(Sales) 0.105∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗ 0.095∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.144∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.033) (0.039) (0.037) (0.067) (0.062)
Ln(Age) -0.131 -0.067 -0.255∗∗∗ -0.244∗∗∗ -0.258∗∗∗ -0.296∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.067) (0.095) (0.075) (0.094) (0.096)
R&D stock, 10% Benchmark Benchmark Benchmark Benchmark Benchmark Benchmark
R&D stock, 20% 0.162 -0.096 0.119 -0.125 0.028 -0.259
(0.145) (0.090) (0.161) (0.132) (0.187) (0.220)
R&D stock, 30% 0.533∗∗∗ 0.174∗ 0.648∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗ 0.265 0.172
(0.145) (0.099) (0.160) (0.132) (0.191) (0.229)
R&D stock, 40% 0.648∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗ 0.578∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗ 0.207 0.323
(0.154) (0.113) (0.168) (0.137) (0.199) (0.237)
R&D stock, 50% 0.793∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.668∗∗∗ 0.621∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗ 0.567∗∗
(0.180) (0.134) (0.177) (0.160) (0.206) (0.255)
R&D stock, 60% 0.784∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.887∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗ 0.436∗ 0.638∗∗
(0.182) (0.140) (0.184) (0.160) (0.229) (0.260)
R&D stock, 70% 0.959∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗ 1.106∗∗∗ 0.998∗∗∗ 0.625∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗
(0.192) (0.155) (0.201) (0.170) (0.231) (0.265)
R&D stock, 80% 1.259∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗ 1.379∗∗∗ 1.135∗∗∗ 0.941∗∗∗ 1.065∗∗∗
(0.206) (0.175) (0.210) (0.185) (0.234) (0.275)
R&D stock, 90% 1.611∗∗∗ 1.285∗∗∗ 1.881∗∗∗ 1.610∗∗∗ 1.156∗∗∗ 1.438∗∗∗
(0.251) (0.225) (0.244) (0.219) (0.305) (0.312)
R&D stock, 100% 1.858∗∗∗ 1.613∗∗∗ 2.260∗∗∗ 1.975∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗ 1.523∗∗∗
(0.316) (0.302) (0.296) (0.284) (0.383) (0.376)
Observations 3271 3271 3271 3271 3271 3271
Notes: This table presents estimates of OLS, NB and Poisson panel regressions of firms’ patents
weighted by the number of forward citations (CITES ) and firms’ unweighted patent counts
(PATS ) on options volume (Optvol), R&D stock dummy variables based on deciles of its dis-
tribution and other firm-level control variables. Firms in all columns: 548. Robust standard
errors are clustered by firm (in parentheses). All regressions control for a full set of four-digit
industry dummies, time dummies, and fixed effects by including pre-sample means of the depen-
dent variable as proposed by Blundell, Griffith, and van Reenen (1999). The time period is 1996
– 2004 (with citations up to 2006); ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.7: Innovation and options volume – Internet bubble
Period “1996 – 2000” “2001 – 2004”
Method OLS NB Poisson OLS NB Poisson
Dependent Var. Ln(1+CITES) CITES CITES Ln(1+CITES) CITES CITES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(Optvol) 0.176∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗
(0.035) (0.031) (0.039) (0.037) (0.045) (0.070)
InstOwn 0.002 0.089 -0.131 -0.303 -0.018 0.179
(0.188) (0.170) (0.209) (0.185) (0.280) (0.443)
Ln(K/L) 0.026 0.086 0.533∗∗∗ 0.048 0.125 0.769∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.072) (0.170) (0.060) (0.098) (0.224)
Ln(Sales) 0.173∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.127 0.061 0.095 0.049
(0.049) (0.042) (0.078) (0.042) (0.065) (0.088)
Ln(Age) -0.256∗∗∗ -0.284∗∗∗ -0.334∗∗∗ 0.121 -0.026 -0.291∗
(0.096) (0.091) (0.097) (0.098) (0.137) (0.176)
Ln(R&D stock) 0.260∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.167∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗
(0.054) (0.040) (0.094) (0.049) (0.075) (0.101)
Observations 1906 1906 1906 1365 1365 1365
Notes: This table presents estimates of OLS, NB and Poisson panel regressions of
firms’ patents weighted by the number of forward citations (CITES ) on options volume
(Optvol) and other firm-level control variables for the two subperiods 1996 – 2000 (during
the “dot-com bubble”) and 2001 – 2004 (after the “dot-com bubble”). Firms in columns:
501 in columns 1 – 3 and 398 in columns 4 – 6. Robust standard errors are clustered by
firm (in parentheses). All regressions control for a full set of four-digit industry dummies,
time dummies, and fixed effects by including pre-sample means of the dependent variable
as proposed by Blundell, Griffith, and van Reenen (1999). The time period is 1996 –
2004 (with citations up to 2006); ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.8: Innovation and options volume – Additional (financial) controls
Method OLS NB Poisson
Dependent Var. Ln(1+CITES) Ln(1+PATS) CITES PATS CITES PATS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(Optvol) 0.110∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗
(0.022) (0.019) (0.023) (0.020) (0.044) (0.051)
InstOwn 0.005 -0.290 -0.184 -0.212 -0.340 -0.226
(0.242) (0.183) (0.299) (0.210) (0.298) (0.292)
Ln(K/L) -0.077 0.018 0.041 0.089 0.373∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.054) (0.096) (0.073) (0.128) (0.084)
Ln(Sales) 0.064 0.048 0.069 0.047 -0.177 0.045
(0.060) (0.045) (0.059) (0.053) (0.117) (0.088)
Ln(Age) -0.041 0.048 -0.097 -0.064 -0.285∗∗ -0.281∗∗
(0.113) (0.086) (0.122) (0.091) (0.131) (0.124)
Ln(R&D stock) 0.274∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.054) (0.061) (0.059) (0.118) (0.085)
Illiquidity -0.109∗ -0.136∗∗ -0.173∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗ -0.088 -0.032
(0.062) (0.052) (0.068) (0.055) (0.086) (0.067)
Leverage 0.548∗ 0.280 0.500 0.254 0.315 0.003
(0.296) (0.229) (0.338) (0.236) (0.402) (0.451)
Tobin’s Q -0.073 -0.047 -0.135 -0.085 -0.038 0.105
(0.082) (0.059) (0.085) (0.063) (0.111) (0.118)
ROA -0.553 -0.531∗∗ -0.871∗∗ -0.758∗∗∗ 0.716 -0.205
(0.373) (0.251) (0.361) (0.286) (0.449) (0.448)
Capex 1.613 0.087 -0.344 -0.402 0.564 1.196
(1.041) (0.758) (0.995) (0.801) (0.952) (1.188)
Ln(1+Analyst coverage) -0.003 0.044 0.029 0.050 0.070 0.039
(0.080) (0.064) (0.083) (0.064) (0.073) (0.058)
Observations 3271 3271 3271 3271 3271 3271
Notes: This table presents estimates of OLS, NB and Poisson panel regressions of firms’
patents weighted by the number of forward citations (CITES ) and firms’ unweighted patent
counts (PATS ) on options volume (Optvol) and other (additional) firm-level control variables.
Illiquidity is the natural logarithm of relative effective spread measured over firm i’s fiscal year
t, where relative effective spread is defined as the absolute value of the difference between the
execution price and the midpoint of the prevailing bid-ask quote divided by the midpoint of
the prevailing bid-ask quote; Leverage is the book value of debt (DLTT+DLC) divided by
the book value of assets (AT); Tobin’s Q is calculated as (market value of equity (PRCC F
× CSHO) plus book value of assets (AT) minus book value of equity (CEQ) minus balance
sheet deferred taxes (TXDB)) divided by book value of assets (AT); ROA is the operating
income before depreciation (OIDBP) divided by book value of assets (AT); Capex is defined
as capital expenditures (CAPX) scaled by book value of assets (AT); and Analyst coverage is
the arithmetic mean of the 12 monthly numbers of earnings forecasts for firm i extracted from
the I/B/E/S summary file. Firms in all columns: 548. Robust standard errors are clustered
by firm (in parentheses). All regressions control for a full set of four-digit industry dummies,
time dummies, and fixed effects by including pre-sample means of the dependent variable as
proposed by Blundell, Griffith, and van Reenen (1999). The time period is 1996 – 2004 (with
citations up to 2006); ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.9: Innovation and options volume – External knowledge acquisition
Control variable Collaboration frequency Collaboration intensity Acquisitions
Dependent Var. Ln(1+CITES) Ln(1+PATS) Ln(1+CITES) Ln(1+PATS) Ln(1+CITES) Ln(1+PATS)
Method: OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(Optvol) 0.107∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.024) (0.019) (0.024)
InstOwn -0.186 -0.252∗ -0.164 -0.224 -0.153 -0.211
(0.152) (0.139) (0.153) (0.141) (0.152) (0.139)
Ln(K/L) -0.012 0.040 -0.011 0.042 -0.014 0.040
(0.048) (0.043) (0.049) (0.044) (0.048) (0.044)
Ln(Sales) 0.129∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.033) (0.037) (0.034) (0.036) (0.033)
Ln(Age) -0.062 -0.032 -0.059 -0.032 -0.057 -0.027
(0.077) (0.069) (0.078) (0.069) (0.077) (0.069)
Ln(R&D stock) 0.250∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.043) (0.042) (0.044) (0.042) (0.043)
Collaboration freq. 0.106∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.032)
Collaboration int. -0.731∗ -0.923∗∗∗
(0.393) (0.303)
Acquisitions -0.570∗∗ -0.539∗∗
(0.290) (0.257)
Observations 1446 1446 3271 3271 3271 3271
Notes: This table presents estimates of OLS panel regressions of firms’ patents weighted by the number
of forward citations (CITES ) and firms’ unweighted patent counts (PATS ) on options volume (Optvol),
collaboration frequency, collaboration intensity, acquisitions and other firm-level control variables. Collab-
oration frequency is the natural logarithm of (one plus) the number of R&D alliances formed over the
previous five years (i.e., from t− 5 to t− 1); Collaboration intensity is the number of firms’ jointly owned
patents filed over the previous five years scaled by its total number of patents filed over the same period;
Acquisitions is the acquisition expenditure (ACQ) divided by the book value of assets (AT). Firms in
columns: 236 in columns 1 and 2; 548 in columns 3 – 8. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm (in
parentheses). All regressions control for a full set of four-digit industry dummies, time dummies, and fixed
effects by including pre-sample means of the dependent variable as proposed by Blundell, Griffith, and van
Reenen (1999). The time period is 1996 – 2004 (with citations up to 2006); ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Table A.10: Innovation and options volume – High- versus low-tech industries
Dependent Var. Ln(1+CITES) Ln(1+PATS)
Matched sample All All High-tech Low-tech All All High-tech Low-tech
Method: OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln(Optvol) 0.186∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗
x Dummy for high-tech (0.059) (0.056)
Ln(Optvol) 0.120∗∗∗ 0.004 0.144∗∗∗ 0.070 0.113∗∗∗ -0.007 0.147∗∗∗ 0.046
(0.039) (0.052) (0.049) (0.058) (0.034) (0.049) (0.040) (0.051)
Dummy for high-tech 1.219∗∗ 0.932∗ 0.543 0.243
(0.485) (0.510) (0.578) (0.605)
InstOwn -0.092 -0.053 -0.148 0.199 -0.164 -0.123 -0.287 0.208
(0.189) (0.188) (0.248) (0.252) (0.170) (0.170) (0.231) (0.216)
Ln(K/L) -0.068 -0.071 0.085 -0.252∗ -0.023 -0.025 0.090 -0.166
(0.098) (0.097) (0.134) (0.143) (0.079) (0.079) (0.111) (0.109)
Ln(Sales) 0.104∗ 0.091 0.180∗∗ -0.076 0.100∗ 0.086∗ 0.163∗∗ -0.031
(0.062) (0.062) (0.087) (0.081) (0.053) (0.052) (0.075) (0.065)
Ln(Age) -0.138 -0.150∗ -0.155 -0.156 -0.099 -0.111 -0.114 -0.119
(0.085) (0.084) (0.113) (0.118) (0.073) (0.072) (0.097) (0.102)
Ln(R&D stock) 0.167∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.050) (0.043) (0.028) (0.027) (0.041) (0.035)
Observations 2906 2906 1453 1453 2906 2906 1453 1453
Notes: This table presents estimates of OLS panel regressions on a matched sample of firms’ patents weighted by the number
of forward citations (CITES) and firms’ unweighted patent counts (PATS) on options volume (Optvol), a dummy variable that
equals one if a firm is operating in a high-tech industry (Dummy for high-tech), their interaction and other firm-level control
variables. Firms in the matched sample: 547. Firms in columns 3 and 7: 311. Firms in column 4 and 8: 236. Robust standard
errors are clustered by firm (in parentheses). The matched sample is constructed using nearest-neighbour matching with scores
given by a probit model in which the dependent variable is Dummy for high-tech. The propensity score is estimated using
the following firm characteristics: Ln(Optvol), InstOwn, Ln(K/L), Ln(Sales), Ln(Age), Ln(R&D stock), Illiquidity, Leverage,
Tobin’s Q, ROA, Capex, Ln(Analyst coverage) and fixed effects. All regressions control for a full set of four-digit industry
dummies, time dummies, and fixed effects by including pre-sample means of the dependent variable as proposed by Blundell,
Griffith, and van Reenen (1999). The time period is 1996 – 2004 (with citations up to 2006); ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Table A.11: Innovation and options volume –
Within-firm relationship
Dependent Var. Ln(1+CITES) Ln(1+PATS)
Method: OLS (1) (2) (3) (4)
Post 0.370∗∗ 0.277∗
(0.146) (0.118)
Inclusion year −3 0.240 0.008
(0.154) (0.080)
Inclusion year −2 0.207 0.084
(0.144) (0.075)
Inclusion year −1 0.313∗∗ 0.135
(0.142) (0.098)
Inclusion year 1 0.243∗ 0.116
(0.131) (0.078)
Inclusion year 2 0.568∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗
(0.148) (0.103)
Inclusion year 3 0.636∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.114)
Inclusion year 4 0.558∗∗∗ 0.526∗∗∗
(0.162) (0.124)
InstOwn -0.088 0.010 -0.159 -0.111
(0.257) (0.256) (0.245) (0.241)
Ln(K/L) -0.058 -0.061 -0.011 -0.014
(0.073) (0.074) (0.061) (0.062)
Ln(Sales) 0.196∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.053) (0.044) (0.045)
Ln(Age) -0.225∗∗ -0.225∗∗ -0.072 -0.070
(0.112) (0.112) (0.087) (0.087)
Ln(R&D stock) 0.211∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.044) (0.048) (0.048)
Observations 744 614 744 614
Notes: This table presents estimates of OLS panel regressions of
within-firm changes in firms’ patents weighted by the number of
forward citations (CITES) and firms’ unweighted patent counts
(PATS) before and after the option listing event. Post is a dummy
variable equal to unity to indicate the post-listing period; Inclusion
year # are dummy variables indicating the relative year around the
listing event (the omitted category is the year of the event). Firms in
columns: 93. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm (in paren-
theses). All regressions control for a full set of four-digit industry
dummies, time dummies, and fixed effects by including pre-sample
means of the dependent variable as proposed by Blundell, Griffith,
and van Reenen (1999). The time period is 1996 – 2004 (with cita-
tions up to 2006); ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.12: Innovation and options volume – Open
interest as instrumental variable
Method OLS 2SLS
(first stage) (second stage)
Dependent Var. Ln(Optvol) Ln(1+CITES) Ln(1+PATS)
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(Optvol) (instr.) 0.087∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.024)
InstOwn 1.185∗∗∗ -0.028 -0.218
(0.140) (0.156) (0.137)
Ln(K/L) -0.205∗∗∗ 0.015 0.039
(0.053) (0.053) (0.045)
Ln(Sales) 0.242∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.041) (0.033)
Ln(Age) -0.412∗∗∗ -0.121 -0.036
(0.065) (0.083) (0.068)
Ln(R&D stock) 0.056∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.046) (0.044)
Ln(Open int.) 1.207∗∗∗
(0.028)
Observations 3271 3271 3271
Notes: This table presents estimates of 2SLS panel regressions of firms’
patents weighted by the number of forward citations (CITES) and firms’
unweighted patent counts (PATS) on options volume (Optvol) and other
firm-level control variables, with the total open interest Ln(Open int.)
as instrumental variable. Firms in all columns: 548. Robust standard
errors are clustered by firm (in parentheses). All regressions control for a
full set of four-digit industry dummies, time dummies, and fixed effects
by including pre-sample means of the dependent variable as proposed
by Blundell, Griffith, and van Reenen (1999). The time period is 1996 –
2004 (with citations up to 2006). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.13: Innovation and options volume – Managerial
entrenchment (E-Index)
Dependent Var. Ln(1+CITES) Ln(1+PATS)
Method: OLS (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Optvol) -0.032∗∗ -0.031∗∗
x E-index (0.015) (0.013)
Ln(Optvol) 0.168∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028)
E-index -0.014 0.012 -0.016 0.009
(Entrenchment Index) (0.034) (0.034) (0.029) (0.029)
InstOwn -0.020 -0.048 -0.015 -0.041
(0.192) (0.193) (0.170) (0.170)
Ln(K/L) 0.106 0.107 0.075 0.076
(0.070) (0.069) (0.059) (0.058)
Ln(Sales) 0.108∗∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.047) (0.044) (0.044)
Ln(Age) -0.183∗∗ -0.173∗ -0.106 -0.098
(0.090) (0.090) (0.084) (0.084)
Ln(R&D stock) 0.126∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.024) (0.024)
Observations 921 921 921 921
Notes: This table presents estimates of OLS panel regressions of firms’
patents weighted by the number of forward citations (CITES) and firms’ un-
weighted patent counts (PATS), managerial entrenchment (E-Index), their
interaction and other firm-level control variables. Firms in columns: 331.
Robust standard errors are clustered by firm (in parentheses). All regres-
sions control for a full set of three-digit industry dummies, time dummies,
and fixed effects by including pre-sample means of the dependent variable
as proposed by Blundell, Griffith, and van Reenen (1999). The E-Index is
an average of 6 provisions in the firm’s charter (see Bebchuk, Cohen, and
Ferrell, 2009). The measure is based on data from RiskMetrics in 1998,
2000, 2002 and 2004. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.14: Tobin’s Q and innovation
Dependent Var.: Tobin’s Q
Method: OLS (1) (2)
Ln(1+CITES) 0.050∗
(0.026)
Ln(1+PATS) 0.059∗
(0.033)
One-year lagged Tobin’s Q 0.383∗∗∗ 0.383∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.049)
Ln(Optvol) 0.236∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.037)
InstOwn -0.052 -0.041
(0.202) (0.202)
Ln(K/L) 0.057 0.054
(0.106) (0.106)
Ln(Sales) -0.221∗∗∗ -0.225∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.071)
Ln(Age) -0.173 -0.175
(0.112) (0.111)
Ln(R&D stock) 0.030 0.028
(0.039) (0.039)
Leverage -1.625∗∗∗ -1.610∗∗∗
(0.297) (0.295)
ROA 1.823∗∗∗ 1.830∗∗∗
(0.641) (0.638)
Capex 0.598 0.634
(2.470) (2.476)
Observations 2658 2658
Notes: This table presents estimates of OLS re-
gressions of firms’ market value (Tobin’s Q) on
firms’ patents weighted by the number of for-
ward citations (CITES ) and firms’ unweighted
patent counts (PATS ), one-year lagged Tobin’s
Q, options volume (Optvol) and other firm-level
control variables. Firms in all columns: 526.
Robust standard errors are clustered by firm
(in parentheses). All regressions control for a
full set of four-digit industry dummies and time
dummies. The time period is 1996–2004 (with
citations up to 2006); ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.15: Innovation and options volume –
Controlling for possible mechanisms
Dependent Var. Ln(1+CITES) Ln(1+PATS)
Method: OLS (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Optvol) 0.216∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.042) (0.043)
Competition 8.454∗∗∗ 5.384∗∗∗
(1 − Lerner) (2.619) (1.764)
G-Index -0.033 -0.032
(Governance Index) (0.028) (0.025)
Ln(CEO age) -0.807∗∗ -0.605∗
(0.396) (0.325)
∆ ROAt−1 -0.162 -0.123
(0.406) (0.307)
Ln(CEO vega) 0.038 0.113∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.041)
Ln(CEO delta) 0.072 0.044
(0.055) (0.046)
InstOwn -0.072 -0.092 -0.139 -0.145
(0.293) (0.296) (0.259) (0.266)
Ln(K/L) 0.023 0.055 0.079 0.099
(0.102) (0.101) (0.084) (0.080)
Ln(Sales) 0.231∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.080) (0.072) (0.071)
Ln(Age) -0.147 -0.122 -0.102 -0.068
(0.154) (0.154) (0.142) (0.140)
Ln(R&D stock) 0.140∗∗ 0.142∗∗ 0.080 0.082
(0.062) (0.061) (0.059) (0.058)
Observations 1530 1530 1530 1530
Notes: This table presents estimates of OLS panel regressions of firms’
patents weighted by the number of forward citations (CITES) and firms’
unweighted patent counts (PATS) on product market competition (Com-
petition), managerial entrenchment (G-Index), CEO age, lagged change
in profitability (∆ ROAt−1), stock-based compensation (CEO vega and
CEO delta) and other firm-level control variables. Firms in columns: 285.
Robust standard errors are clustered by firm (in parentheses). All regres-
sions control for a full set of four-digit industry dummies, time dummies,
and fixed effects by including pre-sample means of the dependent variable
as proposed by Blundell, Griffith, and van Reenen (1999). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.16: Descriptive statistics – Robustness tests
Mean StdDev Min Median Max Observations Source
Co-patents/Patents[t−5,t−1] 0.03 0.09 0 0 1 2391 USPTO
Leverage 0.16 0.16 0 0.13 0.91 3271 Compustat
Tobin’s Q 2.97 2.75 0.40 2.13 39.12 3271 Compustat
Capex/Assets 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.53 3271 Compustat
Acquisition exp. (in $m) 85.1 458.3 -3557 0 8800.2 3271 Compustat
Average Open Interest 395.8 1056.3 0.03 92.4 13266.6 3271 OptionMetrics
Stock illiquidity -5.52 2.14 -11.66 -5.45 2.89 3271 TAQ
Analyst Coverage 8.4 7.9 0 6.08 45.6 3271 I/B/E/S
R&D Alliances[t−5,t−1] 3.7 15.2 0 0 270 1446 SDC Platinum
Entrenchment Index 2.1 1.1 0 2 5 921 RiskMetrics and
Bebchuk et al. (2009)
CEO tenure 7.3 7.9 0 5 53 1845 ExecuComp
CEO cash comp. (in $000s) 1340.4 1491.9 0 961.9 43511.5 1845 ExecuComp
Appendix B
Appendix for ”Modelling Electricity
Swaps with Stochastic Forward
Premium Models”
B.1 Spot Prices - One factor Model
We summarize the framework outlined in Lucia and Schwartz (2002). Spot electricity
prices Pt are characterized as
Pt = f(t) +Xt (B.1)
where f(t) is a deterministic function, and Xt, is a mean-reverting stochastic process with
constant volatility σ and, under the natural probability measure P follow:
dXt = −kXtdt+ σdZPt (B.2)
It can be shown (see Cartea and Figueroa (2005)) that under the risk-neutral proba-
bility measure Q it follows:
dXt = k(α
∗ −Xt)dt+ σdZQt (B.3)
where dZQt are increments of standard independent Brownian motions Z
∗
t , the mean re-
version parameters are k and X(0) = x0, where the drift terms are
α∗ =
−λσ
k
(B.4)
In this section we assume the Market Prices of Risk (MPR) of the electricity, which
are λ respectively, to be constant over time. Under the risk-neutral measure the spot
price Pt follows
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Pt = f(t) +X0 exp(−kt) + α∗(1− exp(−kt)) + σ
∫ t
0
exp(k(s− t))dZQ (B.5)
The distribution of Pt is Normal with mean given by:
EQ0 (Pt) = f(t) +X0 exp(−kt) + αQ(1− exp(−kt)) (B.6)
The value of any derivative security must be the expected value, under the risk-neutral
measure, of its payoffs discounted to the valuation date at the risk-free rate. Assuming
a constant risk-free rate r, the value at time zero of a forward contract on the spot price
maturing at time T must be
V T0 (PT ) = exp(−rT )E∗0 [PT − F0(P0, T )] (B.7)
where F0(P0, T ) is the forward price set at time zero and T is the time to maturity. Since
the value of a forward contract must be zero when it is first entered into, we obtain a
closed form expression for computing forward prices with maturity T as follows
F0(P0, T ) = E
∗
0(PT ) = f(T ) + (P0 − f(0)) exp(−kT ) + α∗(1− exp(−kT )) (B.8)
The variance of the forward prices are given by
V arT0 (PT ) =
σ2
2k
(1− exp(−2kT )) (B.9)
These results are for forward contracts providing electricity in a single point in time T .
Given that the swap contract provides delivery of electricity during a period of time (e.g.
during 31 days in January), we use (B.8) to generate prices during the full delivery period
(e.g. we generate thirty-one forward prices in the cases of monthly contracts maturing in
January and so on) , and we take the average. This average is the estimated swap price
provided by the spot price model.
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Table B.1: Estimation of the One Factor Model
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Coeff. s.e. t-stat 
NEG -79.86** 12.91 -6.18 
@WEEKDAY=1 46.25** 0.77 60.09 
@WEEKDAY=2 48.06** 0.64 75.30 
@WEEKDAY=3 48.14** 0.67 71.49 
@WEEKDAY=4 47.48** 0.66 71.76 
@WEEKDAY=5 46.22** 0.71 65.28 
@WEEKDAY=6 39.84** 0.60 65.99 
@WEEKDAY=7 33.60** 0.68 49.21 
𝟏 − ?̂? 0.77** 0.03 29.70 
?̂? 0.23** 0.025 8.79 
?̂? 5.86   
𝑹𝟐 58.7   
Notes: This table reports the results of regressions (B.1) and (B.2). The dependent variable is the
average daily EEX spot price (EEX - Phelix Base Hr.01-24 E/Mwh). Our database spans from February
2, 2009 to December, 31 2012. Explanatory variables include day of the week dummies as well as the
NEG variable which is a dummy variable taking into account negative electricity prices. It is equal to 1 if
the price is negative (4 Oct 2009, 26 Dec 2009, 25 Dec 2012 y 26 Dec 2012) and it is zero otherwise. We
estimate the coefficients by means of a regression robust to heteroskedasticity, and serial autocorrelation.
The results presented correspond to the estimated coefficient, standard errors and t-statistics. The symbol
* and ** denotes that the variable is significant at 5% and 1%, respectively.
Figure B.1: Parameter Stability
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Notes: The figure depicts the recursive estimation of the parameters (mean reversion k and volatility σ)
for the Spot Series 7 days EEX - Phelix Base Hr.01-24 E/Mwh. We use a 365-day rolling window. There
are 1066 estimates. The last window is: 2/01/12-31/12/12. Average values are k = 0.23 and σ = 5.86.
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Figure B.2: Swap Prices, Fitted Values and Errors in the Spot Model
Error M1 M1 Fitted and M1 
  
Error Q1 Q1 Fitted and Q1 
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Notes: Using the parameters estimated in Table B.1 we compute forward prices we obtain a closed form
expression for computing forward prices with maturity T using Equation (B.8). We then generate swap
theoretical prices (average of forward prices during the delivery period) using the previous equation for
all contracts (denoted M1 fitted, Q1 fitted and Y1 fitted). As an illustration we present the results for
M + 1, Q+ 1 and Y + 1 denoted M1, Q1 and Y1 (which are the most liquid contracts within each market
segment) and compare them against market prices during 2010. The results for the other contracts and
time periods are available on request.
B.2 HJM Model
We tested several different specifications for the HJM model. We present in this section
the one based on the three more liquid contracts within each segment because in this
case the model gives the best results . This model is a HJM-based multi-factor stochastic
process for electricity swap prices under the real-world probability measure,
dFi(t, T )
Fi(t, T )
=
N∑
k=1
αki(t, T ) + σki(t, T )dW
ki
t (B.10)
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Given that we work with the most liquid contract within each market segment we
propose specific parameterizations for the volatility functions in (B.10) as follows
dFi(t, T )
Fi(t, T )
= αi + σ1i(t, Ti)dW
1i
t (B.11)
σ1i(t, Ti) = exp(−ki(Ti − t)σ1i) (B.12)
where dW 1it , is an independent Brownian motion for all delivery periods, and σ1i(t, Ti)
are volatility functions. We decide to use the parameterization (B.11)-(B.12) for the
following reasons. The first question is how many factors are needed to realistically
model the evolution of the forward curve. Extant empirical evidence (see Clewlow and
Strickland (2000)) suggests that, in most cases, a minimum of two or three factors are
needed to model the dynamics of the forward curve . So we decided to start with the
most parsimonious representation, that is, one factor. Regarding the specific functions
to be used, Equation (B.12) was chosen because of its analytical tractability and at the
same time its ability in reflecting the well-known fact that short dated forward returns
are more volatile than long dated forwards.
To calibrate this model we proceed as follows: We compute returns for our 3 contracts
available in each case yearly contracts (Y1 to Y3), quarterly contracts (Q1 to Q3) and
monthly contracts (M1 to M3). The volatility functions are recovered by eigenvector
decomposition of the covariance matrix. The decomposition yields the set of independent
factors that drive the evolution of the variables underlying the covariance matrix Σ. We
decompose Σ into n (n=3) eigenvectors vi (size 3x1) and associated eigenvalues λi such
that Σ = RV R′ where the columns of R are the eigenvectors and the principal diagonal
in V contains the eigenvalues (other elements in V are zero). We only consider one
eigenvalue. The first volatility function is computed by fitting the Equation (B.12) to the
data v1
√
λ1.
The basic statistics of the return series are in Table B1. The average return in all
cases is not statistically different from zero suggesting overall null drift for the swaps,
and therefore we set αi = 0, ∀i. The estimated standard deviation is annualized by the
number of trading days (250) and varies from 13% for the contract Y3 to 32% for the
M1 contract. Volatility is usually higher for the closest to maturity contracts (Samuelson
effect), confirming the well-known fact that short dated forward returns tend to be more
volatile than long dated forwards. Figure B1 shows (sample period from 2004 to 2012) the
term structure of the volatility for each market segment. The distribution of the returns
has some skewness and deviates significantly from the normal distribution, as the very
high kurtosis figures on Table B.1 suggest.
The eigenvalues resulting from the eigenvector decomposition tell us the importance
of each eigenvector and hence the number of factors that we should include in our model.
Thus the first eigenvector is the most important, explaining 87%, 89% and 94% of the
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total variation in the evolution of the swap curve for the monthly, quarterly and yearly
contracts respectively.
Figure B.3 shows the first principal component function recovered from the above
procedure for each contract type. The first principal component acts to shift the forward
and also acts to tilt the swap curve. The most important factor (COMP1) is positive
for all maturities, but decreasing with maturity. This implies that a positive shock to
the system causes all prices to shift up but by decreasing amounts, depending on the
maturity. The longer the maturity the smaller the increase in prices is. The Table B.3
presents the parameter estimates from the volatility function obtained in the Principal
Component Analysis using equations for the entire sample 2004-2012.
Table B.3 presents in Panel A the LS estimates of the parameters from the volatility
functions obtained in CPA using equation σ1i(t, Ti) = exp(−ki(Ti − t))σ1i for the full
sample period 2004-2012. Panel A reports the in-sample root mean squared pricing errors
(RMSEs). Errors are computed daily based on the fitted swap prices based on estimated
parameters in Panel A. We compute the volatility function implied by the HJM model
and by the SFP model and compare the results against market prices. In the case of
the HJM model, root-mean squared errors (RMSEs) are 6.05%, 19.32%,and 11.96% for
monthly, quarterly and yearly contracts respectively. By contrast, the RMSEs for those
contracts are 0.10%, 0.12% and 0.30% respectively in the case of the SFP model. The
degree of fit of the SFP model is substantially higher than the HJM model. In the case of
the first volatility function parameter σ1i represents the overall volatility of the forward
curve whilst parameter ki tells us how fast the forward volatility curve decreases with
increasing maturity. The parameter σ1i recaptures the annualized volatility averaged over
all contracts of a given class. From Table B.1 it is easy to see that average volatility for
annual, quarterly and monthly returns is 17%, 19% and 32% respectively. These are very
close to estimated parameters σ1i in Table B.1 which are 19%, 19% and 38% respectively.
The reason of the proximity lies in the low values of the decay factor. Estimated values of
this parameter k (0.15, 0.03 and 0.20) suggest a fairly slow decrease in volatility as time to
maturity increases. Monthly prices present higher overall volatility and faster decrease in
volatility with maturity, followed by quarterly and yearly prices. However, monthly prices
present slower volatility attenuation than yearly prices. The degree of fit of the equation
is high in the case of yearly prices (99%), followed by monthly (99%) and quarterly prices
(83%). To check parameter stability we have repeated the calibration exercise using
different subsamples 2006-2010 and 2010-2012. A comparison of the parameters can be
observed in Figure B3, which shows the stability of the parameter estimates. Overall the
results suggest that parameters are reasonably stable over time.
It is fair to say that, although the model seems to fit the volatility term structure
to some extent, it is completely unable to recover the skewness and kurtosis observed in
the empirical distributions. By contrast, the SFP model not only fits better the markets
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volatility term structure, but is also able to take into account the skew and kurtosis.
Table B.2: Descriptive Statistics of Returns
 
 M1 M2 M3 Q1 Q2 Q3 Y1 Y2 Y3 
 Mean -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Median -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Maximum 0.163 0.149 0.126 0.109 0.099 0.099 0.088 0.070 0.073 
 Minimum -0.146 -0.163 -0.239 -0.062 -0.161 -0.074 -0.071 -0.063 -0.064 
 Std. Dev. 0.329 0.269 0.239 0.193 0.191 0.182 0.174 0.150 0.131 
 Skewness 0.175 -0.160 -1.837 0.326 -0.905 0.136 0.008 0.163 0.516 
 Kurtosis 9.999 14.152 37.444 9.801 24.640 10.586 9.424 10.023 14.248 
 p-val 0.080 0.133 0.195 0.511 0.985 0.984 0.962 0.595 0.998 
 
 

Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics of returns (1-day changes in the natural logs of swap
prices) and the sample covariance matrix of these returns. We study three contracts for each market
segment (yearly, quarterly and monthly), contracts M1 to M3, Q1 to Q3 and Y1 to Y3 from 6/1/2004 to
12/31/2012. The ”Std. Dev.” column reports the standard deviation of the series in annual terms. The
nine series are corrected of the rolling effect by means of intervention analysis. p-val is the p-value for
the test of zero mean.
Table B.3: Descriptive Statistics of Returns
 
 
 
Yearly 
 Contracts 
Quarterly 
Contracts 
Monthly 
Contracts 
Panel B: RMSEs 
HJM 6.05% 19.32% 11.96% 
SFP 0.10% 0.12% 0.30% 
Panel A: Volatility Function 
1 0.012 0.012 0.024 
 ( 37.34) ( 34.75) (67.90) 
K -0.154 -0.030 -0.201 
 (11.32) (2.23) (26.09) 
R2 0.992 0.834 0.998 

Notes: The table presents in Panel A the LS estimates of the parameters from the volatility functions
obtained in CPA using equation σ1i(t, Ti) = exp(−ki(Ti − t))σ1i for the full sample period 2004-2012.
t-statistics are presented in parenthesis. Panel A reports in-sample root mean squared pricing errors for
HJM and SFP models. In the case of HJM, the errors are computed daily based on the fitted prices of
swap based on estimated parameters in Panel B.
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Figure B.3: Volatility Functions
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Notes: The Figure shows the first principal component functions recovered from the above procedure for
each contract type (M1, M2, M3; Q1, Q2, Q3 and Y1,Y2, Y3). Sample period 2004-2012.
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Figure B.4: Stability of the parameters by subsamples
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 S04012 S06010 S1012 
SIGMA_M 0.0242 0.0257 0.0169 
K_M -0.203 -0.181 -0.182 
 
   
SIGMA_Q 0.012 0.0134 0.0094 
K_Q -0.031 -0.021 -0.034 
 
   
SIGMA_Y 0.0126 0.0146 0.0093 
K_Y -0.157 -0.158 -0.112 
 
 
Notes: To check parameter stability we have repeated the calibration exercise using different subsamples
2006-2010 and 2010-2012. The plot presents a comparison of the parameters.
B.3 Value at Risk
In order to compare the performance of alternative models in comparison with the SFP
model, we compute Value-at-Risk (VaR) at different probability levels over a one-day
horizon. Given a portfolio P, a time T and a probability level Q, a loss L∗ is selected, at
which exists a probability Q that effective losses L, are at most L∗ in period T . The loss
L∗ is portfolios VaR. Formally,
Prob[L∗ > L] = Q (B.13)
and therefore V aRQ is a quintile of assets returns probability density function, which
defines the maximum expected loss with confidence level Q. In the following, and to
be consistent with the empirical evidence in our sample, we assume that the expected
one-day swap return is zero. A comparison of the VaR for standardized returns and
for different probability levels, Q is shown in Figure B.5, for the Normal distribution
and for the NIG distribution with different kurtosis parameter values. In the case of
relatively low significance levels (90% and 95%), the values of V aRNormalQ tend to be
higher (in absolute terms) than those of V aRNIGQ , so the latter measure will probably
underestimate risk. However, in the case of high significance levels (99% and beyond)
there is a very substantial difference between the two measures, because the V aRNormalQ
B.3. Value at Risk 118
strongly underestimates the risk in comparison with V aRNIGQ . The difference between the
two measures, for a given Q, is higher; the closer to the unity is the kurtosis parameter ξ.
For the computation of the 1-day VaR for each swap contract, we proceed as fol-
lows. We assume that the innovations in the spot model and in the HJM model are
normal. However, and given the limited success of the spot price model in our sample,
we employ errors from the HJM model for the VaR calculations. Therefore, we compute
V aRNormalQ (i, T ) as follows
V aRNormalQ (i, T ) = k(σi,T
√
∆t) (B.14)
where the factor k depends on Q as presented in Figure 3.4 and σi,T is the volatility
of the innovations of the forward prices generated by means of the HJM model.
To compute the VaR in the case of the SFP model, we consider that each swap can be
thought as a portfolio containing two stochastic factors and therefore its VaR should be
computed using the standard VaR formula for a portfolio (Jorion, 2007). Using Equation
(3.1), we define the VaR for the swap in market segment i and maturity T as follows
V aRNIGQ [Fi(t, T )] =
√
V aRQ[F i(t)]2 + V aRQ[γi(t, T )]2 + 2Cov(F i(t), γi(t, T )) (B.15)
We compute the cumulative distributions functions for the NIG processes driving F i(t)
and γi(t, T )) by means of numerical simulation. We compute the VaR for each component
as follows
V aRQ[F i(t)] = kξ,χ(θF i
√
∆t) (B.16)
V aRQ[γi(t, T )] = kξ,χ(θγi(t,T )
√
∆t) (B.17)
where the factor kξ,χ depends on Q and on the skewness and kurtosis parameters. The
volatilities are the residual standard errors obtained from Equation (3.12) and reported in
Table 3.5. We obtain the covariance term from matrix (see Table 3.6) and it is computed
as follows
Cov(F i(t), γi(t, T )) = θF i × θγi(T ) × ωF i,γi(T ) (B.18)
Next, we compare the Failure Ratios (FR) of these two alternative models in our
sample. We define FR as
FR =
N/T
c
where 1 − c is the confidence level, T is number of time periods (e.g. T = 100 days)
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and a failure appears when the realized loss (negative return) is larger than the VaR
forecast. If the model producing the VaR forecasts is right in assessing the risk, we expect
that FR = 1. On the other hand if the model tends to underestimate, (overestimate)
risk, then FR > 1 (FR < 1). To formally test the statistical difference from 1 of
the estimated FR , we use a variation of Kupiec (1995) test, suggested by Campbell
(2006). Under the assumption that the VaR under consideration is accurate, the z-
statistic has an approximate standard normal distribution and has a known exact finite
sample distribution. The z statistic is actually the Wald variant of the likelihood ratio
statistic proposed by Kupiec (1995). One potential advantage of the Wald test over the
likelihood ratio test is that it is well-dened in the case that no VaR violations occur.
Kupiecs test is not dened in this case. Moreover, the possibility that no violations occur
in a relatively short period, is not trivial. The z-statistic is
Z =
√
T
(
N
T
− c
)
√
c(1− c) (B.19)
A positive (negative) z statistic indicates that the model tends underestimate (over-
estimate) risk. We present the results in Table 3.9. It may be seen that V aRNormalQ ,
calculated under the assumption of normality tends to understate risk, and this under-
statement is very strong for high confidence levels (99.5% and 99.99%) suggesting that tail
risk is severely underestimated. On the other hand V aRNIGQ tends to mildly overestimate
risk at relatively low significance levels but it is able to properly account for extreme tail
risk. It is worth noting that the overestimation of risk provided by the NIG distribution
is proportionally much lower than the underestimation of risk produced by the normal
distribution.
One important practical implication of our results is as follows. We know that VaR
models allow users to control risk and decide how to allocate limited resources. Financial
intermediaries impose a capital charge to traders based on risk-adjusted capital. This
creates a natural incentive for traders to take a position only when they have strong views
on markets. If they have no views, they should abstain from trading. Our results suggest
that the risk adjusted capital for traders using EEX swap electricity contracts should
be adjusted upwards in comparison with the standard practice based on the normality
assumption. Traders should also rationally adjust positions as risk changes (in the face
of an increasingly volatile environment a sensible response is to scale down positions).
Furthermore and given that VaR is also a performance evaluation tool, the evaluators of
the performance of the traders should adjust their measures accordingly.
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Figure B.5: Critical values
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